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1.
SUMMARY
My thesis is' about planning the optimum allocation of resources in
the medium term. It views the problem at the level in the organisation
at which there are quantifiable interactions between the demands for and
supplies of resources which ought to be resolved simultaneously. The
research was empirical, my thesis is descriptive and normative.
I suggest a new conceptual approach to the planning of resource
allocation which both fills a gap in the literature on Ihowl to plan and
provides one solution to some basic problems in the current practice of
planning. The basic problems were of concept and execution.
Of concept because the planning process did not recognise that
operational data may be inappropriate for tactical planning, that resources
cannot be allocated rationally by consolidating and pruning functional plans
and finally that many demands for and suppl ies of resources must be consi dered
simultaneous ly.
Of execution because the method of processing the data was inadequate
for the task, in that the technique was trial and error, the criterion was
not financial and the means was manual.
In consequence, the plans from the old planning system were unachievable,
inconsistent and non-optimal. Moreover, those responsible for the performance
of the company had no effective control over the allocation of resources.
Besides a new conceptual approach, I suggest the use of a corporate
optimal resource allocation model, discuss its construction and illustrate
its use.
The empirical study concerned an engineering company in the medium
to light category. The normative aspect maintains that the approach is valid
at least for companies with a similar technology and perhaps to other
industries which satisfy certain conditions. These technologies and
conditions are defined in the main body of the dissertation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite all the attention corporate planning is receiving from
many directions, there is one aspect which has been conspicuously neglected,
namely, how a company should organise the process of allocating resources .
. This neglect is not immediately apparent from a keyword search
through 'the ~xist;ng literature based on the title of this dissertation.
In general, writings will be found to fall into one or two of three
•
categories: theory, application, practice. The distinction between the
last two is more blurred than the others. Applications usually refer to
c'~sses of problems such as trans-shipment, trav~lling salesman and blending.
~
In contrast, practi ce refers to a parti cular instance Ni thin a class.
Relevant literature comes from ~t least four areas of study:
finance, linear programming (L.P.), planning, production. Insofar as
these are subsets of wider areas,'a case could be made for expanding the
boundaries still further. But these four will do for the present.
In the attempt to apply existing theory to a practical situation,
I discovered that in all four areas the literature did not adequately cover
the ground. The deficienceswere evident not so much in each area on its
own, as in the ir joint application to resource allocation at Massey-Ferguson
(M-F). The man deficiencies related to applications of existing theory to
a class of problems of which planning at M-F is .one instance.
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The approach I developed took the form of an optimal resource
allocation model which had a number of interesting and perhaps novel features.
It was successfully demonstrated and accepted at two levels in the organisa-
tion. It was accepted by top management who wanted a "tool to help with the
broad policy issues arising in the agricultural and industrial machinery
business: product line, sourcing, capacity, etc.; and by line managers
responsible for developing tactical plans over a one or two year horizon.
I suggest that M-F is sufficiently typical of manufacturing
industry for the omissions in the literature to be of substance. The three
schematics of Exhibit 1 attempt to summarise the position outlined so far.
The dissertation is divided into two main sections: the body and
the appendices. The former ;s a resume of the most important descriptive
and normative aspects of the work. It summarises the previous work in
the area and isolates the unresolved problems which are the subject ef
this dissertation. It then presents the particular industrial situation
for which a model was developed and applied in practice. Finally, it
discusses the more general use of the approach and its limitations.
The appendices provide more detailed justification and evidence
than is given in the body of the dissertation. Each appendix has been
written, as far as possible, as a self-contained module, on the assumption
that the reader has not necessarily read any of the other appendices. The
penalty of this approach is a mild degree of repetition. The advantage
is the possibility of skipping large amounts of material which might be
redundant for a particular reader.
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Exhibit 1
L.P.
Existing ~-F
Appneations I------~~~l_::ulation
mulation
FINANCE
Finance
L.P.
Planning
Production
PRODUCTION
Theory Appl. Prac.
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Before reviewing the literature it might be helpful to mention
the main characteristics of the approach as they relate to each of the four
main 'areas of study referred to above.
Finance: the estimates for and results of capital budgeting
procedures are an integral part of other planning activities;
the medium for financial planning is not functional budgets,
in the first instance; in some cases cost accounting data for
direct variable costs overstate, in others, understate, the
marginal cost of production.
L.P.: the model concerns m products, n departments and is
dynamic; it includes the main demands for and supplies of
resources; nanpower , overtime and sales are all variables;
there are costs and 1imits on the rates of change of manpower;
the amount of overtime available is related to the number of
men on the regular payroll; both labour loading and machine
loading are included; the objective is maximisation; the
model is capable of analysing a wide range of policy issues.
Planning: it is difficult, if not impossible, to profit plan
for interdependent variables using a sequential and iterative
process; it is also difficult to profit plan when a majority
of the company's resources are pre-empted by the activities
of a function whose planning involves neither costs nor profits;
functional budgets are not an appropriate vehicle for achieving
initial consistency or eventual profitability.
8.
Production: the activities of production control influence
(a) costs, (b) profits, (c) assets, (d) inventories, (e) capital
expenditure plans; it is desirable that the planning concepts
and processes explicitly recognise the pivotal role of
production planning and its interdependence with other functions
such as marketing, etc.
With this framework in mind, section 2 reviews the literature.
9.
2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
This section reviews the contribution of four books in some
detail, other literature more briefly and finally isolates the gap
between the literature and a few of the practical issues at M-F of
planning resource allocation.
The four books were chosen because each author is welI-known
and represents a different approach to the topic. The motive iSl to show
how they were aware of the problems of corpor-ate planning which still
remained to be solved and to indicate the extent to which this project
is indebted to their earlier contributions.
The four authors are Solomon, Bower, Ackoff and Driebeek. To
summarise: in a limited way I share Mao'~ view that Solomon appears
confused about the nature of the resource allocation process, however,
Solomon does initially discuss the problem in general terms before con-
centrating on the specific issues of certain aspects of financial manage-
ment. Bower's book is a behavioural stu~, in the last chapter he points
out the need for an innovation to make possible the tasks he prescribes
for the 'integrators'. Ackoff specifically excludes the question of how
to plan, nevertheless, in the chapter on Resource Planning, his comments
do not represent an entirely accurate description of either the problems
or possible approaches. And finally, Driebeek, in chapter 14, has a
heading 'Total Corporate Model', but then describes a total corporate
- .'
production planning model.
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2.1. Ezra Solomon - The Theory of Financial Management
One view of corporate planning is that it is synonymous with
corporate financial planning. Or, if the author has a financial back-
ground, vice vers~. Ezra Solomon in his book 'The Theory of Financial
Management' probably epitomizes the latter approach.
However, he appears to be ambivalent about the scope of financial
planning. Perhaps it is not what financial management is to ach+eve ,
but how it is to achieve it, that causes the inconsistencies.
On the one hand he suggests: a centralised process for analysing
current operations and for making decisions about the acquisition, deploy-
ment and disposal of resources; a system for analysing all demands for
and supplies of resources and for matching them in an optimal fashion.
This gives the impression of nothing less than a corporate system
for the optimal allocation of resources.
On the other hand, he says that financial management should only
be concerned with decisions involving changes in the use of funds, with
the acquisition and destruction of assets.
This looks like the traditional narrow approach of capital budgeting.
Even his short paragraph on the distinction between profit
planning and financial management - the former is a function of lower,
the latter of top, management - does 'not resolve the conflict. The duties
of financial management at one point specifically include the allocation
11.
of resources to and the continuing analysis of current operations~ and
elsewhere exclude it.
I back his intuition against his reservations. The capital
budget should not be drawn up independently of plans for the other resources:
the development costs of a new project are manpower costs; the operation of
new plant requires direct labour; the resources absorbed by the future
operation of the current facilities making the existing products have a
decisive influence on both the financial implications and technical,
feasibility of new investment. And finally, apart from deriving mutually
dependent plans simultaneously, it should be possible to analyse
alternative courses of action and optimally match demands for and supplies
of resources.
There is substantial agreement on what should be achieved, the
problem is how to achieve it.
2.2. J. L. Bower - Managing the Resource Allocation Process
Bower's book sounds as if it covers the same ground as this
dissertation. In fact his work (a) is based on a decentralised company,
(b) is behaviourally oriented, and Cc) is only concerned with. new invest-
ment whi ch changes the future course of the company. Despite these
important differences in emphasis~ the present stuQy covers the systems
and procedural side of problems he discusses as a behaviouralist.
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Starting with the literature on capital budgeting, he says
that its recommendations, although theoretically correct for a class of
decisions, are in practice irrelevant because the class is extinct.
He develops a new conceptual framework for thinking about the
process of allocating resources, which he defines as new investment
decisions. The framework has three phases: corporate, integrating and
initiating; and four processes: definition, impetus, structural context
and measurement.
Bower says that the process of changing the product/market/
faci 1ities posture of a company consists of two parts, (a) rout; ne and
(b) critical. Routine change is the continual use of assets and generation
of profits which result from the activities of the ongoing business. He
ignores routine change.
For critical change he defines two components, (a) the business
planning process, and (b) the investment process. The forner corresponds
to strategic planning (choice of markets and product objectives) and
the latter to tactical planning (commitment of resources).
Critical change is achieved within the new framework of phases
and process.
His definition of the area of study precludes an analysis of the
important relationship between planning over different time horizons and
the initiation of investment projects. He suggests the picture of a
facility-oriented initiator perceiving a discrepancy which the reward and
punishment system motivates him to overcome.
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As a development of this valuable approach I would suggest firstly
that planning is not just a step down sequence from strategic to tactical.
Secondly, that current operations are an important component of planning
the allocation of resources. And thirdly, that medium term planning
(tactical) plays a distinctive role in the initiation of projects and
their subsequent analysis. The fact remains that strategic planning
often starts from an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
company, one component of which is identified when the pre$ent course of
Ithe company is extrapolated into the future, i.e. it starts from tactlcal
planning, which has as its base the current operations (Bower's excluded
routine change). Moreover, it is important, before committing resources
to new projects, to test out the tactical consequences of new projects
when combined with the future plans of current operations.
Bower mentions these problems, 'although expressing them in
different terms, when talking about the importance of the integrating
phase in the process of impetus. His integrator is sitting in-between
corporate staff and the initiator, transforming strategic measures into
financial ones, correcting and qualifying potentially mis'leading financial
summaries and selecting projects for submission to corporate.
Additionally, the integrator must make trade-offs between short-
run pressures for current performance and long-run pressures for future
earnings.
This ;s a very interesting role. The integrator second-quesses,
makes trade-offs and selects, in the knowledge that the appropriations
cotmlittee acts as a go/no go filter, and has never turned down a project.
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The important decisions are therefore made by the integrator, provided
he has done his political homework.
Having posed the problem so succinctly and having discussed the
demanding functi ons assi gned to the integrator, Bower has these concl uding
remarks to make on the subject:
'It waul d seem that the role of second source is too important
for the cited drawbacks to prevail. Rather they must be overcome
with managerial skills, perhaps with some yet-ta-be conceived
organizational innovation' •
.This dissertation is about one innovation which might help to
make possible the role of the integrator. Although n~ work concer~ed
a centralised manufacturing company, the integrator between a decentralised
division and head-office has much the same problem as a corporate planning
department in a centralised company.
Whereas Bower's work ably tackled the behavioural problems of
the resource allocation process, mine is concerned with developments in
procedures, concepts and techniques which make possible the implementation
of his prescription to certain types of industry.
2.3. R. L. Ackoff - A Concept of Corporate Planning
This book is of immediate interest, if for no other reason than
the coincidence of title, author and discipline. Despite a disclaimer
in the introduction that II have not produced a ha~dbook, a how to do it
book', there is a chapter on Resource Planning.
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He identifies four types of resource (a) money , (b) facilities
and equipment5 (c) materials5 supplies and services, and (d) personnel.
The first three receive very little attention because 'Currently
available techniques and knowledge enable us to plan reasonably well
for three of the four types of resource: personnel planning is the least
well developed'; the last receives the bulk of his attention.
Ackoff does discuss the first three briefly and in general terms.
In so doing, he makes some suggestions which would have been conspicuously
,inappropriate for M-F and fails to make others of crucial importance to
a viable system for resource planning.
In the first place, while advocating the use of a financial
model, he says the existing accounting system is suitable; if manual,
it should be computerised. This appears to assume that a system for
collecting data is necessarily suitable for predicting data.
Secondly, the planning of each of the resources is discussed
separately without any suggestion that they might be mutually dependent:
for instance that the financial plan contains summaries of materials and
manpower planning.
Perhaps these omissions are not so much oversights as issues
tangential to the main theme of the book. Nevertheless, it could be
argued that a slightly less sweeping generalisation about existing
techniques and knowledge might have led to a little more honesty about
the difficulties which still remained and some of the pitfalls awaiting
the unwary.
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The normative aspect of this dissertation takes a fresh look at
how resource planning can be accomplished - an application of existing
techniques, an extension of existing knowledge.
2.4. Driebeek - Applied Linear Programming
A book with such a title holds out considerable promise of having
a chapter on corporate planning - the allocation of scarce resources to
competing ends subject to specific constraints in such a way as'to maximise
the value of an objective.
One example cited by Driebeek is called a ITotal Corporate Model I.
The company was a multi-product, multi-plant manufacturer of container-s,
The purpose of the model was to computerise the production planning
operation, as the manual system was unab'leto cope. He describes a
linear programming formulation for cost-minimisation and production
smoothing.
Potentially Driebeek had a corporate resource allocation model,
but the chapter gives no hint that he appreciated the fact or how the
model would have to be adapted for this purpose. It was conceived in
terms of and used as a production planning model.
Under the heading of sensitivity, Driebeek does mention that
they managed to use the model to help decide on the location of a new
plant, but he does not suggest that he developed the basis for a total
resource allocation model capable of helping management decisions to
acquire, deploy and dispose of company resources.
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A total resource allocation model would probably have meant
a different fOl~mulation, but he was surely right in suggesting that the
heart of a corporate model of a manufacturing company consists of a model
of the manufacturing process.
His last paragraph confirms the bias in the conception, construction
and use of the model, 'The production planning personnel had cooperated
extensively ~nd they readily accepted the development of a total corporate
production planning model'.
2.5. The Gap Defined
Perhaps the simplest method of extending the discussion to define
more closely the facets of resource allocation in manufacturing not
adequately covered by the literature is to take each of the four areas
in turn.
2.5.1. Finance
As mentioned in section 1, there are three aspects of immediate
interest: capital budgeting, 'corporate financial planning and cost account-
ing.
Capital Budgeting. The three aspects of this wide subject
are: how are new projects initiated?, how are the cost
estimates developed?, how are the benefits measured? Bower
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criticises capital budgeting literature for being theoretically
correct and practically useless. In general, apart from
the usual comment in the literature that estimates should
be incremental, the emphasis is more on the techniques of
appraisal than the process of generating the proposals.
Quirinls book is an example of this approach. In chapter 2
he discusses project generation, evaluation and selection.
Of both types of capital expenditure decision he says lit is
probable that a large proportion of proposals originate in
a rather haphazard fashionl. This is fine as description,
but one expects some normative guidance. There is little
about the contribution that integrated planning could make
to the initiation of both types of expenditure proposal.
In chapter 4"Quirin talks about the correct estimates, but
omits to mention the problems of generating incremental
costs and benefits.
Res~arch Report 43 of the National Association of Accountants
does discuss the relationship between capital budgeting and
long-range and annual planning. While stressing the need
for integrated and comprehensive planning, there is little
about the problems of achieving it and how these might be
overcome, apart from advocating the project approach.
To give the last word to Bower: the problems are now with
selection and estimation, not evaluation.
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Corporate Financial Planning. Solomon is an able exponent
of this subject and the comments in the earlier part of
the present section do not need reiteration. There are two
additional points: firstly, financial planning is not well
done if it picks up the story after the estimates come to
head office, and secondly, budgets are a suitable express ion
of the financial implications of tactical plans, they are
neither a substitute for tactical plans, nor a good vehicle
for tactical planning.
Cost Accounting. The shortcomings here are nearer those of
concept than application. The point is easily made; present
developments in industrial relations, the power of the unions,
etc., make the assumptions behind the definition of direct
variable costs increasingly obsolete. Seldom is it true that
the direct variable cost of a product, as usually defined,
corresponds to its marginal cost. Moreover, the marginal
cost is as likely to be below direct variable cost as above
it. Neither Horngren, Shillinglaw nor Brown and Owler seem
to recognise this. For example, Shillinglaw suggests that
incremental costs.are direct variable costs plus certain
decision costs which can be attributed to a particular policy
decision.
The reason for marginal costs almost never corresponding to
direct variable costs (quite apart from the usual variances
between actual and standard costs) is that decisions about
20.
products and decisions about direct labour are not necessarily
linked in the manner assun~d by direct variable costs. The
direct labour required by a production programme is only in
part influenced by the direct labour content of the product.
Other influences are industrial relations policy on hiring
and firing, overtime, short-time, and so on. One method of
getting at incremental costs is to build a model containing
all these factors and evaluate the consequences from the
results. On one occasion marginal cost will be less than
direct variable cost, on another it will be greater by the
addition of premiums and the hiring costs of additional men.
2.5.2. Linear Programming
The class of problems referred to in the literature as production
smoothing was appropriate neither to the task of production control at M-F
nor the wider issue of the relationship between production control and
corporate planning.
The theory of L.P. and its extensions as developed by Dantzig
and explained by such author~ as Hillier & Lieberman and Gass was capable
of describing the situation at M-F with acceptable precision.
The literature on applications and practice appears to miss
several important characteristics of the problem.
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The characteristics of a job-shop are well described in an
article by Elmaghraby, but he goes on to develop an approach to scheduling
parts instead of products. In a book he discusses an L.P. formulation for
.production and inventory systems. It is a single product, single department
problem, and includes overtime working, costs and limits on changes
in capacity, as well as inventory. However, simply expanding the model
by the addition of more products and more departments would not be
appropriate for M-F for several reasons. First, he uses the separate
factory approach to capacity (x = hours of regular time production,
I
y = hours of overtime production); this works fOt" the simple case but not
for a more complex model. Secondly, he defined recursive, cumulative
relationships going through the model from the last period to the first,
which makes the model difficult to maintain. Thirdly, he does not
explicitly mention the problem of the capacity of existing facilities.
Neither Teichroew nor Hanssmann get as far as Elmaghraby.
Their formulations are more general and of less relevance.
Going on to a different aspect of the problem, Wagner mentions
the difficulty of obtaining relevant data but has no specific suggestions
about either cost or production data.
None of the authors on the subject mentioned the class of problems
in which all the following properties are of interest:
production smoothing is part of corporate planning and
resource allocation;
planned actual sales are variables;
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the objective is maximisation;
there are n products in j departments with different constants
for each product/department combination;
. overtime availability is linked to the number of men assigned
to the regular payroll (the latter is therefore a variable);
there are costs and limits on the rate of change of manpower;
labour loading and machine loading are included;
. separate tranches of capacity are not treated as separate
factories (Xij = amount of product i made in tranche j).
Apart from the first three and the last points, the others are
mentioned by a number of authors in different combinations. However. this
is an instance of the total problem being more complex than the sum of its
parts.
A complete description of the formulation is contained in
Appendix 4.
2.5.3. Planning
This subject has spawned a vast literature. Steiner's book
about the theory and practice of planning is probably one of the most
comprehensive. It covers every aspect from strategic planning to short-
term operational planning. While passing through tactical planning he
equates it with budgeting and emphasises the need for internally generated
data. especially accounting data. In the chapter on techniques he mentions
23.
L.P. On the whole, those parts of the book devoted to tactical planning
are better on describing the framework than the substance; although
even some parts of the framework seem a bit shaky. Many practical
problems appear to be inadequately discussed (perhaps this is unfair,
the book already has 800 pages):
consistency;
· 'genet'ating corporate plans from functianal budgets;
· profit planning by consolidating and reviewing functional
plans;
• profit planning when a significant proportion of company
resources are allocated as a'consequence of functional
plans which are neither cost-nor profit-oriented;
sequential and iterative planning processes;
trade-offs between interdependent variables;
· 'what if' Of policy formulation.
Perhaps the explanation is that it is easier to generalise about
the concepts of planning than the practice. But, on the other hand, even
his concepts of tactical planning do appear to gloss over some of the
practical difficulties.
Aloost all the books were better on strategy than tactt cs,
Another example is Argenti. In his five step practical guide, the last
step was tactical planning. The main suggestion was that the sole
responsibility for each part of the plan be given to one man, that he be
24.
given the specifications for the plan and be required to make progress
reports. This is perfectly reasonable advice, but one is left with the
feeling that thet'e is something more that a practical guide should say.
Ewing, in a book on practice, is primarily concerned with the
concept of practice.
Steiner & cannon again emphasise strategic plann lnq. Their
comments on tactical planning regard the latter as activities of sub-units
in the pursuit of strategic objectives. There is little dtscuss'ton of
the problems of generating tactical plans or of how to modify them if
they are not consistent with strategic goals.
Newman & Logan mention what information is needed for tactical
planning, and omit to suggest how it might be processed, and how the
results could be used. They also imply that the medium for tactical
planning is functional budgets.
To generalise, it could be said that the practice of tactical
planning fares badly in the literature. In part the concepts are inadequate
for the tasks, whi eh impl ies that the appl ications of the concepts probably
inherit the latters' deficiencies and may have a few of their own.
2.5.4. Production
In genel"al, production 1iterature views production control as an
activity separate from the other activities of the company. The objective
is to minimise costs or fluctuations in labour activity: the sales forecast
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is an exogenous variable: capital expenditure should be approved to
enable capacity to match sales, and so on.
Burbidge has a good introductory text on the subject, wi th an
excellent glossary of terms. In the chapter on production programming
he talks about planning boards, and the need for an optimum balance
bet\'1eenproduction and sales. There is no mention of how this balance
can be achieved, merely examples of the consequences of imbalance.
Integration of sales and production plans are to be achieved via budgetary
Icontrol. In an important paragraph he does say that decisions taken in
production control influence: capacity and output, costs, fixed assets,
stocks. There is no mention of profits, and elaboration takes one-and-
a-half pages. L.P. is mentioned in chapter 16.
Moore emphasises the importance of the link between production
and sales but says nothing about deriving and optimizing joint plans.
Bowman & Fetter discuss capacity allocation, production scheduling
and L.P. However, the objective is to establish general relevance rather
than to be exhaustive.
Magee has two chapters, 7 and 9, of slight relevance, but both
are too general to come to grips with practical complications.
Buffa's book of readings is divided into a discussion of general
problems and examples of applications. Neither covers the class of
problems of which either production control 'or corporate planning at M-F
is a subset.
26.
The lack of relevance of the existing literature on production
can be classified under two headings:
the failure to describe a model to fit the production
processes at M-F;
the failure to emphasise the role of production planning
and resource allocation, and the way this should modify
the concept and process of planning.
The expansion of these two corresponds to that under L.P. in
2.5.2., and so will not be repeated.
27.
3. THE CORPORATE PLANNING PROBLEM
Why does the 'how' of planning the allocation of resources
cause so many difficulties? This is the topic of the present section.
For a more detailed treatment the reader should turn to Appendices 1
and 2.
One of the answers, I believe, is a failure in diagnosis, in
that top management does not perceive the underlying causes which generate
a continual stream of diverse decision-making problems. These problems
have in common the need for reliable quantitative data about the likely
internal consequences of alternative courses of action.
Bower states the issues very well. On the one hand, any competent
executi ve can make the figures tell whatever story he wants. On the other
hand, top executives wish to control the future course of the company by
allocating resources to those projects which are most likely to further
the company's interests. Bower goes on to say that the result of most
planning/budgeting systems is to give top management information they are
least able to handle. Bower's solution is neither to change the role of
nor the information going to.top management, but instead to place an
integrator between top management and the divisions who second-guesses
financial summaries of projects, corrects misleading figures, examines
alternatives and ranks projects. Bower finishes his book with the question
'How is the integrator to perform this task?'.
28.
I think Bower has identified what I would call IThe Corporate
Planning Probleml•
Without going into all the details, the problem divides into two
parts. The first concerns errors, and the second omissions.
3.1. The Errors
In general, the errors are due to a faulty concept of tactical
1planning, incorrect data and.an inadequate method of processing the data.
The evidence that sonething is wrong with the current practice of planning
is the frequency with which consolidated functional plans are inconsistent,
unachievable, non-optimal and unacceptable.
Concept - many planning systems use a sequential process for
drawing up functional plans which are then sent to head office
for consolidation. The consequence of this process is that
costs and profits, instead of being a criterion of choice
between alternatives, are the results of decisions made on
non-financial criteria. In other words, the major decisions
affecting the allocation of resources are made without any
awareness of the financial consequences. The attempt to
improve the final profit figure, either by pruning the
consolidated plans or by recycling the planning process
with some fresh guidelines, does not go to the heart of
the problem. The point is that all interdependent demands
for and supplies of resources must be planned simultaneously,
29.
i.e. the financial plan is not unrelated to either the manpower
plan or facilities plan, as Ackoff would appear to have us
believe.
Data - the second difficulty with attempting to allocate
resources on the basis of plans submitted by the functions is
that not only do the functional plans reflect functional objectives
(and it is sometimes hard to discover how these have biased the
figures), but also functional data is often inappropriate for
corporate tactical planning. The reason for this is that
functional data tends to be operationally oriented; whereas
in the broader perspectives of tactical planninq , new trade-
offs are possible, different options exist: fOt'instance, the
.standard costs produced by the costing section at M-F are
based on assumptions which are not valid for tactical planning.
Appendix 7 gives details of errors in functional data.
. Processing - besides the need for the simultaneous assignment
of values to all interdependent decision variables; informed,
rational decision-making requires the capabilities of evaluating
the consequences ·of a variety of different policies and of
combining the demands for and supplies of resources in such
a way as to maximise profits. The requirement for simultaneous
assignment and evaluation of options rule out manual calculattons ,
and for maximisation rules out trial and errpr; only an optimisation
techn ique and a computer \\'i11 suffice.
30.
3.2. The Omissions
Apart from having reservations about the utility of the figures
produced by the usual planning system, for the reasons mentioned in 3.1.,
there are a number of desirable pieces of information which there is often
no attempt to provide:
• Sensitivity analysis - this is a well-known procedure for
exploring the consequences of specific changes in the value
Iof selected input variables. It is one method of allowing
for risk without constructing a stochastic model. To perform
this type of analysis it must be possible to run through the
planning cycle a number of times. Obviously, this is out of the
question with a manual system which takes 6-9 months to generate
a single set of plans.
. Vulnerability analysis - often confused with sensitivity
analysis, it is in fact different in two important respects.
In the first place, vulnerability analysis refers to the
systematic exploration of the consequences of changes in the
input costs and parameters and output activity values of all
decision variabl~s. Secondly, it does not require rerunning
the planning system with new input values, instead it is an
analytic procedure carried out after the optimal allocation
of resources has been determined. The effect of vulnerability
analysis is to automatically identify the variables having a
key influence on pr~fits.
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Profit improvement - not only should a planning system be
capable of evaluating the consequences of proposed action
programmes (new management action), but also it should be
capable of pinpointing those areas having the greatest
potential for profit improvement. It may be something easy
to remedy, such as a different finished machines inventory
policy; or it may be virtually impossible, for instance,
a restrictive practice by the trade unions. But even in
the latter case, management is aware of hav, much itlis
worth paying to buy-out the restrictive practice.
• Effects of uncertainty - one of the arguments frequent ly used
to discredit the use of advanced planning techniques is that
in the loodium term the error in the estimates of the basic
data entirely swamp any significance the results might other-
wise have had. This attitude would betray less prejudice
ifit were phrased as a question rather than as a conclusion,
e~g. is it possible for the planning system to identify the
error in each estimate which can be tolerated without the
basic allocation of resources being affected?
Before closing this·section of the dissertation it is worth
reiterating that the approach to planning which is initially focused either
on individual functional plans (marketing, production control, etc.),
or on individual resource planning (finance, nanpower , etc.) is inappropriate
when decision variables are interdependent.
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4. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The discussion of the previous three sections can be used as a
specification for a planning system. There are four main strands to the
solution of the corporate planning problem developed for the situation at
M-F. Each is necessary, and, by itself, none sufficient. The four
strands are: modified conceptual approach, the computer, linear pl'ogramming
and post-optimal procedures. The problems, and the contribution each
strand makes to their solution, are illustrated in Exhibit 2 and discussed
more fully in Appendix 3.
The fact that there are four strands to the solution and that each
is necessary is evidence, perhaps, that this study is more than just another
app1ication of L.P. If so, the reason is that the study was problem-
oriented instead of being either technique or solution-oriented.
4.1. The Revised Concept
It was necessary to revise the conceptual approach to planning
at M-F because the old was tncapab'le of accommodating the conflicting
requirements of human behaviour, the maximisation of sustainable growth
and the complexity of planning in a manufacturing company. The behaviour-
alists very reasonably assert that motivation, commitment and the reward
and punishment system all require that the individual manager be associated
with drawing up his own plans and setting his own goals. Those concerned
with profits and efficiency prescribe the centralisation of control over
ERRORS
OMISSIONS
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Exhibit 2
THE CORPOr~TE PLANNING PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS
PROBLEMS SOLUTIONS
Concept Computer L.P. Post-Opt.
acceptable X X
achievable X
consistent X X
optimal X X
profit impr. X
sensitivity X
uncertainty X
vulnerability X
what-cif X
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the resource allocation process because it is important to them that
the company's interests prevail over those of a function or individual.
Finally, a pragmatist, understandably wary of the pitfalls of management
information systems, would want assurance that centralisation, and
computerisation, would not involve the creation and maintenance of a
large data base and computer model, both of which would probably be
inflexible, expensive and rapidly obsolete.
A schematic of the revised conceptual approach is shown in
Exhibit 3 and described in more detail in Appendix 3. Briefly, the
more important features are:
corporate planners specify the unresolved policy issues
and the data (not plans) to be submitted by the functions;
the functions submit data for the planning base and for the
policy issues;
the operational data is corrected for tactical planning
purposes;
the cor.rected data is input to a corporate optimal
resource allocation model which contains as decision
variables all in~erdependent demands for and supplies
of resources~
the outstanding policy options (product line, manpower,
facilities, etc.) are tried out on the model and decisions
taken;
the decisions are embodied in planning guidelines, setting
out the pattern of resource allocati on and speci fying 1imits
Targets and
Guidelines
1
Submit Data
1
Correct Data
!
Run Model
1
Option Anal.
J
Policy
Decisions
1
Pattern of
Resource
Allocation
1
Submit
Detailed
Plans
1Consolidate
& Approve
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Exhibit 3
A NEH PLANNING CONCEPT
From Corporate to Functions
From Functions to Corporate
{
Corporate
Corporate
Corporate + Functions
Corporate + Functions
From Corporate to Functions
From Functions to Corporate
Corporate
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for the values of variables (e.g. decision costs) not
included in the model, and sent to the functions;
• the functions draw up their detailed plans within the
limits of the pattern of resource allocation established
by the corporate planning department and submit their
functional budgets;
• shoul d the final consolidated plans underperJorm the
targets (a function originally misjudged the impact of
a policy issue), the process is fast enough to permi~
recycling from the first stage, although it might not
be necessary to go back that far.
This scheme has a number of advantages:
• Both sales and production capacity are treated as variables,
whi ch of course is true in the medium term, but represents
an unusual L.P. formulation.
• The functions are represented at the stage when policy
decisions are made. In this way they are actively involved
in the debate about the rational allocation of resources.
• The final plans are more likely to be consistent, achievable
and optimal .
There are fewer surprises from the final consolidation of
the plans, i.e. they are more acceptable, as most problems
about the gap between the president's profit target and the
company's profit potential should have been largely resolved
at the fourth, fifth and sixth stages.
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. The usual farce or game, depending on one's view, associated
with the efforts of corporate planners to unearth hidden
profit potential is no longer so necessary.
4.2. The Computer
The computer is directly responsible for the solution of three
problems and is party to the contributions of L.P. and Post-Optimal
Analysis, although this is not shown on the diagram, insofar as'neither
of the latter two would be possible without it.
The problems to which it contributes most of the solutions are:
consistency, sensitivity and what-if. These need no explanation other
than the fact that the processing speed of modern computers is measured
in nanoseconds and that general purpose machines can handle large amounts
of input and output.
4.3. Linear Programming
This is a more contentious part Of the approach than either of
those already mentioned. There are people who prefer a manual planning
system to a computerised one, but many more who advocate simulation
instead of L.P. There are several factors to be weighed: the nature of
production technology, management's needs for planning information, its
ability to assimilate new techniques and adapt to change, and its attitude
to risk. The last point is important. The chances of not constructing
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a good L.P. are higher than of not building a good budget compiler.
The model developed for M-F went through a number of stages of
refinement, which stopped when its performance was acceptable to
management. The criterion was that there should be a useful improve-
ment over existing systems. Its formulation is described in Appendix
4, results in Appendix 5 and uSes in 6. Obviously, further development
is still possible, and this topic is taken up again in section 7 of the
body of the dissertation.
Of the possible approaches to optimisation, those of Bellman
and Holt et al, were not adopted for the usual reasons.
If the assumptions of L.P. can be met either directly or \'Iith
the help of a few mathematical tricks, there are some advantages of
using L.P. instead of simulation (budget compiler):
good L.P. codes exist for most computers, so that building
a model is a matter of formulating equations and collecting
data; with a simulation model the program would have to be
written as well;
an L.P. model is inherently more flexible than a simulation
model insofar as ·a change which involves reprogramming the
latter only requires new input data for the former;
• the decision rule implicit in the objective function of an
L.P. cannot be replicated in a simulation model without a·
prohibitive number of explicit decision rules and a large
amount of temporary storage of intermediate results;
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the development costs of an L.P. model should be smaller
than for a simulation model as there is no computer program
to write and debug;
similarly, the cost of maintenance and the vulnerability
from staff turnover is lower for an L.P. than for a
simulation model, provided the company is prepared to hire
staff of the requisite calibre.
From most viewpoints: development, maintenance and results,
l
depending on the company, an L.P. is preferable to a simulation model.
4.4. Post-Optimal Analysis
This is mentioned separately as not all L.P. codes have the
facilitiy for performing post-optimal analyses. After an optimal
solution has been obtained, a number of further questions may be asked
about the particular optimum, e.g. about the vulnerability. The two
procedures which provide the additional information are usually called
Ranging and Parametrics. Both procedures operate on the objective
function and the R.H.S. either separately or together. Ranging asks
the question, 'how .far can the value of each variable move in either
direction, while holding the value of all other variables constant.
before the optimal solution changes?'. An extension of this problem
would be to ask, 'what happens to the optimal solution when more than
one coefficient moves over a specified range of values?'. This is
parametric programming.
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S. THE SCOPE OF THE PLANNING MODEL
The purpose now is to define more closely the sector of the
planning spectrum for whf ch the model was developed, and to introduce
the company. Together these suggest the types of problems for which
the model can be used. The company is mentioned first.
Massey-Ferguson U.K. produces farm equip~ent (F.E.) - tractors,
combines, drills, etc. - and industrial construction machinery (Le.M.) -
j
tractors + diggers and loaders. It therefore comes under the heading
of manufacturing industry. There are three manufacturing plants! one
for tractors (Banner Lane, the largest tractor plant in the wor-ld}, the
second for farm equipment and industrial diggers and loaders (Barton Dock
Road - B.D.R.), the third for combines (Kilmarnock). The last two plants,
at times, make parts for each other and for the tractor plant. The
project was centred on B.D.R. with the intention of establ ishing the
viability of the revised approach to planning. The factory was run as
a .large job-shop; its basic production control and accounting data was
good and records went back at least five years.
B.D.R. produced about 9 main line machines (products) and had
8 or 9 productive departments. The uncertainty over the number of
products is caused by there being frequent changes to the product line
and to sourcing. While that over the number of departments
depends on how the assembly area and the machine shop are classified.
In manufacturing industry it is not unusual for the plants to account
for at least 70% of all resources: money, facilities, materials and
personnel.
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Top management~ unhappy with the response of the planning system
to their demands for information, thought it worthwhile to attempt to
improve the planning process. Initially the focus was on decision costs,
it then moved via production planning to resource allocation and tactical
planning. The objective was to integrate and, if possible, optimise the
joint plans of the different functions.
Exhibit 4 shows some of the components which can be used to
specify a planning system. Associated with each component are two or
three attributes which commonly describe more precisely the area of
interest. Thus, the planning horizon is typically divided into three
periods: the long term or strategic planning which concerns the nature
of the business, the markets and so forth; the medium term or tactical
planning is a statement of how the strategic object"ives are to be achieved,
the main decision variables are such things as product ion plans and manpo,...er,
the unit of time may be one month and the plan may look one, two or three
years ahead; finally, there is short term or operational planning covering
day to day affairs in the appropriate detail. One of the descriptions
of each component is boxed to indicate the particular sphere of interest
of the planning model which is the subject of this dissertation. In
contrast, the ringed descriptions show the characteristics of the planning
system to be improved.
5.1. Level
The primary focus is planning at the corporate level, where
variable but limited resources are allocated to competing uses after (a)
COl-lPONENT
level
behaviour
structure
horizon
philosophy
processing
techniques
sequence
Exhibit 4
DESCRIPTION OF PLANNING SYSTEM
function
satisficing
decentralised
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bottom-up
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\,
~
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I' \
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\ .I'....... _ - -_ ....
,.---- ....,
I sequential J
\ I
...~-_ .. - - .""
DESCRIPTION
division
adaptivising
,.---- ....I centralised J
.... _---/,.---- ....
[m:_dium 1
... - -,--_._,
Gi ~ture "7'1
..... - - -
I co~~puter -~
heuristic
[iimul taneous
42.
- _.- - .....
(maxin;isi:D
....... _. - - -
long
top-down
43.
exploring the trade-offs, (b) evaluating the consequences of alternative
courses of action, and (c) ensuring that wherever possible the interests
of the company can prevail over those of an individual function. This
act;vity by the corporate planning department establ ishes the pattern
of allocation of the company's resources. The pattern is embodied in
a policy document sent to each function, and is the franework within
which detailed functional plans and budgets are drawn up and sUbmitted.
5.2. Behaviour
Much has been written about the theory of the firm and I have
no wish to join the controversy. However, a planning model, if us~d,
will tend to alter the manner in whi ch behaviour is expressed in performance.
Implementation is made easier if extensive education or change is:not
require~ on the part of the executive for initial understanding and use
of the model. At first, while the new man/model interfaces are established,
it ought to be possible for the manager to continue with many of his
previous behaviour patterns: whether thi~ is the bargaining between
coalition members proposed by Cyert and March, or the process by which
the integrator decides which project should receive backing and impetus,
according to Bower. At M-F the model was accepted partly because no
.great change was required in the way management formulated ideas and
questions. Answers coming back from the model were catalysts to new
ideas.
The planning model I constructed accommodates management's
idiosyncrasies by permitting blo extreme modes of operation, as well as
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any variation in-between. The two modes correspond to two attitudes
towards the value of any particular decision variable. On the one hand
management may specify a particular policy towards an individual variable
or class of variables. An example might be that reductions in manpower
must be limited to natural wastage. Such a policy could result in a
particular variable being given a specific value or a range of possible
values. In both cases management has a definite view about the value or
values which can be assigned to the variable in question. On the other
hand, management is assumed to be indifferent to the values taken by
the remaining variables, apart from the preference that these should tend
to ~enerate more profit rather than less. It is this flexibility which
enables the model to initially accommodate and perhaps to subsequently
modify management behaviour. The model is properly described as a
maximisation model in that it assumes that where management is indifferent
to the value of a variable, the value assigned to it should be consistent
with higher profits (greater efficiency) rather than 10\'Ier.
5.3. Structure
The dissertation relates to planning at the level in an organisation
at which there are quantifiable interactions between the demands for and
supplies of resources. In a centralised, undiversified company this
corresponds to the activities of the corporate planning department. In
a decentralised, highly diversified company, this approach would have
more in common with the tasks of the divisional planner than the corporate
staff. At r~-Fthe most difficult and contentious problems often arose
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at the level in the organisation where the activities of one func~ion
(for instance) affected the actions of other functions, which in turn
caused the original function to modify its initial proposals. It was
this interdependence which made it imperative that (a) the values of the
interdependent variables be determined simultaneously, (b) corporate plans
should not be the result of consolidating and pruning functional plans,
and (c) that the company objective should override functional objectives.
Other companies in the same or different industries might well suffer
from the same problems. Bo'tler's descriptions of the resource allocation
process in three divisions of an American company, and his invention of
the integrator, confirm that M-F is not the only company to su+ter in
thi sway.
5.4. Horizon
Tactical planning is not only important because of the role it
plays in profit planning, it also has a significant contribution to make
to both operational and strategic planning.
In the former case it facilitates the replanning of the immediate
future for such decisions as the optimal sales mix, the manpower policy,
production scheduling. The replanning could be necessitated by the
occurence of unplanned operational events, e.g. a strike or shortage of
, a bought-in component.
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For the latter, the demands that strategic planning place on
the capability for tactical planning are to (a) evaluate the tactical
feasibility of strategic plans, for instance, a product line policy~ and
(b) to assist in the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
,organisation by providing information on the current position, rate of
change and direction of change, i.e. the need for extrapolation. Both
of these are illustrated in Appendix 6 on using the model.
5.5. Philosophy
The proponents of both bottom-up and top-down planning woul d
probably agree that some form of compromise is preferabIe to either
extreme. The debate is not so much about which should be used to the
exclusion of the other, as which should initiate the planning process.
MY own prescription is that (a) the functions submit data (not plans)
to the corporate planning department, (b) the latter determines the
optimal allocation of resources which is transmitted to the functions
as planning guidelines, and (c) the functions draw up their detailed
plans within this framework. This approach is designed to ensure that,
as far as possible, the final plans are consistent, achievable, optimal
and acceptable.
5.6. Processing
Corporate planners must choose a method of planning and a degree
of aggregation which permits them to process the figures, maintain the
data and evaluate the options in a manner consistent with the legitimate
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demands of top management for reliable, relevant, quantitative information.
Except for the smallest companies, these objectives can only be met if
the data base is maintained on and manipulated by a computer.
5.7. Techniques
Trial and error is not capable of providing the information
required for the rational allocation of resources. A heuristic method
is an improvement on trial and error but still falls short of the benefits
of an optimisation technique such as linear programming (L.P.). L.P.
has many advantages in its favour other than the mere discovery of the
optimum: namely, (a) sensitivity analysis, (b) vulnerability analysis,
(c) shadow or marginal pricing, and (d) parametric programming of either
the objective function or the right hand side. As I show later, in
Appendices 5 and 6, the benefits of a well constructed L.P. can far
outweigh those of either staying with a manual system or using a corpor-ate
simulation model.
5.B. Sequence
This has already been touched on, but the point is worth emphasising
if only for the reason that the practice of planning in the U.K. is still
predominantly at the sequential stage. Sequential planning is the process
by which plans go from marketing to production, on to costing, etc. Attempts
to improve the final profit by recycling are totally inadequate for two
reasons (a) the time taken to complete on cycle, and (b) the number of
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cycles necessary for management to get a feeling for the interactions
between the decision variables. One solution is for the simultaneous
assignment of values to all the interdependent decision variables.
5.9. The Existing Planning System
M-F uses a planning system called Integrated Planning and
Control (I.P.C.). Its aims are that:
· planning should occur in the same units, responsibility
groupings and expense categories as those in which they
are recorded and controlled;
· a manager should have a say in setting a budget
for which he will subsequently be held accountable;
· plans are consolidated and reviewed on their way to head
office~ but are not adjusted without the consent of the
manager ultimately responsible for each item;
• the tasks of corporate staff, during the planning process,
are to set goals, supply guidelines, give advice, consolidate,
review and resolve conflict;
• the final plan should be demanding and achievable;
• the plan may only be revised with approval from head office.
The strength of the system is that it is theoretically analogous
to a vine.growi.ng along a trellts , i.e. the plans evolve from the bottom
of the organisation within a framework laid down by the president and
his staff. Managers are intimately involved in generating the figures,
and they are controlled against their own estimates.
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The weaknesses become apparent when the plans are consolidated
and reviewed. Inevitably, adjustments have to be made; sometimes the
consolidated profit is so far short of the president's goal that nothing
less than a complete replan will do. To allow for this contingency, there
.is a preliminary plan around ~1arch and April and the final plan is submitted
towards the end of the fiscal year, September and October.
The mechanism by which these adjustments are made illustrates
management's reservations about the accuracy of the figures and the manner
in which they are derived.
If profits are too low; planned revenue can be increased by
management action to:
raise pri ces;
.increase sales volume;
make favourable changes in mix.
For costs, action is restricted to decision costs, and here the directive
may be to 'reduce travel expense by xX'.
If the proposed use of funds exceeds the sources, capital expenditure
is cut back by the deletion or postponement of projects.
Most of these adjustments have repercussions elsewhere in the
system. To take one example; cutting out a cost-saving investment could
well imply a new production programme to evaluate the consequences of
compensating changes in overtime and inventories.
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To the extent that neither the initial plans nor subsequent
revisions recognised the interconnectedness of variables, the planning
system could be said to be arbitrary.
M-F's experience illustrates some of the inherent weaknesses
of using functional budgets to generate corporate plans.
It was not the intention of the project to replace the I.P.C.
system. Rather, the purpose was to plan in an optimal manner the
I
resources associated with engineered costs (manpower, capacity, etc.),
to include some elements of decision costs, whi ch could be directly
related to the variables generating engineered costs (if the situation
were correctly modelled) and to provide management with reliable estimates
of these independent variables on which to base their estimation of the
remaining decision costs.
The importance of achieving these limited aims can be illustrated
by some figures from the 1970 Annual Report:
cost of goods sold represented 77% of all costs;
cumulative investment in productive capacity was 70%
of fixed assets~{tooling is expensed);
finished machines inventory was 28% of current assets;
investment in future capacity accounted for nearly
50% of the use of funds.
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6. ACCEPTANCE
The acceptance of the model was primarily due to three factors:
the inability of the existing planning system to produce
reliable figures either for the annual plans or for one-
off ana lyses;
the ability of the model to improve the performance in both
these areas;
the trivial running costs of the model of B.D.R.
The first has already been mentioned in several of the sections
and is taken up again in Appendices 1 and 2. The other two are the
subject of the present section and are covered more fully in Appendices
5 and 6. The section ends with a brief account of the course of the
project from initiation to acceptance.
6.1. Results and Uses
Exhibit 5 illustrates the computer output for top management.
This is a summary of the pla~s for a number of variables. It is explained
in Appendix 5. The detailed plans went to line managers responsible for
production planning, manpower, inventories and so on. The reports for
line managers are not illustrated. Instead, examples of the output
data from which they are derived has been included in Appendix 5.
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The existing planning system was unable to match either the
quality (optimum) or the accuracy of the report. Insofar as it could
produce comparable informations gestation lasted from three to six months.
In contrast, the time requi red to collect the information,
build the data deck and produce the results from the model was one week.
The computer time involved was about half-an-hour.
To demonstrate its ..usefulness, the following situations were
analysed, and the results presented to ~1-F management:
. monthly revisions to the production programme caused by
new sales forecasts (previously these took over one month);
the physical consequences and financial penalties of the
policy for finished machines inventory (this had. never
been done before);
the optimal plan for stopping production of an existing
product in February with sufficient units in inventory to
cover sales for the rest of the year;
the impact on the assembly area of introducing a new product
(was there sufficient capacity? etc.).,
Apart from these uses, other potential applications are such
things as:
Marketing - assess the relevant size, timing and nature of
promotional schemes for individual products
- determine the profitability of existing and the
desirability of new product line policies.
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Personne 1 - identi fy future manpower needs
- isolate the impact the cost of recruiting and
the delay in training has on production plans and profits.
Facilities - give advance warning of the need to change the
investment in either general purpose or special purpose
equipment
- estimate the cost savings to be expected from
'such investments.
Production Control - analyse the consequences of changes in
productivity
.- the same for increases in the mobility
of labour.
Finance - make it possible for financial constraints to be
built into the drawing up of plans rather than being tacked
on to the end
- quanti fy the resul ts of chances in the method of
paying direct labour.
Purchasing - evaluate the merits of single or multiple
sources of supply
- determine the consequences of suppl iers fail ing
to meet delivery dates.
Managinq Director - supply quick and reliable data to
assist in deciding many policy issues
- identify the main areas for profit
improvement
. - iso 1ate the major threats to the
achievement of targets.
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These give some idea of the areas in which the model has a
contribution to make. Appendix 6 gives results for a few specific cases.
But even so, the model's potential is far from exhausted.
6.2. Cost/Benefit
The cost/benefit analysis for the project is given at the start
of Appendix 5. One or two of the more important details are:
total annual running costs for analyst and computer of
1:2,500;
implementati on costs of about the same amo,unt;
• the implementation and first year running costs are covered
twice by projected first year savings.
The development costs were funded by an S.S.R.C. grant.
The intangible benefits to top and line managers were thought
by M-F to more than justify the project. The opinion was also expressed
by a director that the construction of the model by itself, had taught
management a great deal about the way decisions were interrelated and
the manner of approaching problems of r~source allocation.
6.3. Implementation
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the decision to
use the tactical planning model was made for a variety of reasons, and one
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way of explaining the contribution of the different factors is to trace
the course of the project from the initial project proposal through the
development phase to the final decision.
Before doing this, some background information should be given
about M-F's top management in the U.K.
The rate of turnover in top management reflected the rapid
worldwide growth of the company over the last decade: assets employed
have more than doubled. The project was or-iqina'ly sponsored and period-
ically reviewed by a number of directors of the U.K. company. The member-
ship of the committee was constantly changing. This soon created a
difficult situation in which all the directors were new and had inherited
the project and their membership of the committee. Therefore none felt
as responsible for its progress or as involved as would have been the
case if some of the original members had remained.
6.3.1. Initial Project Proposal
After one false start, obtaining permission for the project
was not difficult: the development costs were very low, the problems
were becoming an embarrassment, the intangible benefits were obvious,
and the payback promised to be less than one year ..
Some of the problems frequently recurring at that time were:
57.
the inability to decide whether there was enough general
capacity to enable a new product to be made at B.D.R.;
uncertainty as to whether the estimates of either direct
variable costs or decision costs in a new product analysis
accurately reflected the manufacturing interactions between
new and existing products;
the inability to determine whether the unexpected sales
order should be accepted, rejected or postponed, i.e. there,
was no way of discovering whether their product ion was
technically feasible or financially worthwhile;
in general there was no method for evaluating the consequences
(either physical or financial) of different policies affecting
either the demand for or supply of resources.
It was decided to form a committee to monitor the progress of
the project and to make decisions about its direction and scope. The
members of the committee comprised the directors of the functions most
intimately involved and mY supervisor, Professor B. T. Houlden.
6.3.2. Evolution of the Project
Having identified the main problem area and obtained the approval
of the Review Committee for the conceptual solution, it was necessary to
construct the planning model and demonstrate its use. There were a
number of design criteria I thought desirable for the collection of data~
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the construction of the model, the performance of the model and the
creati on of confidence.
Data - The model should be small enough to make it feasible
to manipulate the data deck by hand.
- Line management should identify themselves with the
model, it was to be their planninq model, therefore the
model was to be built according to their wishes. I should
not second-guess the information they supplied although,
critical questioning was necessary to uncover the assumptions
that lay behind the data and to obtain more detail and perhaps
accuracy where the data appeared faulty. Changes to the model
were to be the result of line managers reacting to the
output and modifying their input.
Construction - The model sho~ld be formulated to use an
existing L.P. code, even though this might have redundant
facilities. The reason was that this approach would be
quicker and cheaper than coding a special purpose program.
- The variable names should be immediately
recognisable mnemonics, in order that the standard computer
output would make sense; thus postponing the necessity for
writing a report-generation program, which could come later.
- The emphasis should be on achieving a
significant improvement on current practice rather than
building an elegant or intellectually satisfying model.
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. Confidence - The model was to stay w+th+n the threshold of
change to which the organisation could adapt. This implied
fil~Stly that the requirement for new data be kept to the
absolute minimum~ even at the expense of building the model
around inadequate or erroneous data, and secondly that the
model produce the familiar reports, as well as the new ones.
- Confidence in the model should be established
at the bottom of the hierarchy, with the cost department
and the supervisor of production control, etc. •No move to
a higher level was to be made before the immediate subordinate
was enthusiastic supporter of the project.
. Performance - The model should primarily (a) satisfy the
practical problems of planning, and (b) be acceptable to
M-F.
Either despite or, in part, because of these factors, the model
was developed and met with increasing acceptance. one.or the major
stumbling blocks was the natural unwillingness of people to accept
solutions to problems whi ch they had previously 1earned to I~egard as
one of the trials of life.
6.3. Final Acceptance
One of the'surprising factors to emerge was that practically
no one at M-F, from the directors down to the supervisors was concerned
with how L.P. worked. In fact it was this misunderstanding on my part
which slowed down the initial progress. I attempted to explain to the
Review Co~~ittee how I intended to achieve the promised results. The
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mention of a computer model was right, while an explanation of L.P. was
not. In fact, not only was the attempted explanation not required, it
was actually disfunctional in that it reduced the director~s confidence.
The final presentation to top management was made to an entirely
new Review Committee. None of the members had had any previ ous contact
with the project. It was obviously out of the question to attempt a
resume of the project, its current status, and the results. Instead,
I prepared a simple, non-technical presentation on the theme: problems,
solutions, results. The latter consisted of computer output in the form
of both handouts and slides.
The meeting revolved round a discussion of the computer output.
This, together wi th some preparatory enquiries made by the Assistant
M.D., was sufficiently convincing to secure the decision to implement
the project.
The general feeling at this meeting was that the model was a
top management decision-making tool, and as such should be the responsibility
of the personal assistant of the director of manufacturing responsible for
all the plants in the U.K.
6.4. Extending the Model
Besides accept tng the model of B.D.R. the Review Committee
raised the question of applying a similar approach to the other plants
in the U.K.
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A meeting was held with the director of the Banner lane
factory and he expressed considerable enthusiasm, while cautioning
that his problems differed from those at B.D.R., and would probably
involve another formulation.
It was recognised that the third factory, Kilmarnock, had much
in common with B.D.R.
The possibility of integrating the three models to cover the
trans-shipment and sourcing problems was also discussed. It was decided
that before pressing ahead with the new areas, experience should be gained
with the existing model.
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. 7. OTHER APPLICATIONS
The close of the body of the dissertation is given to
considering whether there is a class of problems corresponding to
the framework of the problem at M-F.
7.1. Manufacturing Industry
It should not be thought that I am suggesting that the'approach
taken at M-F can be slapped 1ike a paul tice on to the producti on and
corporate planning problems of the rest of manufacturing tndus try,
In the first place, M-F had reliable and well-documented data
for both production and costs.
Secondly, the data was relevant. Thus, time study had established
'allowed times' for each operation; production engineers had produced
routing sheets; there were procedures for authorising and implementing
changes to the specification of a product or the process of manufacture;
and so on.
Thirdly, the planning philosophy was firmly embedded in the
company at all levels. People were prepared to give time and ideas to
the attempt to improve the planning systems.
Fourthly, management was open-minded about new techniques and
was prepared to accept or reject them according to their merits. This
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is not to say that there was no resistance to change, but that the
resistance was open to evidence and persuasion.
At the beginning of the dissertation I suggested that M-F
was typical of manufacturing industry, and, by implication, that it
was probable that other members of the industry suffered from many
of the same problems, whether in the narrow context of production
control or in the wider context of overall resource allocation.
The car industry is a good example of where the problems
might be'similar to those at M-F; a machine shop with three lathes
making shackle pins an example of where the problems would be different.
The relevance to other manufacturing companies of the approach
taken at M-F depends on:
the scale and complexity of the manufacturing process;
the nature of the manufacturing technology; reasonably
stable relationships between factor inputs and product
outputs, for each product; as well as substitutability
of factor inputs between dt fferent products (men and
machines can work on different products);
the nature of the finished product, in that scheduling
products is an important step in the planning of
capacity;
it being possible not only to change the allocation
and utilization of factor inputs, but also to change
the supply of the factors over time;
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the influence on costs and profits of variables which
are linearly related should justify the expense of
building a computer optimisation model;
the short-run marginal cost curve should either be an
increasing function or convex, and in both cases
capable of approximation by linear segments.
Most of the above characteristics are to be found in some
combination in manufacturing industry. In principle, the M-F approach
should be capable of application to other companies in the sector,
with some modifications. In practi~e, the candidates are more likely
to be reduced by lack of appropriate data than lack of relevant problems.
Burbidge's book describes the data one would expect to find
in, or which could be generated for, manufacturing industry. M-F
data, together with adjustments which had to be made, are described in
Appendix 7.
7.2. Other Industries
In looking outside ~anufacturing industry for sectors in
which the approach could be applied, it is necessary to distinguish
between the different strands of the approach. Some are of more
general relevance than others. The main strands are:
L.P.
. Activity values of interdependent variables should
be planned simultaneously.
Functional data is not necessarily appropriate for
corporate tactical planning.
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Budgeting is a medium for expressing the results of
tactical planning, it is not a good vehicle for carrying
out tactical planning.
The assumptions behind establishing direct costs in
manufacturing are not valid for planning, i.e. changing
the volume and mix of production should be evaluated
in terms of the supply and utilization of a resource,
manpower.
L.P. is probably the least general of the components of the
approach. Its use requires firstly that L.P. is relevant, and
secondly that the potential benefits justify the costs.
The assumptions of L.P. are proportionality, additivity,
divisibility and deterministic. Each of these is discussed, and the
usual source of violation indicated.
. Proportionality - both the objective function and each
constraint must be linear. This implies that costs and
revenues and factor inputs must be linearly related
to the 1eve 1 of the appropri ate activity . However , wi th
a careful definiti'on of variables and costs it is possible
to achieve both linearity with respect to each variable
individually, and a quadratic function when ~roups of
variables are combined. For instance, the unit cost per
product and the unit cost per man can both be linear, and
the marginal cost of production quadratic - this is
the case with the model for M-F. One important non-
linearity is the 'set-up' type of cost.
G6.
Additivity - not only should the objective function and
each factor input be directly proportional to the level
of each activity on its own, but also there must be no
joint interactions. Joint-products and by-products are
the most usual exceptions to this rule. For manufacturing,
the assumption means that the cost and resource inputs
of each product on its own is independent of the production
levels of other products.
Divisibility - the variables must be able to take on non-
integer values. In other words, either they must be
capable of infinite divisibility or it must be reasonable
to approximate their planning in fractional terms. The
M-F model, for instance, planned manpower and production
in fractional terms. The numbers were large enough for
rounding not to be inappropriate. One type of indivisibility
is investment in new facilities. A new lathe adds, say,
eight thousand standard hours of potential capacity per
annum.
Deterministic - all the coefficients must be assumed to
be known constants,:and it should be adequate to explore
the effects of uncertainty either with parametric programming
or by revising the model and reoptimizing. In the
manufacturing model, the sales forecast was assumed to
be a reasonable guide to actual sales,· the standard hours
per product for each department were assumed to reflect
likely operating efficiencies, and so forth. If the
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system is characterised more by randomness than stability,
L.P. is not suitable. In some cases stochastic programming
can be used to accommodate randomness .
It is difficult, without detailed knowledge of individual
industries, to say of one that L.P. is relevant and of another that it
is not. M-F, at first sight, fell into the class of problems in which
production-smoothing formulations were releval1t, on closer inspection
there proved to be a number of non-linearities which, in the event,
could be described in linear terms. There are no a priori reasons why
M-F should not be typical of a class of manufacturing problems nor
why the problems of manufacturing industry should be so distinct from
those of other industries that similar approaches are necessarily ruled
out.
This is a weak form of generalisation to other industries,
but rash is the man who commits himself to building a good L.P. model
for either an industry or even a company without detai led knowl edge.
The other components of the approach do not need elaboration;
for instance, the second point about activity values of interdependent
variables is true irrespective' of the sector. The question is more
likely to be whether the objective is realisable (suppose the inter-
dependence is non-linear, etc.) not whether the statement is '}4elevant.
In summary: the least general of the components of the approach
is L.P., here the restrictive assumptions of L.P. limit its relevance.
The other components are of more general relevance outside the
manufacturing sector.
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7.3. Developments
There are two immediate directions which developments could
take:
Improve the correspondence between the model and the
system it describes by such things as including the
nightshift as a separate variable, including work-in-
progress, allowing for set-up times.
. Widen the boundaries of the model to include the
distribution system, other factories, etc., perhaps
using a decomposition approach of, say, Beal e to
provide the linkages between sub-models.
M-F's
Quite another type of development is to integrate it with
computerised I.P.C. system and to build-in some predictors
of factory-generated decision costs.
While the first two developments are largely a matter of
replication, the third would involve much more research.
A final example would be to convert the model to produce P/L
accounts and balance sheets as well as the existing schedules.
The weaknesses of the model are a corollary to the developments.
In addition, then, to those already implied, should be specifically
mentioned the eventual need for integer values for variables such as
investment in new capacity, where linearity is not a good approximation.
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PROBLEMS
THE ORIGIN OF THE PROJECT
1.1
CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Antecedents
3.· Stage 1 - Predicting Decision Costs
4. Stage 2- Production Planning
5. Sunrnary
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PROBLEMS
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the specific problem
that initiated mY research, to show how this,led to the discovery of a
Pandora's Box of planning problems, to describe the selection of one or
two key areas to be tackled first and to trace the process by which the
symptoms can be generalised to become what I have called 'The Corporate
Planning Problem', which is described in Appendix 2.
On the next page there is a schematic representation of the stages
,in the project, with comments outlining the motivation for each successive
move. It was a question of problem analysis and cost/benefit. The
objective was not to come up with the illusive total management information
system, but rather to define an area in which significant improvements
could be made at low cost and with the minimum initial disturbance to
the existing systems and people. Hopefully, an innovation acts as a
catalyst, but I thought it important not to exceed the threshold of change
to which an organisation can adapt.
This last point is very important when it comes to implementation.
The fewer demands a system makes both for new data and for the understand-
ing of new reports the easier it will be to implement. The implication
of a policy of minimum disturbance is that the sequence should be
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Exhibit 1.1
1.5
analyse
probl em
coHect
data
formulate
solution
t t
instead of the more usual:
analyse
problem
formulate
solution ---:----9'\l'" call ectdata
In the latter the emphasis is on intellectual respectability,
while the former is a more pragmatic approach.· Perhaps this overstates
the dichotomy. But it is my serious suggestion that a significant
improvement + implementation should be the primary motivations.
Having briefly touched on the objectives which guided the
development of the project, I turn to the development itself.
1.6
2. ANTECEDENTS
The project started with management's wish to find a reliable
means of predicting decision costs. However, the story begins slightly
prior to my direct involvement.
Becoming increasingly unhappy with both the effort of predicting
the behaviour of costs and the intuitive unreasonableness of the figures
once they had been computed, the company decided to change from absorption
costing to direct costing. Direct costing was considered to have several
advantages:
inventory profits and losses caused by variations in production
volume are eliminated
• management thinks in marginal costing terms
it facilitates planning and control
product costs are more accurately described.
As a consequence, management felt more confident in its ability
to predict the outcome of changes in volume or mix. On the other hand,
the primary disadvantage was the existence of a proportion of total
. costs (20%), called decision costs, which management knew would often
be affected by decisions but for which there was no automatic means of
prediction.
The effect of the change on the classification of costs is shown in
Exhibit 1.2 overleaf.
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COMPARATIVE COST BREAKDOWN
STANDARD FULL ABSORPTION COST STANDARD DIRECT VARIABLE COST
Direct Haterial 60% Direct Material 60%
Direct Labour 10% Direct Labour 10%
Variable Overhead 10% Direct Labour Operating,
Allowances 6%
Fixed Overhead 20% Processing Supplies & Scrap 4%
100% 80%
Decision Costs 20%.
Exhibit 1.2
Since there was no formal method of generating decision costs,
their estimation tended to be arbitrary and consequently a source of
conflict. In the final analysis it was a matter of one man's opinion
against anothers.
My research project was born out of the attempt to find an answer
to this dilemma: the old system was all-embracing and inaccurate; the
new was accurate as far as it went but did not go far enough.
1.8
3. STAGE 1 - PREDICTING DECISION COSTS
The initial investigation pursued three courses:
• an examination of the way decision costs were estimated in
practice
• statistical analysis of past data using multiple linear
regression
• discussions with the heads of budget centres to discover if
there were any behind-the-scenes rules-of-thumb.
3.1. Current Practice
The outcome was rather what one might have expected: an improvement
was possible but only after the planning of direct variable costs had
been reorganised. Going into a little more detail: the company uses a
planning system called Integrated Planning & Control (I.P.C.), which
bases the new budget on the current year's actual results. To be'more
precise, the plan evolves in the following manner:
Latest estimate of current Year End (9 months actual)
+ Carry-over
- One-time
+ Environmental
= Planning Base
+ New Management Action
= New Plan
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i.e. this constitutes a series of systematic adjustments to the latest
estimate of the current year's actual results.
If, for any, reason, the consolidated profit for the company is
inadequate, theoretically there would be a loop round the last two items,
in practice it is not quite as simple as that.
Later on we will see how a corporate tactical planning model
interfaces with the I.P.C. system, in Appendix 6.
The weaknesses of this approach when applied to decision costs,
and incidentally management's reservations about it, are illustrated
by the way the planning game is played. Top management will arbitrarily
instruct, for instance, the General Factory Manager (G.F.M.) ta reduce
his decision costs by x%. This never happens to direct variable costs.
As an amusing example of the rules of the game I tell the story of a
G.F.M. who was caught in this manner one year, and sweated blood to find
the x%. The next year, having learned his lesson, he 'plugged' his
decision costs by at least x%, carefully distributed over the different
expel'lsecategories. The expected instruction never came; he had the
greatest difficulty in legitimately overspending by x%!
The disadvantages of the I.P.C. system are:
it fails to identify the factors (variables) which generate
an expense
it does not necessarily question the efficiency of the
operations in the base year
it fails to relate the change in the expenses to the changes
in the activity levels which generate them.
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If the impression is that this adds up to a complicated game of
bluff, in which the objective is to secure as large an allocation of
company resources as possible, this could well be correct. Moreover, it
does emphasise the difficulty of verifying the estimates thrown up by
the budget centres and the arbitrariness of attempts at profit improve-
ment. "The main justification for a blank~t instruction such as 'reduce
all inventories by y%' is the hope that it will be ignored by line managers
when to carry it out woul d produce a nonsense". The heart of the matter
is that management has little idea of how the company is articulated and,
in general, no means of evaluating the consequences of different policy
decisions. To parody this top management philosophy it could be described
as 'kick everyone until they squeal '. Hardly a rational process of resource
allocation!
3.2. Statistical Analysis
The attempt at statistical analysis was no more promising. Mostly,
all indices of company activity, and therefore expenses, moved in sympathy,
and the unexplained variance was too large for this method of prediction
to be of value. For instance, I found that practically everything was
related to the general level of production in the current month. Leads
and lags of a month or so did not materially alter the correlation coefficient.
And even supposing useful relationships had been established, they would
probably have been statistical or permitted rather than causal; with the
threat that the model would perform badly in anything but a stable or
loll
or slowly changing environment. Gershefski has constructed a model in
which the coefficients in the regression equations are regularly updated
by an analysis of the immediate past, and he says it works reasonably
well. But input to his corporate model also includes a large number of
estimates by management which could not be generated from regression
equations. My own experience is that Indus tr-i al data on levels of
activity and categories of expense is so bad as to be virtually useless
for statistical purposes. There is never enough information to make all
the corrections necessary to render the analysis valid and the figures
comparable.
3.3. Rules-of-Thumb
The last line of approach, discussions with those responsible for
budget centres, proved at first sight to be more promising. The foremen
and section leaders had a very good idea of the factors which generated
the expenses under their control. It could be a cause and effect
relationship (we need ..... ), a statistical relationship (we find ..•.. ),
or the result of a policy decision (we always ..... ). Although it was
theoretically possible to gather the data and build a model, it would
have been exceedingly complex (similar in many respect to bill of material
processing - B.O.M.P.), in danger of being inflexible, of doubtful cost/
benefit and, most important of all, it would require data on future
production programmes, manpower and overtime which was not available.
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The significance of this last point is established by the fact
that production programmes and manpower plans are the basis for deriving
the direct variable cost of production.
3.4. Summary
It became apparent that whereas management was unhappy about its
ability to predict and control decision costs, in fact there were major
shortcomings with the plans for direct costs. Apart from the latter
being a much more important cost category, it was not possible to improve
the planning of decision costs without first improving the planning of
direct costs. Before I leave the planning of decision costs, I ought to
say that a model based on the opinions of supervisors, etc. seems to me
preferable to one using a large number of regression equations.
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4. STAGE 2 PRODUCTION PLANNING
Production Control is the department in the factory responsible
for production scheduling and manpower planning, and consequently for
determining the most influential constituents of financial plans: profits,
cash flow, premiums, inventories and so forth.
It is my contention that production planning, encompassing as it
does the horse-trading with marketing, is financial planning. Or to
express it another way, financial plans are largely the natural consequence
of production plans. There is of course a domain that is the sole preserve
of the financial experts, for instance, such things as capital structure,
the integrity of the financial control systems and so on. But the roots
of most financial plans can be traced back to the production area. To
give just one example: suppose the financial director wishes to explore
the consequences of reducing the bank overdraft by kx during the year;
far from being a constraint imposed on the financial plans at the last
stage of the planning process (the traditional approach), it should be a
constraint on the marketing/production plans at the beginning.
The realisation that production planning is profit planning materially
alters the manner in which the planning process is conceived and the method
in which it is executed. This theme will be taken up again in Appendix 2 on
corporate planning problems. In the present section I describe the
traditional approach to production planning, discuss the problems it
leaves unresolved and show how they led me on to the wider issues of
corporate planning.
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4.1. The Objective of Production Planning
The function of production control is to turn a requirement for
products (sales forecast + finished machines inventory policy) into the
production programme which, while satisfying all the other manufacturing
constraints, minimises the fluctuations in labour loading. In other
words, the objective of production planning, in the medium term, is
production smoothing.
The first point to note is that the objective is an example of
the dichotomy between being production oriented and marketing oriented;
the supremacy of either view leads to suboptimisation. The motive for
production smoothing is to further the narrow interests of the factory.
The rationalisation ~r this behaviour is the implicit and t~ue assumption
that big changes in factory activity cause expensive premiums and the
unquantifiable disadvantage of labour unrest. However, it takes no account
of the penalties incurred by other parts of the organisation as a con-
sequence of this policy; the implication being that a certain amount of
fluctuation in activity may be justified by the benefits accruing elsewhere.
for a moment I want to look at the situation through the eyes of
the factory manager and see whether the policy of production smoothing,
in terms of labour loading, is even in his best interests.
I suggest that labour loading is the wrong objective for the
following reasons:
• it assumes that minimising fluctuations in activity necessarily
minimises factory costs
• it is difficult to decide when the smoothing process should
stop
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the process does not take into account the fact that the labour
force shrinks through natural wastage
. the smoothing is done in physical units, whereas the criterion
should be financial and the contraints physical
it does not include all the sources of capacity.
I do not think that any of these points require further explanation.
The most important mistake in the production planning system was to confuse
a constraint and an objective. The objective should have been to explicitly
minimise costs, subject to the contraints on labour loading and so forth.
Instead the objective was to reduce fluctuations in activity to an acceptable
level. In summary, even with a parochial view, the objective was wrong
and the problem inadequately described.
4.2. The Process of Production Planning
The first step in the production smoothing process was to treat
the requirement for products as a production programme, and work out the
manpower needed in each department in each month. The result was always
unacceptable to the factory. Seasonal sales were reflected in peaks and
troughs in the activity of the productive departments. The next step
was colloquially referred to as 'massaging'. Initially, the attempt was
. -
made to smooth activity by scheduling products to be made earlier than
they were required by marketing; in the interval they went into finished
machines inventory against the factory budget. Invariably the moving
forward of production was only partially successful and the final resort
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was to move production backwards, so the products were available after
marketing had nominally sold them. As can be imagined, this generated
much conflict and many acrimonious exchanges.
Whether the system is called 'hunt and peck' or 'trial and error'
does not alter the inqdequacy of using experience and a desk calculator
to schedule the production of 9 products ~hrough 9 departments over 12
months. With this method it took over 1 month to produce and agree a
production schedule. As new sales forecasts came out monthly, the factory
was always working on obsolete information and could be in the ridiculous
position of implementing a production programrre (hiring men, ordering
.materials, etc.) which was the exact opposite of the policy implied by
information already available within the cowpany.
Appendix 7 on data collection and data conversion gives more
details of the production scheduling process, and specifically explains
the linkage between products and direct manpower.
4.3. The Results of Production Planning
Production control issued two reports which summarised the results
of their planning activities. The first was a production programme, and
the second a schedule of departmental standard hours and manpower.
Extracts from the old versions of both are shown in Exhibit 1.3 on the next
page.
Starting with the production programme: the 34.7 Drill is a very
. good example of the inherent weaknesses of the 'massaging' process.
Seeding occurs, at most, twice a year, which is reflected in the pattern
of sales. It may well be that in the case of drills a postponed sale is
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a lost sale, for fairly obvious reasons. However, despite the necessity
for meeting sales the finished machines inventory goes nega~ive for
three months consecutively at the beginning of the year and for two months
at the end. This surprising result is the consequence of marketing
refusing to rephase the sales forecast, a euphemism for losing sales,
and the factory being unable to meet all the demands placed upon it. In
this situation marketing Igoes on allocation', which means that marketing
refuses to negotiate and requests the factory to say what products will
be available and when. The factory then 'does its best', but the criterion
for choosing between products is the physical one of standard hours
required and available, rather than a financial one.
The last stage in the planning process was the most surprising of
all. Once a year plans are drawn up for the next fiscal year by months
and the following two years by year. If mark~ting and production control
fail to agree on the production plans and marketing Igoes on allocation',
instead of treating the production plan as the marketing plan, which is
the case when marketing can sell all that can be produced, each submits
its own plan. Given a large product line and financial summaries, the
inconsistencies are impossible to discover. They only become apparent
when working in physical units. Consistency is easier to achieve when
plans are drawn up than when they are consolidated. Mistakes discovered
at the latter stage involve laborious replanning •
.The second document concerns departmental standard hours and
manpower for each productive department. A summary sheet,which is not
illustrated,provides the information that the effective (usable) manpower
in the welding department at the start of the planning period (November
1st) would be 210. In the light of this, how is the schedule to be
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interpreted? The manpower line indicates that in November there will
be 256 men's worth of work to be done, i.e. this is effective manpower
and does not allow for absenteeism, etc. Each man can work up to 25%
overtime per week. So our 210 men will be adequate, provided 27 men's
worth of work is subcontracted in March and between 18 and 23 men's work
for the rest of the year. The schedule says nothing about the effect
of natural wastage on the department, nor what the overtime policy should
be, nor whether it is genuinely better to subcontract 23 men's work
rather than employ another 18 men and have them work overtime. Although
it does indicate the general workload on each department, the fact that
costs are not included in the evaluation process means that management
still has to work out the consequences of different policies on hi.ringand
firing, overtime and subcontracting. Moreover, there is the suspicion
that the production programme and manpower schedule would have been different
had these other factors, and especially the costs, been included ex ante
rather than ex paste.
Once .again, I must emphasise the complete absence of any financial
data.
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s. SUMMARY
Here I wish to draw together some of the criticisms mentioned
earlier and set the stage for the next appendix on corporate planning.
To summarise the deficiencies of production planning:
the objective was wrong
the system was inadequately described in that some important
variables and constraints were omitted
• the method of processing the data was inadequate for the
task, insofar as the processing time was greater than the
interval between decisions
· no goal-searching technique was used, so that trial and-error
had to continue until satisfactory results were obtained
trade-offs had not been systematically explored and sometimes
the results were obviously nonsense
• many decisions which could and should have been built into
the production smoothing process had to be taken subsequently.
At this point the problem looks like the conventional one of
production smoothing. The motive for pursuing the initial problem of
predicting decision costs this far was that the plans for direct variable
costs and the physical quantities they represented were inadequate. The
physical units of production and direct manpower were planned by production
control, so it was a logical step to look at the objectives and methods of
production smoothing. Having sorted out production and manpower scheduling
and hence the planning of direct variable costs, why did the project move
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on to corporate planning instead of back to decision costs, the original
area of interest?
If one were to have stopped at this stage, the solution to the
problem of production smoothing might well have been to include and
minimise costs, to use linear programming and to broaden the description
of the problem area to include the possibilities of, and therefore to
explore the trade-offs between, overtime working and subcontracting.
The direct variable cost of each product was known, as was the capacity
of each productive department and the physical overtime that could be
worked. Finally, there were proven L.P. packages for most makes of
computer, so the solution, as distinct from the formulation, should have
presented no difficulties.
However, having realised that production control not only controls
production programmes and manpower schedules but also determines total
direct variable costs (plus some associated decision costs), and being
aware of the number of management decisions which either directly involve
or have an impact on production programmes and manpower plans, it is
reasonable to explore to what extent production control was conscious of
its wider sphere of influence, and top management of the deficiencies of
the planning process. The deficiencies, if substantiated, were not of
trivial importance but represented major flaws in the theory and practice
of planning.
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CORPORATE PLANNING
1. INTRODUCTION
In the present appendix I describe what I have called 'The
Corporate Planning Problem'. It is, I believe, endemic to many companies
once they have passed the stage where entrepreneurial ability and
enthusiasm are capable of retaining effective control over all the major
activities. The problem has something to do with the difficulties of
planning and controlling the allocation of resources once responsibility
is delegated and functions become specialised.
I have seen no evidence (which proves nothing) to suppose that the
problem is confined solely to M-F or indeed to manufacturing industry.
Apart from one or two exceptional companies such as I.B.M.,the problem
usually beconles more acute with increasing size. The approach I adopted
for M-Fis explained in Appendix 3, it is less general than the problem;
but with minor reservations, should be applicable to manufacturing
industry.
To reiterate the motives for widening the scope of the research
project to include corporate planning:
• Despite the factory accounting for at least 70% of all costs
and a similar percentage of new and existing investment;
production smoothing, the primary method of resource allocation,
insofar that it preempted a significant proportion of company
resources, was concerned with neither costs nor profits; the
objective of production control was a satisfactory labour
loading.
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. Top management was continually making decisions about the
product line, sales, production and manpower levels, sourcing
of parts and products, and so on, without knowledge of the
consequences on the key-variables and without a systematic
examination of other possibilities. This is sometimes colloquially
referred to as' 'seat of the pants' decision making.
The remainder of section 1 elaborates these two points in the
context of their impact on the process of allocating resources.
1.1. Satisficing
The diagram overleaf, Exhibit 2.1, helps to illustrate the point
that as costs only enter the planning process after the production programme
has been agreed, and profits even later still, the negotiations between
marketing and the factory were restricted in their aim to establishing a
feasible production schedule rather than an optimal financial plan.
In other words, the objective was to find a production programme
which was acceptable ·to the factory and to marketing. The latter were
satisfied if their requests for units for sale and inventory were met.
The former were satisfied if there were no violent fluctuations in activity.
The discussions between marketing and the factory centred around
production volume and timing. While the internal procedures of the
factory were concerned, in the first instance, with standard hours. it
was assumed that if the capacity was available or could be found, the
factory would meet marketingls request for products.
PRODUCTION SCHEDULING AND PROFIT PLANNING
OBJECTIVE
Market Share and
_Sales Revenue
Smooth Labour
Loading
Direct & Indirect
Production Costs
Earnings/Share,
Profitability, etc.
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As can be seen from the diagram, the cost of the production plan
was only known after the plan had been settled. And the profits from the
combined production and marketing plans were only discovered after con-
solidation by corporate financial planning. At such a late stage there
was little that the corporate planners could do to influence profits.
All the important linkages between sales, 'production and factory activity
had been swallowed up by the summaries submitted to them as functional
plans. As a last resort, it was possible to recycle the planning process,
perhaps once, in which case the plans were almost certain not to be ready
in time for the start of the fiscal year.
The corporate financial planning department did not take part in
the negotiations to agree a production programme other than initially
stipplying the planning guidelines and subsequently consolidating the
functional plans.
To conclude that one answer is to bring costs and revenues directly
into the process of production planning and to computerise the system is
to misunderstand the nature of the problem. The different components of
the method I used at M-F are described in Appendix 3.
The effect of including costs and revenues and using the computer
is to speed up the calculations and use the financial consequences of a
particular sales/production schedule as feedback to the negotiations
between marketing and production control. There is no denying the extra
information to be an improvement. But it does not go to the centre of
the problem. In the first place it requires someone to specify the
decision-rules by which all the trade-offs are to be made. Secondly. it
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is impractical to systematically explore by complete enumeration the
feasible combinations when there are 9 products, 9 departments and a
12 month time horizon. Thirdly, it begs the question about which figures
should be used for costs and revenues. As I show in section 2 of the
present appendix, and in more detail in Appendix 7 on data collection and
conversion, direct variable costs and company net return (sales price
less discounts) are not appropriate. Lastly, there are a number of
questions to which the corporate planners would like answers and about
which the system envisaged above would be silent. These questions are
considered in section 1.3 of the present appendix.
Another prescription mig~t be that it would be a help if the
corporate planners could become more involved sooner, so that they were
in a position to influence the outcome of the production smoothing
process and thereby establish some control over resource allocation.
Such a development would be desirable provided the nature and scope
of their intervention could be defined to everyone's satisfaction. But
although it would introduce the profit motive into the discussions, it
is not immediately clear how this would necessarily improve the outcome,
unless some means could be found of incorporating the criterion of
profit into the process of manipulating the data. As I mentioned earlier,
the problem is so large and complex that recycling, by itself, is of
little help.
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1.2. Seat of the Pants Decisions
If the first motive for broadening the project to include corporate
planning is summarised as the desire to introduce the criterion of profit
into the system for production smoothing, the second takes the part of
top-management'faced with having to make strategic and tactical decisions
with very little reliable and relevant data. Exhibit 2.2 shows the
importance of tactical resource allocation in the planning cycle.
It can be argued that tactical planning plays a decisive role in
the profit planning of manufacturing industry. By the time operations
planning occurs, many commitments, whether to customers or suppliers,
have already been entered into, and the objective is to minimise costs.
Strategic planning often starts with ~n analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of current operations: much of the quantitative material in
this analysis comes from tactical planning. For instance, I suggest that
one of the explanations of the gap between the promise of strategic
profits and the reality of current performance is the widespread inability
of industry to assess the tactical implications of strategic plans. An
example of using the model I developed to help with the analysis of a
proposed new product is given in Appendix 6.
On the other hand, operational problems can generate a need for
swift tactical planning. A good example would be an unexpected strike
which disrupted production schedules and made it necessary to derive a
new production programme and to decide which products should be given
precedence. The task is not easy when the marginal cost of a product is
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not its direct variable cost (the correspondence is seldom true) and
when it it takes lon~er than one month to calculate a new production schedule.
Therefore tactical planning, besides being important in its own
right, contributes to strategic and operational planning.
Without the means of quickly producing reliable tactical plans
covering the main decision variables,managem~nt has to resort to such
things as hunch, rumour, rules-of-thumb and pressure groups to guide them
in reaching decisions.
It is partly because tactical planning is so badly done that the
executives of manufacturing companies typically spend their time 'fighting
fires'. Of course, industrial relations problems are a contributing
factor, but some of the problems are caused directly by the inadequacy of
the planning systems, and others by the inability to respond adequately
to the unexpected once it has occured. One suspects that 'fire-fighting'
could be self-perpetuating.
1.3. Unanswered Questions
A planning system should be capable of more than simply grinding
out one set of consistent figures, although in many cases that in itself
would be an achievement. Even the ability to repeat the performance
several times, while perhaps giving a feel for the robustness of the plans
over a limited range, will not provide much of the information that
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rational planning requires. There will still be too many unknowns
surrounding the variables the company does control for there to be
much confidence about decisions based on such plans, quite apart from
being uncertain of the eventual state of nature.
Some of the questions corporate planners would like to ask
are such things as:
Does the marginal revenue of a certain policy exceed marginal
cost?
Have all the main possibilities been explored?
How stable is the solution?
Which factors constitute the greatest vulnerability?
Which areas are most promising for profit improvement?
It can be seen that there is more to the answering of these questions than the
mere processing speed of a budget compiler or the combination of regression
equations,management data inputs and processing speed of Gershefski's
simulation model.
However, despite fairly ready agreement on what the aims of
corporate planning should be. the practice at M-F, and,as far as I can
discover, most car manufacturers in the Midlands', concentrates on the
three areas of: setting overall objectives, providing guidelines (and
ensuring uniformity) and consolidating plans. Conspicuous by its absence
is a means of analysis and review which wrests control of planning resource
allocation away from the plants and places it in the hands of the chief
executive.
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1.4. Some Consequences
A glance at the previous diagram on production scheduling and
profit planning shows profits to be the result of decisions instead of the
criterion for choosing between possible courses of action. The consequence
is that the final profit is the result of a mix of inter-related factors.
The contribution of any particular component or group of components is
unknown, lost in the aggregate.
Suppose that at the end of the day the planned profit falls short
of the president's goal for earnings per share. A complete revision of
the plans is impossible - in many corporations the cycle takes about 9
months. Another possibility is the adoption of one of the popular panaceas:
cut all costs by x%, increase sales by y%, cut headcount by z%. There are
many stories of cases where such an approach was not just shortsighted,
but actually counterproductive. MY own variant is of the severe pruning
of a printing department, only a token labour force was left. Perhaps the
hope was that the work would dry up - a corollary to Parkinson's Law -
'work contracts to meet the capacity available', Since this particular
department did a great deal of work for the marketing department, and
since there were to be no changes in the product line or product literature,
the printing originally done in-house was subcontracted. The headcount
was down, total expenses up. Of course, this cause and effect relationship
was disguised on the control reports sent to head office. The managing
director received credit for carrying out so promptly and effectively
the instruction to reduce headcount; the increased costs were all but
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lost in being aggregated with a large expense category and were explained
by the bland 'adverse movement in environmental factors'. Perhaps the con-
clusion is either that the managing director was an astute player of
the planning game or else that he was unaware of the consequences of his
decision.
As experience with the planning sy~tem and its results increased,
behind the specific examples of general inadequacy, it was possible to
detect a number of issues which might be causing most of the trouble.
These issues I have collectively called 'The Corporate Planning Problem'.
It would be inappropriate if the overall impression created by
this account of either the people or the systems at M-F was unfavourable.
In fact the opposite is the case. The project was born out of the desire
to improve a system which, by the prevailing standards, was functioning
reasonably well. Had the basic planning systems not been sound, the
planning philosophy not been widely diffused throughout the company
and the raw data not been in existence, mY project would never have
started.
The reason that the true picture does not come across in the
normal course of the narrative is that it was the deficiencies which
motivated the search for improvement.
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2. THE CORPORATE PLANNING PROBLEM
The Corporate Planning Problem has a number of components which
I first list and subsequently explain. The components are: conflict,
consistency, data, optimisation, processing, profit improvement, sensitivity
and vulnerability. Exhibit 2.3 shows the structure of this section.
2.1. Conflict
For whatever reason, the aspirations of an individual are not
always compatible with those of other individuals in the organisation,
nor do they necessarily correspond with the objectives of the corporation.
Conflicts frequently appear in their most acute form during the planning
process, when individual targets are set and the resources of the company
allocated to the divisions, departments and budget centres.
The planning process should be conceived with awareness of possible
conflicts in mind. Such an approach implies that, firstly, the quantifiable
consequences of different courses of action should be known and agreed
upon by all concerned so that the area of uncertainty, in which the
final decision has to be made, is reduced to weighing the risks and the
qualitative elements. In other words, the quantitative factors are
removed from the debate. secondly, it must be possible to generate the
quantitative data with sufficient speed to permit the evaluation of various
options and the revision of basic policy. Thirdly. the control and audit-
ing procedures should be capable of relating outcomes to forecasts. This
can only be done if both forecasts and results are held in the same
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THE CORPORATE PLANNING PROBLEM
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disaggregated form and classified by project, budget centre and time
period as well as the usual expense categories. LastlY, the planning
unit should have some independent means of verifying the reasonableness
of forecasts and requests. This is one of the tasks Bower assigns to
his 'integrators'. Again, there are numerous stories of a new project
being loaded with unnecessary new investment in order to kill it, or
having vital expenditure omitted to save it, or having irrelevant
investment added because the profitability can stand it. An example
of a realistic approach to the need to verify estimates and resolve
conflicts is given in Appendix 6 on using a corporate planning model.
2.2. Consistency
The extracts from the sales and production plans shown earlier are
good examples of the type of inconsistency which can occur and the manner
in which they arise. The problem is due to the unfortunate coincidence
of a number of factors: planning being done sequentially, i.e. estimates
go from marketing to'the factory, on to the cost department and so forth;
the time delay this involves; the pressure to revise the data to include
the latest estimates. Together, these factors make it very difficult to
ensure that all the parts of the organisation are working with the same
version of the data or even on the same assumptions. The task of ensuring
consistency once the separate plans have come to head office is virtually
impossible, even if the plans are broken down into units in which the
inconsistencies can be discovered, i.e. physical units as opposed to
financial summaries.
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It is one thing to have plans which are too ambitious - the
behavioural rationalisation would be to call them 'demanding and achiev-
able' - it is quite another when the individual targets and action
programmes are mutually exclusive.
2.3. Data
In a different category of significance from the other components
which characterise the corporate planning problem is my suggestion that
for a number of reasons tactical planning should not be the extension of
operations planning. In other words, apart from the sequence in the
diagram on production scheduling and profit planning being a source of
error, the concept it represents is mistaken.
It conceives of planning in terms of information flowing through
the various departments. Each department in turn processes the information,
seeks clarification from and supplies feedback to departments further
upstream and eventually produces its own plans. By the time the plans
reach the stage of consolidation, several types of error have accumulated;
detail, assumptions, omissions and interactions.
Some of the reasons for errors occuring and accumulating are:
Systems for monitoring the current activities of a company ~end
to collect operational data. For want of a better alternative,
the relationship between variable and activity is often inter-
preted as independent and dependent variable respectively and
used as a predictor. So there are reports on the number of
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direct workers employed each week and the wages bill, the weight
and the value of material delivered broken out by main categories,
etc. Frequently such operational data and relationships are
not suitable for tactical planning. For example, it would be
incorrect to plan the payroll for direct workers by using past
data on the relationship between manpower and total wages. The
independent variable for wages is not just manpower. There are
several independent variables, all of which must be estimated,
such as, the relative sizes of the departments, productivity,
capital intensity.
Where data is generated specifically for planning, while fulfill-
ing the primary role satisfactorily, it may be inappropriate
for other uses. Some of the arguments for a standard costing
system are that it is a help in pricing, valuing inventory and
planning the costs of manufacture. However, it would be wrong
to use the standard costs for (a) new product analyses, (b)
looking at sales mix and production mix, (c) deciding on the
allocation-of existing and procurement of new resources.
. The data available within each function may be adequate for
the activities of each in isolation, but insufficient for them
Jointly. At B.D.R., production control issued a production
programme - products, manpower - which was sent to the 'factory'
department. The latter had to supply products according to
the schedule and was responsible for production facilities and
manpower. The manpower figures on the production programme
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were not instructions as much as an indication that the programme
had been smoothed. The factory department then developed and
pursued its own manpower policy. If production fell behind the
schedule, the factory department apologised. One of the reasons
for the discrepancy between required and achieved production
was that the factory's ability to hire and fire had not been
expressed as constraints on the process of production scheduling
by production control. In fact neither department knew what this
constraint was. The need for it only became apparent when
viewing their joint activities.
Apart from such unintentional causes of error, there are those
introduced purposely. The production control department was
continually second-guessing the marketing forecasts. The worst
incidence of second-guessing was in the magnitude and the lead-
times each link in the procurement chain built into his request
for products to guard against non-delivery by the preceding link.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that each function filters the
information sent to others; partly because not to do so would•
swamp the system, partly because of the territorial imperative,
partly in the interests of the recipients to select for them the
relevant information.
For a number of reasons, then, errors appear to be inherent in the planning
,system unless their presence is realised and action taken to identify the
variables and their characteristics required for tactical planning.
The rest of the section ;s an attempt to indicate the type of errors
that can occur. It trys to answer the question 'what sort of errors should
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I be looking for?'. Whereas the earlier part of the section was concerned
with why errors occur.
2.3.1. Detail
There is no difficulty if the requirement of corporate planning
is for less detail than is supplied by the functions and it can be met
by aggregating existing categories of data. However, what happens if
.a different breakdown is requi red, say by project rather than budget
centre, or by time period?
Unless the specific needs of corporate planners have been built
into the planning guidelines for the functions, any analysis which is
not functionally oriented will be difficult.
Although such a step would be an improvement, it is not the whole
story. Let me draw an illustration from mY research. I discovered that
the data used by pr09uction control was suitable for labour loading
but inappropriate for the larger issue of resource allocation. To put it
very simplYt neither the plans they submitted nor the data used to generate
the plans took into account the problem of machine loading. The information
I required could not be obtained from ~he published documents of production
control, but was available from detailed records within the department.
It took someone who was familiar with both production control and corporate
planning to unearth the def'tciency.
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.2.3.2. Assumptions
Another type of error is that the implicit assumptions on which
the data is based, while being valid operationally, need not be valid for
tactical planning. An example is the direct variable cost of production.
This is defined as the increase/decrease in costs from making one more/less
unit of product. The main categories are: material, labour, labour
allowances and processing supplies and scrap. The direct labour cost is
made up of the clock hours required for a unit of product plus an average
bonus payment. It is implicitly assumed that there is a constant relationship
between products, clock hours and men. This is not true. Men are frequently
employed even though there is insufficient work to keep them all busy in
the immediate future. So, in fact, management has two distinct choices,
the first is whether to employ a man, the second is whether to give him
work. The effect of making. this correction is shown overleaf. A method
of allocating resources which assumes a constant relationship between
products and men does not permit the evaluation of the major options,
especially towards dtrect labour, which are open to management.
Importantly, not only are the assumptions obscure to those outside
the cost section who request data from it, very often the assumptions are
so enshrined in the operations of the cost section that no one inside
thinks of questioning the assumptions. Moreover, members of the cost
section are unlikely to spend much time thinking deeply about the relevance
of cost data to situations being analysed by another department; the
presumption is that the questioner has done his homework, and anyway there
is a continual stream of such requests.
DATA ERROR
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The direct variable cost of a product ~s taken as the marginal
cost for all planning horizons.
The standard direct variable cost of a product is not its marginal
cost for tactical planning. Two corrections are necessary. The first is
to subtract the amount representing the day-wage of labour. The second
is to subtract the cost of freight.
The effect of these two adjustments on the Drill ~s shown below.
D.V.C. OF
DRILL 13216
MATERIAL
LABOUR
OTHER
Exhibit 2.4
MARGINAL COST
OF DRILL bIBS
LESS DAY WAGE
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I have used the cost section to illustrate that whatever the source
of data it needs to be checked not only for accuracy and general relevance
but also for the assumptions on which it is based .
.2.3.3. Omissions
This is a variant of the mistake of sub-optimisation, with the
emphasis now on the wrong variables instead of on the wrong objective
function. Although, naturally, the former implies the latter. Viewing
corporate plans as the product of consolidating functional plans often
results in an incomplete description of the demands for and sources of
capacity, and also of the possible exchanges between sources of capacity
within a month and from one month to the next. Specific examples are:
failure to include finished machines inventory as a source of stored
capacity (previously it was simply the balancing item), treating sales
as an exogenous instead of endogenous variable, failure to include the
costs of hiring and firing, and so forth.
If the problem is inadequately described it is difficult to weigh
up the possibilities in a realistic manner .
.2.3.4. Interactions
Strictly speak~ng, the lack of the proper interactions is as
much an omission as the lack of the proper variables; both cause the
problem to be incorrectly described. However. I wish to distinguish
between failure to identify the right variables and failure to quantify
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the relationships between them. The former is dealt with above, the
latter now. In fact all relationships were omitted except for the link
between products and labour content via standard hours and standard hour
performance. In other words, there were no limits on such things as
the rates of change of capacity or the maximum rate of production due to
the shortage of supplies.
2.4. Optimisation
With all the usual caveats about size, relevance, run times and
flexibility, I take the arguments in favour of an optimisation model to
be decisive. The reasons are set out below.
Corporate planners need a model which is capable of two extreme
modes of operation (and, of course, any shade in-between):
On the one hand,it must be able to evaluate the consequences
of different policies expressed in terms of point values for
all variables; this is what I call the non-discretionary mode
of operatibn.The model is doing nothing ~hich could not be
done, albeit more slowly, on a desk calculator.
• On the ·other hand, it must be able to explore all the feasible
possibilities and in a finite number of steps, a long way
short of complete enumeration, identify the best solution;
this is the discretionary mode.
(I should emphasise that these were the immediate requirements at M-F.
Once supplied, it is possible to go on to such developmentsas stochastic
models. models of the company and its environment, and so on.)
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In other words, I view management as having set opinions about
certain facets of running the company and being indifferent about others.
Examples of the first might be: no overtime is to be planned for Sunday
afternoon in order that there is room to accommodate operational problems;
reductions in manpower are to be limited to natural wastage; the manpower
in the primary department mus t be somewhere between 23 and 30. ~~here
management is indifferent, typically a large area, the task of the model
is to choose the most profitable combination of demands for and supply of
productive resources. This embodies the idea that where all other things
are equal (the area of indifference), the company would rather make more
profits than less. An optimisation technique, when applied to financial
planning, is nothing more nor less than a means of discrimination-on the
basis of profits, a method of choosing the more efficient from the less.
2.5 Processing
.The justification for a model of any description, and particularly
where a single mistake can be disastrous, is that it is better to experiment
with a model than with the real situation. Planning models are no exception.
A single planning cycle, for M-F and many other large corporations,
frequently lasts from 9 months to 1 year, making it impossible either to
tryout a number of policies or to carry through a complete revision
should the results prove unsatisfac~ory or to update the plans quickly
should some major unplanned event occur (the expropriation of mines or
oil supplies).
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The vulnerability caused by a slow manual planning system ;s
illustrated by the case of a large multinational company. At the final
submission of the plans to corporate headquarters, the chief executive
refused approval because the consolidated plans did not meet his target
for earnings per share in the current year. It was not until 6 months
of the planning horizon year had elapsed that the new plans were submitted
and approved.
2.6. Profit Improvement
Under a system of Integrated Planning and Control (I.P.C.), a
series of adjustments are made to the present year's actual results to
arrive at the 'Planning Basel; this is the 'do nothing' situation - the
outcome in the planning year if management takes no new action. Then
comes Inew management action', designed to lift profits on to a new
plateau. Typically, the new action will involve pricing, promotional
expenditure, cost reductions, and so forth. One of the perpetual
uncertainties in planning is whether some important area for profit
improvement has been overlooked, i.e. what are the key areas for profit
improvement?
I doubt whether many management teams would claim to know all the
important factors limiting profits, or for that matter the particular
contribution of those which they had identified. In these circumstances,
it would be a great help to know the particular contribotion of every
variable. The type of information I have in mind is that if marketing
were to reduce their minimum inventory of tractors by x units in month
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y, profits would be higher by ~z. This is precise information about a
particular variable and it is unlikely that management would have thought
of asking the question which elicited such a specific reply. One of the
problems of corporate planning is to be aware of all the key factors
which limit profits.
2.7. Sensitiv.ity
A great deal has been written about sensitivity analysis and I
have nothing new to add. I mention it because it is important and to
distinguish it from the problem~ of profit improvement and vulnerability
analysis with which it is sometimes confused. Clearly it is impo-rtant
for management to know the robustness of the plans in the face of changes
in the values of input variables. There are three facets to sensitivity
analysis: the magnitude of the change in an input variable, the likelihood
of the change and the consequences of the change. A deterministic approach
handles the first and the last. Some variant of the Hertz method is
•required for all three. Implicit in the idea of sensitivity analysis is
that the variable or combination of variables and the range of values
are chosen by management.
2.8. Vulnerability
This is the last problem of corporate planning I wish to mention.
In one sense vulnerability can be thought of as a comprehensive sensitivity
analysis. Whereas sensitivity analysis answers the question 'what are
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the consequences of sales of tractors being down 5% over the whole year?',
vulnerability analysis answers the question 'over what range of values
of input variables is the final plan insensitive?'. Framed in such a
manner it is apparent that this is a different type of question altogether.
Instead of asking about the sensitivity of the solution to specified changes
in particular variables, it asks about th~ range of ~alues of all input
values over which the solution is indifferent.
The motive for the question is to determine which estimates are
critical to the achievement of the plan and therefore should be checked
carefully to ensure their correctness and subsequently watched closely
to monitor variances as they occur.
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3. CONSEQUENCES
Enough has been said to indicate that the problems and their
consequences were important. However, I would like to emphasise the con-
tribution of tactical resource allocation not only within the framework
of planning over different time horizons, namely operational, tactical
and strategic, but also to most other planning activities of the company,
whether it be capital structure (here the contribution would be through
retained earnings and financial needs), the timing of a new product
introduction (here, the feasibility and consequences for the factory),
negotiations with the unions about mobility of labour (here, the premium
which it would be worth paying to achieve mobility) and so forth.
Thus the consequences of not to be able to produce either valid
or optimal tactical plans were far-reaching. Exactly how far-reaching
,
can be appreciated by recollecting that 70% of the company's resources
were effectively outside the control of the corporate planners.
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4. SUMViARY
A schematic summary of the course of the whole project is given
in the first table of the previous appendix. The following fills out
that f'ramework .
Full costing was a bad predictor of costs, so the company adopted
direct costing. The latter was an excellent predictor of directly
variable costs but no help with decision costs. The prediction of
decision costs required data on the physical quantities represented by
direct costs: products, direct labour, overtime, etc. This data was not
generated in sufficient detail by the planning system. Production control
was the department responsible for planning the physical units from which
total direct costs were derived. The primary function of production
control was to schedule production. In the course of scheduling production
some 70% of the company's resources were allocated. Despite pre-empting
70% of the resources, production control was concerned with neither costs
nor profits. It was difficult to understand how profits were planned or
controlled. Corporate planners were ultimately responsible for planning
the allocation of resources. Corporate planning was obviously done in a
semi-vacuum because of the inability of the factory to evaluate the
consequences of different courses of action. The difficulties with
planning resource allocation were in part due to the way the planning
process had been conceived and in part due to the way it was executed.
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Some stages of the planning process should not have been done
sequentially, because this prevented the exploration of the trade-offs
between demands for and supplies of capacity. Furthermore, tactical
planning should not have been the extension of operations planning
because much operating data was unsuitable for tactical planning and
the resource allocation process was incorr~ctly described.
The result was that there was no effective planning of or control
over the resource allocation process.
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A POSSIBLE APPROACH
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of the appendix is to describe the changes I thought
were necessary at M-F to improve the existing planning system and to
realise the potential of the resource allocation model I had constructed.
In fact the sequence was the reverse of that just suggested.
Having built a model which helped with a number of planning situations and
crossed functional boundaries, such questions arose as:
• Who should be responsible for the model?
• How should the model be used?
In what situations is the model relevant?
• Who should have access to the model?
Organisational difficulties were caused by the model's ability,
for instance, to produce better production schedules than the production
control department. Better, that is, by the criteria of production control
as well as the corporate planners. I do not discuss the organisational
.
problems.
The Assistant Managing Director decided that one of his staff
should be responsible for the B.D.R. model. Implementation at B.D.R. was
to be the first stage. It was envisaged that the possibility of extending
the approach to other areas would be examined. That was to be the second
stage. Use of the B.D.R. model would involve, embryonically, the planning
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scheme outlined in section 2 of the present appendix. However. formal
change to the organisational structure and planning systems as outlined
in this appendix would only be necessary if the model were to be
extended~
It follows that this appendix is largely normative in that it
suggests one way in which M-F could make use of planning models. covering
all the plants, as part of the formal, day-to-day, planning and decision-
making process. By implication, other companies in manufacturing
industry, the data base and organisational structure permitting, could
adopt a similar model and similar procedures.
Section 3 develops the outline of section 2, and explains the
contributions individual components make to alleviating the problems
mentioned in Appendices 1 and 2. Section 4 says something about the
corporate planning department and model building.
3.5
2. THE GENERAL APPROACH
2.1. A New Concept
On the assumption that a rational method of allocating the resources
of a company is a legitimate objective, I suggest the following scenario:
Step 1. Targets and general guidelines are sent to the functions
by the corporate planning department.
Step 2. In response, the functions send data (not plans) to the
corporate planners.
Step 3. The operational data is converted for tactical planning
uses.
Step 4. The corporate planners, in collaboration with representatives
from each function, run the corporate optimal resource allocation model.
Strategies are tried out and refined, policy decisions are taken.
Step 5. The results of these decisions are embodied in detailed
policy documents, setting out the pattern of resource allocation, which
are sent to the functions.
Step 6. The functions draw up their detailed plans within the
constraints laid down by the corporate planning department.
Step 7. The detailed plans are sent to head office where they are
checked, consolidated, reviewed and submitted to the president.
Step 8. The president approves the plans.
It may not be immediately clear in what way this is a new concept.
Perhaps most of the steps look reasonably familiar, if not in practice
then at least from the literature.
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I suggest that the solution is novel in specifically recognising
two important factors:
. operat+onal data may be inappropriate for tactical planning
• the process of consolidating and pruning functional plans cannot
achieve the optimal allocation of resources in a situation where
a change to the plans of one function alters both the demands for
and supplies of resources from another.
The means by which these two are overcome are by (a) asking, .ln the
first instance, for data which is then converted into a form suitable for
tactical planning, (b) building the data into a model which includes all
the important linkages both wi thtn functions and between them, and (c)
resolving all these interdependent and conflicting demands simultaneously:
thus eliminating the endless chasing of tails.
Looking at each step a little more closely may help to distinguish
the new concept from the old:
Step 1 is indeed the familiar one of setting overall targets,
specifying the assumptions on such things as inflation and
movements in exchange rates, outlining the products and markets
for the coming year, and so forth. Additionally this step
includes a list of unresolved issues, e.g. new product policy,
on which decisions have still to be made and for which data
must be prepared and submitted.
Step 2 is the submission of operational data in accordance with
the instructions of Step 1. An example of the form this could
take is given in Appendix 7.
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Step 3 is the important process of data conversion. This;s
better done at the centre under the supervision of those
responsible for processing the data than out at the functions.
This leaves the corporate planners free to modify the data in
parallel with the changing nature of the decisions to be made.
Step 4 is the heart of the resource allocation process.
Approximately 70% of the company's resources is allocated - all
the direct variable costs and the premlums associated with them,
as well as the major investments. These decisions set the frame-
work for a number of other policy areas such as capital structure,
short-term financing, the strengths and weaknesses of the current
product line and production facilities etc.
Step 5 can be viewed as a more detailed version of step.L. It
is important that the final results of consolidating the plans
are still compatible with the targets laid down in Step 1. To
this end, I would expect Step 4 to make allowances for the decision
costs and peripheral investment needs {amenities, etc.} not
included in the corporate model, and Step 5 to constrain the
functions so that they stay v+thtn the limits.
Step 6 is the detailed planning by the functions of all costs and
investments, within the contraints agreed with the corporate
planning department.
Step 7 is the submission of the functional plans to the corporate
planning department. They are checked for compliance with the
instructions on direct variable costs and conformity with the
restrictions on decision costs and investments. Provided there
are no violations, the consolidated plans will be consistent
with the targets established at the beginning of the planning
. ...
process.
3.8
Step 8 is the nominal one of approval. If the original targets
of Step 1 are unattainable this will come to light at Step 4.
The whole planning process is designed to minimise the
possibility of last minute surprises and maximise the chances
of a rational allocation of resources. The only reason for
the president to reject the plans would be a major change in
world or national affairs between Steps 3 and 4. Otherwise the
profit pattern of resource allocation, etc. would all be in
accord with his wishes.
The advantage of this system is that at a single stroke it achieves
several objectives previously thought, in some measure, to be mutually
exclusive:
resources are optimally allocated
corporate planners are not swamped by either a mass of detail
or a large computer model
head office retains both the responsibility for and effective
control over resource allocation
the functions playa constructive role in drawing up their
own plans
the final plans are achievable and consistent.
2.2. The Method of Execution
It is evident' by now that I advocate the use of both the computer
and an optimising technique. These replace respectively the desk calculator
and trial and error. The technique most appropriate to the situation at
Massey-Ferguson was 1inear programmi,ng (L.P.). The reasons for this choice
, ,
are, given in the next section of the present appendix.
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My suggestions of L.P. and the computer (the former implies the
latter) are not conditional upon the company having its own computing
facilities; although this does have distinct advantages. The size and
nature of the mathematical model I am proposing can easily be run on a
computer bureau. In fact, all the output in the appendix on using the
model came from that source. The run time never exceeded 10 minutes and
was more often below 5 minutes than above it. The model was of a mythical
company, making 4 products, in 3 departments, over a 13 month time horizon,
with an annual turnover of about k5.5m. So even with bureau facilities
the cost/benefit should be firmly positive; quite apart from the fact that
there are few other methods of obtaining comparable information.
2.3. The Benefits
Without prejudicing the formal statement on cost/benefit, which is
to do with the results of the planning process, I would like to consider
the e~fects on the planning process itself.
Under the old, manual, trial and error method there was no knowing
whether the plans were optimal, achievable or consistent.
The chief executive never knew on the one hand whether one more
kick would force the last ounce of potential profit out of the company
or, on the other hand, whether he had applied too much pressure, causing
promises to exceed reasonable expectations - the expedient of bUYing time
is very understandable' behaviour on the part of a harassed executive.
Firstly, his luck may change, and if the worst comes to the worst, he
has longer to look for another appointment.
The proper use of an optimization model will indicate the profit
potenti a1. If, for any reason, management wi shes to make non-optimal
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decisions, the model, in the semi-non-discretionary mode, will calculate
the consequences. If, despite every endeavour, profits are still below
the president'sgoal, the model will help evaluate extraordinary, and more
risky, courses of action in the direct cost area: for example, such things
as increasing labour efficiency, cheapening the product (euphemistically
called 'value analysis'; Rootes/Chrysler cars are a good example).
There are numerous advantages from just computerising the planning
process: one obvious example is the situation which involves revising the
plans at short notice. At M-F it was frequently the case that as the year
unfolded, sales did not run at the level anticipated when the plans were
approved, variances built up between forecast sales and actual sales. and
if marketing insisted that this was a temporary set-back and refused to
revise their forecasts, the surplus production went into finished machines
inventory. Eventually even marketing took their medicine. admitted a
mistake had been made and that the original forecast was too high and
revised their forecasts downwards. It was then necessary to reschedule
production in the light of the new, lower forecasts and high inventories.
If revising the plans takes two months, an already bad situation is needlessly
exacerbated. A computer could produce the new plans overnight, and an
optimization model would give the added assurance of choosing the most
profitable path out of the mess.
2.4. Common Reservations
I have presented the benefits to'the planning system as if they
needed very little explanation, which I believe is true, and as if 'one
could expect management, after a brief introduction, to regard these
sugges tions as the panacea for thei r p1anni ng i11s, wh ich is not true.
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Whatever the final outcome, doubts can take one or more of the following
forms:
Usually the first one to be voiced is 'what happens if a major
unplanned event occurs which upsets all the plans?'. The
questioner seldom realises that not only is this an argument
against planning (if it is against anything at all) rather than
one against using computers, in fact it is the very reverse
of what he intended; it is a situation which favours the
computer system over the manual one.
Another common objection is 'what about the unions?, have you
included them in the model?'. lhe answer is that the model
contains all the factors which can be quantified which affect
the decision variables - many more than are included in the
manual system. The purely qualitative factors are in neither
system.
There is often a question about detail, which takes the form
'part number M9l 040993 Kl is causing a lot of trouble at the
moment; the machine shop is breaking 1 in 3; it could be a
faulty batch, on the other hand, this particular job is usually
done by Bert, who has been with us since he was an apprentice
20 years ago, and he's been off sick since the beginning of the
month. It cauld be that none of the others have the ski11 .
Could your model cope with that situation for me?' If one
takes the question at its face value, the reply is that this
is a problem about scheduling parts, not about scheduling
products, but insofar as the former affects the latter, the
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model can easily be adapted to include it. However, if one
judges the real motive to be insecurity, as I would be inclined
to do, the reply is that the model has a number of shortcomings
and, astutely, this question has pinpointed one of them.
There is the notion that a manual system is inherently more
flexible than a computer system., In one sense this is true.
A manual system is capable of infinite variation. A computer
model with anything approaching the same capability would be
very expensive to develop and run, and at anyone time would
have many redundant features. However, over the range of
variation encountered by most companies there is no reason why
a computer model should not be as versatile as a manual system.
Finally, there is a style of management implacably opposed
to computerised planning and perhaps with reservations about
the value of planning at all. Typically, such people say that
they run the business 'by the seat of their pants' and that
90% of their time is spent 'fire-fighting'. There are others,
myself included, who judge both these to be symptoms of bad
management, the inadequate rushing from one crisis to another,
each the breeding ground of the next.
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3. THE SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS
3.1. Introduction
Exhibit 3.1 on the next page shows the problems, the deficiencies
of the old manual system and the strengths of the new. It can be seen
that the new approach is divided into three sections: concept, computer
and L.P. (Together, the last two comprise the method of execution referred
to earlier.)
The purpose of the diagram is to indicate the contribution made
by each of the strands of the new approach. For instance, we see that
use of the computer without L.P. (referred to in the literature as a
'budget compiler') only helps with some of the problems.
The rest of this section takes each of the problems in turn, and
explains how each strand of the new approach contributes to its solution.
Before finally leaving the old system, it is worth noting that
even taking a generous view, it compares unfavourably. Its inability
both to describe complex situations in sufficient detail and to process
the data is fatal for its claim for consideration as the major constituent
of a management information system during the last third of the twentieth
century. Techniques, technology and concepts make its redundancy increas-
ingly obvious.
I'
THE CORPORATE PLANNING PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
OLD NEW
Hanual Concept Computer L.P.----
Conflict x x x
Consistency x x x x
Data - detail x x
assumptions x x
omissions x
interactions x x
Optimization x x
Processing x
Profit Improvement x
Sensitivity x x
Vulnerability x
Exhibit 3.1
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3.2. Conflict
Each of the three strands contributes to mitigating this problem.
Their combined effect is to reduce the area of uncertainty in which the
final decision has to be made. This is achieved by removing the debate
about the deterministic, quantifiable data from the arena. Agreement on
the latter still leaves risk and qualitative factors open to differences
of opinion.
The specific contributions are:
Concept - provides reliable and appropriate data; achieved by
operational data being corrected for tactical uses, resource
allocation being done at the centre where all the demands for
and supplies of resources are known, and where trade-offs can
be explored, and by detailed guidelines being sent to the
functions, restricting their room for manoeuvre.
Computer - ability to handle the complexities involved in a
'realistic description of the system and to process the different
views of the dramatis personnae.
L.P. - the best solution to each combination of inputs, having
examined all the trade-offs. Moreover, it is able to accommodate
management's specific wishes about the value of certain variables
and to optimise over the area of indifference.
Previously, differences in personal objectives were compounded
firstly by arguments about whether the results of an analysis correctly
reflected the consequences of a particular course of action; secondly,
by the absence of any means of deciding when the company's overall objectives
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were best achieved, and thirdly, by the inability to run an analysis under
a series of different assumptions.
UnderstandablY, a 'one-shot' analysis producing suspect results
tended to increase conflicts rather than reduce them.
For instance, at M-F the new product procedure was a continual
source of friction. For this reason, an example of the introduction of a
hypothetical new product is given in Appendix 6.
Quite apart from the benefits from processing the data, building
a model has the advantage of isolating the data which must be estimated
before certain types of decision can be made. L.P. adds information on
how the accuracy of the estimates affects the results. So, for example,
the inevitable comment that the production engineers are never within
10% of the real direct variable cost of manufacture is put in perspective
as being critical, irrelevant, or somewhere in-between.
Without a centralised resource allocation model the corporate
planning department was at the mercy of the functions and whoever had the
president's ear.
The role of the corporate model is to help the corporate planning
department 'hold the ring', to supply to the combatants data which is
. .
acceptable to them all, to give management the facility of playing the
'what-if' game. In other words, up until now the planning system was- ..
unable to respond to the legitimate demands for information imposed by
the ordinary decisions of running a business. This worsened any natural
tendency for there to be conflicts of interest. A functional director,
if his will did not prevail, would have to live with and be responsible
for the ill-defined consequences of decisions with which he was not in
agreement and which were based on a somewhat arbitrary analysis. The
new system helps alleviate this problem.
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3.3. Consistency
Lack of consistency is one contributor to the problem of conflict.
For instance, awareness that the 1atest production programme, issued
yesterday, is at variance with the revised sales forecast, available a
fortnight ago, naturally increases the number of areas of disagreement.
concept - physical and financial data is processed at the
centre, replacing the former practice of submitting plans
which were consolidated at the centre.
Computer - comprehensive description of the relationships
between the decision variables; the time taken to process
the data being less than the interval between decisions.
L.P. - the planning of all demands for and supplies of resources
in the direct cost area is done simultaneously. This is
important when a change in the value of one variable causes a
bounded ripple effect as opposed to an unbounded effect.
In the first case there is the rebound effect on the first
variable, in the second case there is not.
Evidence of lack of consistency was only too conmon, and did not
increase the executive's confidence in the basic data, the means of
processing or the decisions based on it.
A frequent example at M-F was the factory's habit of having work
subcontracted, which could technically be done in-house, and at the same
time refusing the men overtime because there was not sufficient work to
warrant it.
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Such anomalies cast doubts on the value of any statement by the
factory about its ability to make products, or for that matter, not to
make them.
3.4. Data
The new concept plays the major part in providing an acceptable
solution to the corporate planning problem. It is primarily concerned
with the validity of the data and the process of allocating resources.
. Concept - in summary, the new concept is that tactical planning
must not be the extension of operations planning, that resource
allocation should be done on the basis of data and not_plans,
and lastly that resource allocation must be done at a level
in the organisation which encompasses all the interdependent
demands for and supplies of resources. Perhaps the best way of
explaining the last point is that it must be possible to weigh
the different trade-offs.
Computer - without the computer a planning system had to be
a coarse model of the company. There was no means of recording,
updating and processing the complex relationships linking the
variables. It was hoped that a global view of a few important
variables would adequately describe the company, and whatever
one's reservations it was usually better than nothing. In a
stable environment this is probably good enough, for then past
levels of expense and activity are good pr~dictors. However,
situations characterised by change and complex relationships
make coarse manual models inadequate.
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L.P. - provides a structure for describing the company and a
technique for manipulating the data. Both are important. Without
a formal structure there is no motive to direct the search for
data, no method of classifying it, no guide to relating it and
no idea how to interpret the results. Without a technique
for manipulation, articulating the model in the intelligent
pursuit of a stated objective may be either theoretically or
practically impossible.
Although the new concept represents the main innovation, L.P. and
the computer were the medium for transforming an interesting idea into
a present reality. In fact the formulation of the L.P. has a number of
novel features which made it possible to reflect the wide range of choices
open to management (a flexible approach to policies) and the many potential
sources of capacity.
The effect of the changes mentioned in this section is summarised
in section 2 of the present appendix. The objective is to remove control
over and responsibility for the process of allocating resources to head
office. This implies that the corporate planners should specify the data
to be spbmitted by the functions, check the assumptions which lie behind
the data they request and establish the relationships of variables both
with functions and between funetions. In short, they should use their
vantage point to make sure that appropriate data is submitted to head
office to permit the rational allocation of resources.
3.5. Optimisation
There are two facets to this problem. Firstly, what to optimise,
and secondly, how to optimise. The answer to the first question distinguishes
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. my approach from other applications of L.P. and other methods of corporate
planning. The answer to the second explains why I used L.P. There is a
separate ~ppendix describing the formulation, Appendix 4.
Concept - provides a management and user-orientation to model
building. This concentrat~d on such questions as: what decisions
are made most frequently?, what information and reports are
used at the moment?, how can the information and the reports be
improved to facilitate decision making in the most cost-effective
manner? The complex conceptual scheme has been given earlier
in this appendix, section 2. The new approach did necessitate
many corrections to both the physical units of measurement and
the costs of variables, with the result that the model accurately
reflected the consequences of changes in the value of variables
and also permitted the full range of policies to be tried out.
L.P. - provides a cost-effective approach to optimisation. In
the section on corporate planning problems in the previous appendix,
I identified the need for a mathematical technique which was
capable of being both goal seeking and a straight calculator.
I called these two modes of operation respectively, the
discretionary mode and the non-discretionary mode. In the·
latter case the specific value of every variable may be input
to the model, whereupon the model calculates the value of the
objective function •. It is this ability to set the value or
range of values of particular variables which makes the model
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so flexible and able to accommodate many of the policies ~hich
affect the decision variables. For a variety of reasons) the
optimisation technique I chose was linear programming:
(a) several reliable computer codes already existed,
which therefore reduced the development costs of my project
(b) new problems could be formed by combining or adding
to old problems
(c) advanced starting solutions enabled reoptimisation
of a modified problem to start from an existing optimum solution;
another cost saving feature
(d) post-optimal analysis provided a great deal of
valuable information
(e) report writing languages existed for turning the
results into a form acceptable to management; again improving
the immediate cost/benefit of the project
(f) satisfying the restrictive assumptions of L.P. did
not present insurmountable difficulties.
The net effect was to produce a compact model of the factors
influencing the demand for and supply of about 70% of all company resources
involved in the area in question.
The model was inexpensive to build and run, easy to maintain and
flexible.. Some of the management reports it produced are shown in the
appendix on using the model, Appendix 6.
The result was to provide management with a quality and variety
of information, of considerable help to the decision-making process, which
previously had been unobtainable. And, moreover, for the information to
be available within a couple of days of formulating the policy.
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There are arguments in favour of using a simulation model instead
of an optimising one. There are circumstances when these arguments would
be decisive. This is not one of them. The claims for a simulation model
are:
(a) it can incorporate any type of relationship
(b) it is frequently cheaper to build
(c) it is much cheaper to run than the corresponding L.P. model
(d) it is more flexible
(e) it can get within 5% or 10% of the optimum solution
(f) it does not require such highly qualified staff as an L.P.
To deal with these very quickly:
(a) true, but irrelevant if non-linear relationships are not
required
(b) false, unless the user intends to write his own L.P. codes,
which seems pointless, in the first instance, when so many
. good codes exist for all the important makes of computer
(c) . true, provided the number of sensitivity analyses is kept
firmly under control
(d) false, most L.P. codes are good, it is possible to search
out a bad one
(e) possibly true, but at the expense of considerable increased
man/model/machine interactions
(f) true, but you get what you pay for, and the cost/benefit
analysis should help with this one.
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The immense advantage of an L. P. model becomes apparent, if it not
intuitively obvious, when one tries to build a simulation model. There are
a vast number of situations in which there are several possible courses
of action and no clear method of discrimination other than profit. The
solution would seem to be to incorporate the relative costs into rules of
thumb for the programme to use as each situation arises. Hence, normal
overtime is 'cheap~~ than Saturday overtime and should be used first. But
this overlooks two important factors. First, it is not input costs but
marginal costs that matter. Secondly, the number of tests the computer
would have to perform to be sure that it was selecting the cheapest
possibility would be enormous. For instance, the simple distinction
between the two rates of overtime completely misses the point. Just a
few of the other potential sources of capacity are: normal overtime the
previous month, higher manpower, higher inventories; or another approach
altogether: lower sales because marginal costs exceed marginal revenue.
The advantages to resource allocation of a system which automatic-
ally discriminates on the basis of profits clearly outweights, in such a
situation, a system which lacks this ability.
3.6. Processing
There are many arguments against and in favour of using the computer
for data processing. In general they are we1l known, and I do not think
it necessary for me to rehearse them, except insofar as they are relevant
to my project:
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computer - provides the only means of solving an L.P. of more
than trivial size. The most significant use of computers is
to perform those tasks which are impossible without them. An
optimum resource allocation model is one of those uses. The
combination of the computer and L.P. not only produced better
results than the manual system, ,it was actually cheaper as well.
Having solved the L.P., it saves time and lessens the possibility
of errors (transcription and calculation) if the subsiduary reports are
generated on the computer by programmes with direct access to the original
data and the solution. At one stage I was doing these calculations by hand,
and it was very time-consuming, boring and easy to make errors.
Another advantage of the computer is the flexibility it provides
in generating the maintaining the data. The data is constantly being
modified to reflect new policies, each month it is revised by the addition
of the new month and the deletion of the old, new products are included
to test out sourcing decisions and product line strategy and so on. The
computer makes it possible for the model to reflect management's changing
perception of the problem and the search for new courses of action.
3.7. Profit Improvement
There are two components to the search for greater efficiency and
higher profits. On the one hand there is new management action. These
could be plans to reduce absenteeism or to raise the standard hour perform-
ance or to lower the scrap rate. The model is able to evaluate the
consequences of such actions. On the other hand there is the systematic
analysis of the influence every variable has on profits once the best
solution has been reached.
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L.P. - provides the shadow prices of all relevant variables.
Without becoming technical, two pieces of information arc
supplied: the profit improvement (it can be negative) caused
by increasing the number of the particular variable in the
final solution by one unit, and the range over which this
profit improvement (marginal profit) is valid. The significance
of this information need not be stressed. A report automatically
focuses management's attention on those variables which could
make the biggest contribution to increased profits.
Therefore, not only will L.P. evaluate management's schemes for
profit improvement, it will also suggest schemes. Given the complex system
of interlocking relationships which characterise a manufacturing and selling
organisation, it is unlikely that management will foresee the impact each
constraint and each restriction on the value of a particular variable, will
have on profits. This works both ways. Some factors thought to be important
may turn out not to be, and others thought to be insignificant may have far-
reaching consequences.
3.8. Sens itivity
Sensitivity analysis has already been defined as the exploration of
the consequences of changes in the input value of key variables; for
example, what happens if sales are 5% lower than forecast? Because it is
the input value which is changed, this means that the variables and their
new input values must be selected by management. The motive is to get
some feel for the possible consequences of the uncertainty in the original
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figures and thereby to assist in the formulation of a policy towards the
risks.
Computer - it is the speed and flexibility provided by the
computer which makes possible trial runs on a number of different
values of input variables
L.P. - mistakenly, L.P. is sometimes thought to be inferior to
simulation models in its ability to perform sensitivity analyses.
This is by no means an inherent weakness of L.P., although it
may be true of certain L.P. codes. The one I used, MPS/360,
could not be faulted on this point. It was a case of either
using the model in the non-discretionary mode or of using
parametric programming, a process by which multiples of a change
vector are added to the values of specific variables.
3.9. Vulnerability
This'is another unique feature of L.P. and one of the reasons for
choosing L.P. in preference to other optimisation techniques. One of the
arguments advanced to discredit the use of any optimisation techn~que is
the uncertainty of the estimates in a planning model which spans a 13
month time horizon. The reasoning goes: how can you justify a search for
the last 5% or 10% of profits when the uncertainty in the basic data is
at least as big and may even be as much as twice these amounts?· In fact,
far from being an argument against L.P., uncertainty is an argument for it.
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L.P. - provides a systematic analysis of the manner in which
uncertainty in the input values of the variables affects the
optimal solution.
The best plan for allocating resources will probably be very
sensitive to the value of certain inputs, less sensitive to others and
almost completely indifferent to others. The effect of vulnerability
analysis is to 'identify those input values which should be estimated
carefully and watched closely, and those which are not in need of such
care and attention.
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4. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
4.1. Introduction
Hhile the cost/benefit gives a payback of less than a year, and
the intangible benefits might we ll be considered sufficient to justify
the project on their own, I do not want to gloss over the implications
this approach to corporate planning has for the corporate planning group
and for building a corporate planning model.
4.2. "The Corporate Planning Group
The first point I want to discuss concerns the corporate planning
group: its name, role, composition and responsibilities.
I have carefully not referred to the process of corporate financi a1
planning, which is what most people have in mind when they talk about
corporate planning. The reason corporate planning, either in name or
substance, should not primarily be concerned with financial planning is
that it is impossible to allocate resources in an optimal manner by playing
around with financial plans. The unpalatable fact is that if the
functional plans are inconsistent, sub-optimal and unachievable when they
arrive at head office, no amount of wizardry by corporate financial
planners will rectify the matter.
The problem is not new, and attempts to overcome it tend to
concentrate on prevention; recognising that cure is difficult, if not
impossible. Prevention often takes the form of some combination of
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planning guidelines plus corporate 'travelling circus'. The latter
probably consists of a group from head office who discuss and review
plans with the functions as they are being drawn up. This is a help.
However, if all three problems are to be adequately resolved then I
suggest the answer is an approach very similar to that which I have
outlined.
In which case, the corporate planning group is doing very much
more than produce financial plans, although the financial plans are the
natural consequence of the group's activities. It is also doing more
than is implied by the term logistics, which is commonly used to refer
to planning the flow of materials and products. In fact its activities
span all the usual functional areas. Perhaps it is best called 'The
Corporate Planning Group'.
The group has a formidable task. It is not only responsible for
building and running the resource allocation model, but also has to
specify the input data. The planning cycle starts with the group
issuing guidelines on the functional data to be submitted. They then
convert the data for tactical planning: changing the degree of detail,
aggregating it differently, modifying the assumptions and the data to
reflect the objectives of resource allocation and so on. The model is
continually being adapted as management formulates new policies to be
tried out, new products corne along; in fact all the demands for informa-
tion on the tactical implications of strategic and operations planning
must be accommodated besides tactical planning in its own right.
The decision about the skills to be found in the p1anning.group
determines the success or failure of the whole concept.
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There are those who take the view that the group should consist
of financial experts who can call upon the backroom boys (a collective
noun for: computer specialists, O.R. workers, production engineers, etc.)
as they are needed to perform specialist tasks, such as building the
model.
My experience is that this view is mistaken. Firstly, because
it is difficult to make intelligent use of a model at arms length, i.e.
without being aware of how it has been constructed, its limitations, the
logic, its potential, etc. Secondly, it is equally difficult to communicate
to someone else (a professional model-builder) how the model is to be
constructed without becoming intimately involved in its construction.
It is not possible to say blandly 'build me a corporate resource allocation
model I •
My suggestion is that the group should have within it all the
skills necessary to build, run and maintain the model and to advise top
management. This will include the ability to collect and convert the data
from production control, to unearth the assumptions which lie behind the
cost data, and so forth.
The model spans all the functional areas; the group should be
multi-disciplinary.
I realise that a frequent panacea for people at the top of large
organisations who feel they have lost control to the echelons below,
whom they suspect of filtering out too much or the wrong information, is
to create a new group directly responsible to the man at the top - what
better precedent could there be than the cabinet office and Lord Rothchild's
think-tank?
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However, if the planning group is to have a model capable of
determining the best allocation of resources under any given set of
circumstances, and if strategic, tactical and operational policies are
to be tried out on the model, then the group should have access to what-
ever body or whichever individual wishes to control and is responsible
for the allocation of resources.
The group is responsible for turning policies into inputs to
the model and presenting management with the quantifiable consequences
of these policies in a form which is meaningful and can be understood.
Examples of some of the ways complex information can be communicated are
given in Appendix 6.
4.3. Model Building
In a book on simulation models, Goldie lists his complaints
about models under the headings of lack of responsiveness and lack of
confidehce. In the former category are:
. models take 3 to 4 times as long to build as promised
it takes a long time to incorporate a change
the data ;s not readily available.
In the latter category he mentions:
the model is never quite right
the problem to be solved has to be translated into the model's
terms
the model cannot be explained in understandable terms
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the process being simulated changes faster than the model
can be changed
no-one can define the probable range of error in outputs.
He is probably expressing the reservations many executives have
about computer planning models. And in this appendix I not only advocate
use of an optimal resource allocation model, but also suggest that for some
industries there is no comparable alternative - comparable, that is, in
terms of cost/benefit - for a certain range of planning activities.
Goldie's reservations can be turned round to imply the properties
of an acceptable model. They can be summarised by saying that the model
should be small and flexible, should use existing data, be easy to
validate and should indicate the consequences of the probable error in
inputs.
Perhaps I could illustrate these points with reference to mY
resource allocation model.
Without wishing to play down either the work that went into
developing the model, or the interesting formulation, my model, as far
as models go, is small. It is compact enough for the card deck to be
manipulated by hand should the necessity arise. The reason is that
the deck represents data and not data + programme. This is a point.
which is often overlooked. A change to a simulation model which means
reprogramming, to an L.P. model means more data. The latter is the
easier to accomplish.
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Goldie's comment about data raises several issues. My experience
is that it is possible to achieve a worthwhile improvement over the
manual system wi tb a relatively small model. Three attributes of my
model are that it uses existing data, it presents output ina form
familiar to management and , consequently, it is within the threshold
of change which the company can assimilate. The model is not perfect.
The suggestion is that the model should be built around existing data -
albeit converted - and make as few demands as possible for new data. It
is better that expensive data collection be initiated by a user, who has
reservations about the validity of the output, than by the model builder.
The last two implications from Goldie's article concern validation
and ranges of output values. Validation is a useful process for the model
builder: it provides the opportunity for reassurance that no important
variable has been omitted, no untenable assumption made, no relationship
incorrectly described, and so forth. There are two complementary
approaches to validation. The first is to test the model out on the
limit: put in large opening inventories, close down a factory for two
months, group all the sales at the end of the year, etc. The second is
to run the model in parallel with the existing system and reconcile
discrepancies. While the manual system cannot hope to reproduce the
results of the L.P. from the inputs, it can work backwards and check
the results and the inputs for consistency.
I am not sure that I fully understand Goldie's point about the
range of error in outputs. A corporate model consists of inputs, relation-
ships and output. Uncertainty may be associated with either of the first
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two. With a deterministic model, if the range of possible variation is
known, the consequences can be explored with sensitivity analysis. The
probability of a certain variation and the attitude to risk must both be
assessed by the decision-maker. The contribution L.P. makes to the question
of risk is firstly information about the range of variation in the value of
input data which can be tolerated before the optimal solution changes. And
secondly the consequences changing input values has on output values.
Goldie's experience at Boeing was with a deterministic simulation
model. If he judges randomness to be the most important characteristic
of planning activities, then maybe he ought to consider developing a
stochastic model. Depending on the source of randomness, stochastic
programming could be relevant. Alternatively, he could try a stochastic
simulation model.
However, his views are interesting in that they represent the
attitudes a model-user has to model-builders and models. It is difficult
to say how typical he is. Elsewhere in the article he claims to be a
supporter of the idea to use models for planning and controlling complex
operations.
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5. SUMMARY
The solution strategy had three prongs: a conceptual approach, the
use of the computer, and resource allocation through optimisation.
Between them they go some way to resolving the corporate planning problem
as I perceived it at M-F.
The heart of'the system is the concept which proposes (a) the
submission of data by the functions to head office, (b) data conversion,
(c) optimisation of the demands for and supply of resources (simultaneous
solution), (d) the submission of plans by the functions in conformity
with the pattern of resource allocation established in (c), and finally
(e) the consolidation and approval of the plans.
The L.P. model was the means of achieving the best solution to
any particular problem, it was a great help in determining the robustness
of the solution and was a guide in the search for profitable new management
action.
The effect of these measures was to make the corporate planners
not only responsible for the allocation of resources, which had always
been the case, but 'also to give them more control over the process. The
latter was new. Previously they had consolidated and pruned functional
plans in a well-intentioned by misguided manner. Previously the plans
were inconsistent, non-optimal and unachievable. With the new system~
a rational and optimal allocation of resources is possible.
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THE PLANNING MODEL
1. INTRODUCTION
I start this appendix with the mathematical formulation of the
model. Besides the equations there is a brief description of the coefficients,
bounds and so forth.
With section 3 begins a more detailed account of why I chose the
particular formulation. The logical structure has been reversed in this
manner to make the appendix easier to read for the person more concerned
with the formulation than such things as design objectives and so on.
The formulation should be viewed in the context of the following
scenario:
sales,production and capacity available were
all to be decision variables
. variables should be natural rather than
composite
overtime capacity should be linked to actual
manpower
there should be costs and limits on the rate
of change of manpower.
This framework presents two difficulties. Firstly~ there is no
obvious right hand side (R.H.S.); all the usual candidates have been made
into variables. Secondly, linking overtime to the output activity value
of another variable Jooks as if it might involve a non-linearity.
2. THE FORMULATION
2.1. The Definitions
I define the variables:
S.Lt sales of product i in period t
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i 1, ... ,9
t = 1, ... ,13
Pit production of product i in period t
Gkt production of product group k in period t k = 1,2
lit inventory of product i in period t
Djgt number of men in department j working
capacity tranche q in period t
Hjt number of men hired for department j
at the start of period t
Fjt number of men leaving department j
at the start of period t
The subscript m refers to a raw material
in short supply.
The usual conventions are followed:
a for matrix coefficients
b for R.H.S.
c for objective function coefficients
z for the value of the objective function
Sometimes a variable name in brackets is used
as a subscript to remove any possibility of
confusion t e.•g.
.
J = 1, ... ,8
q = 1, ... ,4
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b(S)it distinguishes monthly sales of product i
in period t from b(P)it the limit on production
of product i in period t due to jigs and fixtures.
Both are part of the R.H.S. vector.
2.2. The Equations
(a) sales restriction
The actual sales must not be greater than forecast sales.
(b) production, sales, inventory identity
Opening inventory plus production equals sales plus
closing inventory.
(c) production and capacity restriction
894
L (L a. 'P't - Ll a. tD. t < 0)j=l i=1 1J 1 q= Jq Jq -
The capacity required must not be greater than the capacity
available.
(d) product group identity
for i = 1,2 and k = 1
i = 3,4,5 and k = 2·
The production totals of certain groups of products are
combined.
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(e) material restriction
13 t
L (L L
t=l i t=l
a .P.m~ ~t < for ~ = 8,9
The cumulative production of certain products must not
exceed the cumulative deliveries of the material in
short supply.
(f) rate of production restriction for individual products
The level of production must not exceed the capacity of
special purpose equipment.
(g) rate of production restriction for groups of products
The combined production of groups of products must not
exceed the capacity of shared facilities.
(h) availability of overtime restriction
D. - D'lJqt J t
< o for q = 2,3
The number of men on overtime must not exceed the number
on normal time.
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(i) hiring and firing identity
- H + F. = 0jt Jt q 1
The difference between the number of men in a department in
two consecuti ve per-i ods equals the number hired minus the
number fired.
(j) rate of hiring and firing restriction
o
The number of men hired (fired) from one period to the next
must not exceed a certain percentage of the number of men
in the department in the earlier period.
(k) facilities restriction
D·t< b'tJq - J q = 1
The number of men in a department must not exceed the
manning restriction of existing facilities.
(1) finished machines inventory restriction
Inventory of each product must not be less than marketing's
minimum requirement.
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(m) the usual non-negativity restrictions
S, P, G, I, D, H, F > 0
(n) the objective function
13
maximise Z = L
t=l
9
(r c,s'ti==l l. l.
8 4
L L
j=l q=l
c. D. -Jqt j q t
9 9
L c.P. E c·tI.ti=l l. l.t i=l 1. l.
8 8
L c, H. L C'tF't)
j=l J t J t , 1 J JJ=
Table 4.1 below gives details of the units of the matrix
coefficients, nature of the R.H.S. elements, and so forth.
COEFFICIENTS, R.H.S. & OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
(a) Coefficients
a. . standard hours per product per department corrected for spares
1J
and wastage
ajqt standard hours available per man for each tranche, ·department,
month combination
a. - usage of material m on product i
ml.
a(H)jt - rate of hiring for each department
a(F)jt ~ rate of firing for each department
All other non-zero coefficients are 1. In the equations above, where a
coefficient has not been explicitly stated it is understood to be 1.
Table 4.1 .../ ...
4.9
(b) R.H.S.
b(S)it monthly sales volume
b cumulative delivery of materialmt
b(P)it jigs and fixtures restraint for individual products
bkt jigs and fixtures restraint for groups of products
bjt maximum size of department with existing facilities
b(I)it minimum inventory holding
(c) Objective Function
c,S't sales revenue minus freight1 1
c'P't direct variable cost minus freight and day-wage1 1
citlit inventory holding cost per period
c. D.Jqt Jqt
~t~t
c·tF.J Jt
cost of each tranche of capacity
cost of hiring one man
cost of firing one man
Table 4.1
4.10
2.3. Some Explanations
In this section I cover a few points which may not be immediately
apparent from the equations and the coefficients, etc.
The introduction to this appendix contains the statement that
there is no obvious R.H.S. And yet no l~ss than 6 equations appear to
have non-zero R.H.S.'s. The explanation concerns the facilities of the
L.P. programme I used (MPS/360) and computational efficiency.
Any equation of the form
x < bpt - pt
in which there is only one variable on the left hand side of the equation,
and its coefficient is 1, can be omitted and the restriction accommodated
by redefining the decision variable. This is known as the bounded variable
technique; a brief description is given in Hillier and Lieberman. Fortunately
there is no need for the user of the L.P. code, MPS/360, to do anything
more than specify the bounds for a particular variable, the programme takes
care of the rest with no disturbance to the intelligibility of the output.
The motive for replacing equations with bounds is that computation time
is very sensitive to the number of rows (it goes up as the square or the
cube). If the matrix is large to begin with, these extra rows, repeated
each time period, could make all the difference between low costs and
quick turnround and high costs and long delays. The compromise was to
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express all the b 's as bounds on variables except for the sales
t.
restriction in equation (a). This had the advantage of making it easy
to do sensitivity analyses on the sales forecast via parametric progranuning
of the R.H.S ..
The equations I wtsh to comment on are:
(a) sales restriction - the sales forecast need not be met. The
t\'10most likely reasons being that to do so would be infeasible
or unprofitable.
(b) production, sales, inventory identity - by defining the
equation to only span two consecutive months this avoids
linking equations ~hich run through the whole matrix. This
makes it easy "to maintain and modify the matrix.
(c) production and capacity restriction - capacity required
(products) is defined as natural instead of composite
variables. An example of the latter would be: the number
of product p made in capaci ty tranche c inti me peri ad t
By using non-cumulative natural variables, the amount produced
each month can be read straight from the L.P. output listing
without either differencing figures (required if cumulative
variables had been used) or adding figures (required if
composite product/tranche variables had been defined without
an accumulating variable). Capacity available is defined
as effective manpower; the coefficients being the capacity
available per man for each tranche of capacity. The four
tranches are linked together as an increasing piecewise linear
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function. The manner in which the tranches are linked so
that the capacity available on overtime is related to the
number of men ass iqne d to work on normal time is covered
in (h) below.
(e) material restriction - by dealing in cumulative units this
equation permits the holding of raw material inventory without
the definition of any variables.
(f) and (9) restrictions on rates of production - the inclusion
of these variables and restrictions makes it possible to
calculate directly the value to the company of further invest-
ment in special purpose equipment.
(h) availability of overtime restriction - the problem is to
link the upper limit of one variable to the output value of
another without getting involved with non-linearities and
integar programming. As mentioned in (c), the trick is to
work in capacity per man and limit the number of men working
overtime to those on normal time. The diagram on the
following page shows how this is achieved; see Exhibit 4.1.
(i) hiring and firing identity - this approach allows the costs
of changes in the level of manpower to be included. If they
were left out the model would (wrongly) always prefer to meet
fluctuations in activity by changing the manpower level (if
possible) rather than use any of the other possibilities, e.g.
work overtime, subcontract, build up inventories, forego
sales, etc.
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ADDENDUN
Page 4.13, Exhioit 4.1
Suppose that instead of employing the maximum number of men possible,
the optimum solution calls for a capacity in normal time of oAt, the
potential capacity at the two rates of overtime will be reduced to the
dash lines A'B' and B'C'.
Thus, for a given department, OA is the maximum potential capacity
available in normal time (with existing facilities) measured in
standard hours. For the primary department in December OA is 30 1: 364,
AB is 30 1: 64 and BC is 30 1: 22; where 30 is the maximum number of men
who can be fitted into the primary department wi thou t additional
investment and 364 is the number of standard hours available per man
on normal time. 64 and 22 are for the two rates of overtime (see page
7.37, table 7.15). Therefore the capacity available at "titr~-and-a-
half", AB, is 17.5% of capacity available at normal time, OA.
Taking the example of the Factory Strike, the actual number of men
assigned to the primary department in December is 25.53 (page 5.39
Exhibit 5.14 Number 384 Column DHTRTTNB). Consequently the amount
of capacity available at "time-and-a-half" is 25.53 * 64 and not
30 1: 64. The capacity available at the premium rates is therefore
controlled to constant percentages of the capacity used at normal
.time, e.g. in December the capacity available at "time-and-a-half" is
.brought down from AB (1920 standard hours) to A'B' (1634 standard
hours) as the capacity used on normal time is brought down from OA
to OA'.
ERRATUM
Page 4.13, Exhibit 4.1
Reading from left to right, the first occurences of L,M,N, should read
L',M',N'.
tI
COST & SIZE OF CAPACITY TRANCHES
For a given department and period
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The solid lines represent the relationship between cost and capacity
if the maximum number of men, permitted by the existing facilities. is
employed in the department. OA is the capacity available during the normal
working week of 40 hours, AB the amount of overtime capacity at 'time-and-
a-half' (17.5% of OA), BC at 'double-time' (6% of OA).
Suppose that instead of employing the maximum number of men possible,
the optimum solution calls for a capaci ty in normal time of OA, the potential
capacity at the two rates of overtime will be reduced to the dash lines A'B'
and B 'C'.
This approach wo rks for two reasons. Firstly, the tranches of capacity
are successively more expensive. Secondly, by making the units in which the
tranches are measured 'output per man', it 1S simple to define an equation
whic/h says that the number of men assigned to each tranche of overtime must
not be greater than the number of men assigned to work normal time.
Exhibit 4.1
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(j) rate of hiring and firing restriction - the shadow prices
associated with these restrictions will be a useful guide
to different manpower policies.
(k) facilities restriction - machine loading is responsible for
the upper limit on the number of men that can be employed
in a department. This restriction enables the potential
value of investment in general purpose equipment to be assessed.
2.4. Strengths and Weaknesses
As a summary of the first two sections of this appendix, I wish
to mention some of the strengths and weaknesses of this method of form-
ulating the problem.
2.4.1. Strengths
The advantages of the model are that:
it is small and compact
values of the important variables can be read from the L~P.
code output
the problems of maintaining or modifying the model are
minimal
it includes the most influential decision variables
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2.4.2. Weaknesses
The shortcomings are due to the refinements which could have
been made but were not because to have done so would p~oably have taken
the model beyond the threshold of change to which the company could adapt.
the nightshift could be defined as separate variables
instead of being included wi th the dayshift
the cost of investing in new facilities could be
included either as a linear or non-linear restriction
the model could be integrated with a financial accounting
module, as described by Mao
the use of integer programming would enable the model to
analyse either/or situations, such as sourcing, more
realistically.
2.4.3. ~1atrix Structure
To give an idea of the way the non-zero coefficients are distributed
and the recurring patterns in a multi-period model, I have tncl uded a print-
out of the first two periods of the model in Exhibit 4.2 on the next page.
Unit coefficients are printed as 1, all other non-zero coefficients are
represented by an asterisk, zero coefficients are left blank.
An explanation of row and variable names is given in Appendix 8.
It can be seen that mY policy of defining natural variables and
reluctance to condense the matrix in the interests of interpreting the
output has resulted in a relatively sparse matrix. In fact, the structural
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density is 0.75, with an m * n matrix (a .. ) the calculation is:
1J
dens ity = count of non-zero a .. 's1
mn
Gross density adds the non-zero elements of the logical vectors and
divides by m(m + n) •
Exhibit 4.3 shows a summary of the magnitude of the matrix
coefficients. MPS/360 has an optional procedure to scale the input data.
I used this procedure rather than scale the data manually prior to input.
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SUMMARY OF ~ATRIX COEFFICIENTS
PlANNI NG BASE <:
SUM~1~RY OF MATRIX
SYMBOL RANG E COUNT {INCL.RHSl
l LESS THAN .000001
y .000001 THRU .000009
X .000010 .000099
W ..000100 .000999
V .001000 .009999 2
U .010000 .C99999 3
T .100000 .S99999 1
1. 1.000000 1.000000 88
A 1.000001 10.000000 1
8 10 ..000001 100.000000 36
C 100.000001 1,000.COOOOO 21 .
0 1,000.000001 10,000.000000
E 10,000.000001 100 ,000.000000
F 100,000.000001 1,00 0,000.000000
G GREA TER THAN 1,000,000.COOOOO
Exhibit 4.3
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3. BACKGROUND TO f"ODEL FORMULATION
The situation which the model was to represent had a number of
characteristics which although typical, I believe, of manufacturing
industry, could not be adequately described by existing formulations.
Consequently, the model I developed for the corporate planning problem
had several interesting features:
contrary to the usual production smoothing or assignment
problems, capacity available was a decision variable
instead of a R.H.S.
sales were also treated as variables
the objective was maximization
the sales mix and production mix problems wer~ solved
simultaneously
the different tranches of capacity within a given department/
month combination were described as interdependent segments
of an increasing piecewise linear function
the number of men working overtime was limited to those
assigned to the regular payroll
the marginal cost of production did not assume a linear
relationship between the direct labour hours of a product
and the cost of supplying the hours
management was able to evaluate the consequences of having
men on short-time
unprofitable sales were dropped (marginal revenue less than
marginal cost).
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4. DESIGN OBJECTIVES
There were certain criteria which if met would increase the chances
of the model being accepted and used. The objectives concerned: construction,
maintenance, performance and results.
4.1. Construction
The model should be as small as possible consistent with producing
valuable results, because (a) refinements could follow later having once
gained management's confidence and approval, (b) the promise of jam tomorrow
would not long sustain top management's enthusiasm for a project they
considered speculative, (c) the data deck should be capable of manipulation
by hand, and (d) computer runs required a dedicated machine which was
expensive as well as difficult to schedule.
Variable names should be standardised in length and easily
recognisable mnemonics in order to ease the interpretation of output, the
flagging and masking of variables and the subsequent writing of a report
generation programme.
The matrix should not be condensed if this involved either adding
more than 6 non-zero matrix elements for each reduction in the number of
rows or making it necessary to perform auxiliary calculations on the output
to derive the activity values of decision variables.
Since the sales of many of the products had a pronounced seasonal
pattern (e.g. seed drills), (a) the basic unit of time should reflect the
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scheduling and resource allocation problems this presented, and (b) the
model should span more than one complete cycle, i.e. 13 months.
4.2. Maintenance
Maintenance of the model would consist not just in updating the
matrix coefficients as new estimates became available once a year, but
also in adding new and deleting old time periods as the year unfolded.
It was envisaged that the model would be maintained on a rolling 13 month
basis. At least one monthly run would be needed ,to evaluate the consequences
of the monthly revisions of the sales forecast.
Some of the problems of maintaining the model would be mitigated
by a matrix generation programme which processed the raw data into the
form required by the formulation and the L.P. code. The original project
proposed to M-F had provision for a matrix generator, but it was low down
on the list of priorities. Initially the model was to be run without its
help.
There should be no linking equations which crossed more than one
time period boundary. This does not usually decrease the number afrows
and variables but it does mean a big saving in non-zero coefficients.
Another advantage would be that adding and deleting months would only
involve operations on the two ends of the data deck; there would be no
sorting and sequencing problems in the middle.
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The variables should be grouped by type within time period instead
of vice versa. This would make possible the addition and deletion of
months by blocks without reducing the ease with which new products or
plants could be introduced. There are arguments in favour of increasing
the length of a unit of time, say from one month to three. after the first
six months of the planning horizon. The reasons are that the uncertainty
in the estimates does not justify a finer analysis, and that for any
given length of planning period the model is smaller. The trouble with
aggregation is that it hides the problems (average demand may be within
average capacity), it increases the calculations and keypunching necessary
for updating (as three month blocks are broken down) and the length of
the planning horizon is constantly changing. I think that the disadvantages
of .aggregation are greater than the advantages.
4.3. ·Performance
The process of debugging and optimising a large model can be
difficult. If possible the model should be designed to reduce the chances
of going infeasible.
An efficiently run computer centre is unsympathetic to inaccurate
estimates of run time. Unfortunately the answer is not to give oneself an
ample ma.rgin of error, this strategy merely lowers the L.P. 's priority
in the queue of waiting jobs.
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If the solution is infeasible it inevitably occurs in the last·
few moments of a run~ sometimes having performed a lengthy search for the
illusive basic feasible solution. The consequences are (a) a time-
consuming search to find and correct the cause of the infeasibility,
(b) no results~ and (c) a delay before getting another computer run.
There are two strategies, not mutually exclusive, for reducing the
risk of infeasibility. The first is to create overspill variables with
high cost penalties so that they are only used as a last resort; an
example would be the provision of unlimited subcontract capacity. The
second is to have a maximising model with 'less-than-or-equal-to' constraints
for the main demands for resources instead of a cost minimisation model
with the opposite constraints.
There are two additional reasons for a maximising model with sales
as a decision variable: (a) the model can assign values to demands for
resources (up to a specified limit) and thereby refuse the unprofitable
.sale, and (b) where a cost minimisation model would go infeasible, leaving
the analyst to select the restraint to be relaxed, the maximisation model
automatically drops the right number of sales and production units of the
marginal product{s). The latter point is perhaps more SUbstantial than
it might appear. The problem to be solved is the selection of both the
variable(s) and/or restraint(s) to be changed and the amount{s) by which
it/they should be changed. The shadow price by itself or in conjunction
with the company net return (not input to the model) is not much help.
Information on the range over which the shadow price is valid is only
available after the optimal solution has been reached, as a result .of
uSi.nga post-optimal procedure. It can be seen that the elimination of
infeasibilities from a minimisation model can be difficult.
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4.4. Results
It was anticipated that the model would be run in response to
four types of demand:
to evaluate the consequences of the revised sales forecast,
which was produced monthly
to help establish the pattern of resource allocation and the
detailed plans for the coming fiscal year
to supply data to the financial analysis department on
the consequences and vulnerabilities of proposed sourcing
and cut-in dates of new products
to provide reliable quantitative data to help resolve inter-
functional disagreements.
Since the model was to be used frequently, for a number of
different purposes and, initially at least, without a report writing
programme, the variable names should be meaningful, the variables natural
rather than compound and post-optimal manual calculations be kept to a
minimum.
In other words, it should be easy to recognise the variables and
to interpret and analyse the results.
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5. VARIABLES AND RESTRICTIONS
E. M. L. Beale in his book 'Mathematical Programming in Practice'
suggests that 'One should shart by formulating and running a one time
period model'. This is good general advice to help identify the key
variables in a novel situation, but it was,not the appropriate initial
step for the model of B.D.R.
One of the main headaches of planning at M-F was the seasonal
fluctuation in sales, and the consequences this had for the scheduling of
men and the provision of facilities.
The effect of·the fluctu~tions would be masked by a single time
period model in which the variables represented aggregate demands ..for
products and supply of resources. The question was not whether to
build a multi-period model, but what unit of time was necessary to capture
the behaviour and complications of the real world.
A suitable conpromtse between size of model, degree of detail,
availability of data, length of planning horizon and requirement for
output reports, was to choose a time unit of one month. The only restric-
tion which did not fit easily into this framework was that on the_maximum
daily rate of production. Otherwise it was possible to establish suitable
relationships between some of the more obvious variables.
The next stage was to experiment with different combinations of
suspected key variables.to discover those critical for the model to
replicate the behaviour of the real system. One of the difficulties of
model construction was the discrepancy between local management's perception
of the system and the way it actually worked. Fortunately this tended to
modify the relationships between the variables rather than their selection.
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One class of decision variables which will not be discussed
specifically under either demands for or supplies of resources is the
production variables - the quantity of each product produced during
each period of the planning horizon. The reason for this is that I
regard sales as the demand for resources, and they are defined as decision
variables, instead of being part of the R.H.S.
In this scheme. production is an intermediary between resource
inputs and sales. and production variables are defined as combinations
of resource inputs.
There is one.type of restriction specifically associated with the
production variables: the limit on the number of each product and some
groups of products which can be produced in any given period. Th~ limit
is due to the capacity of special purpose equipment (often jigs and fixtures),
some of it used for individual products, some common to a family of products.
In the latter case it is necessary to define a variable for the combined
production of the products which share special purpose equipment.
5.1. Demands for Resources
5.1.1. Sales
In this section I consider the reasons for making sales a class
of decision variables instead of the more usual R.H.S.
In a manufacturi.ng and selling company such as M-F, the demands
for all the main resources are generated by the sales forecast for existing
and new products, which is why traditional planning starts at that point
-rather than any other.
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However J there is no overri ding reason why the sales forecas t
should be met for all products, thus viewing the sales forecast as an
exogenous variable. Occasionally a company will continue with an
unprofitable product to maintain a foothold in the market wh ile a replace-
ment is being developed. Alternatively, an unexpected order might be
squeezed in to the production schedule for a loyal customer even though
this generates high disruption costs or even temporary losses. But
these should be the exceptions rather than the rule.
The problem with the traditional approach is that the sales
forecast is accepted or not on the grounds of whether it is possible to
m~ke the products instead of whether it is profitable. lhe diagram on
the following page outlines the process. This approach is illustrated
very well by what happened at M-F when the sales forecast could not be
met: the marketing department 'went on allocation' and accepted whatever
products the factory could supply - marketing then rationed their customers.
At no stage in the process was any attempt made to work out the most
profitable sales and production mix. lhis was due to the quarrel being
regarded as a family affair between marketing and production, neither
of whom were directly concerned with profits, and even if they hqd been
there was no means of performing the calculations.
Apart from making it less likely that the model is infeasible,
there are several reasons for treating the sales forecast as a variable
rather than the more usual R.H.S.
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TRADITIONAL SALES & PRODUCTION PLANNING
SALES
REDUCED AND
MARKETING
GO ON
ALLOCATION
NO
SALES :
FORECAST
NOSMOOTHPRODUCTION
NO
YES
TO. FACILITIES
PURCHASING
Exhibit 4.4
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It permits profit maximisation in place of cost minimisation,
thereby removing the need for post-optimal manual calculations
It solves simultaneously the production mix and sales mix
problems
. The marginal sales are automatically dropped, i.e. marginal
revenue is greater than or equal to marginal cost. In so
doing the model selects the products, the number of units and
the months. The benefit of getting the model to perform this
task is best appreciated by attempting to replicate it manually.
The number of possible variations is large and for each the
steps in the process would involve:
- the addition or deletion of sales or capacity to derive
the new figure for total cost
- the manual calculation of revenue
the subtraction of total costs from total revenue to give
the new profit
- the subtraction of the old profit from the new to discover
the marginal effect of the particular change
the shadow prices and marginal costs are easily interpreted to
identify the most profitable avenues for new management action.
5.1.2. Finished Machines Inventory
Finished Machines Inventory (F.M.I. or inventory) is held by
marketing as a hedge against the unexpected order and the factory's inability
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to meet the promised production schedule. Inventory is also held by
the factory to help smooth production.
The inventory requested by marketing is a demand for resources,
while the factory's holding is a source of stored capacity.
The finished machines inventory policy of marketing, expressed
in minimum values per product per month, i~ properly regarded as a
decision variable contributing to the demand for resources.
5.2. Supplies of Resources
Exhibit 4.5 on page 4.31 lists ~he demands for and supplies
of resources.
The main categories of resource are: manpower, subcontract, inventory,
materials, money and facilities. The contribution of the first five is
relatively"easy to measure and define. The amount of productive equipment
required for the manufacture of one unit of product is more difficult to
determine. The corollary of the last point is that whereas it is simple
to breakdown a production schedule into manpower plans, supplier schedules
and cash flow, it is another matter to decide whether the capacity on the
500 ton brake press will be sufficient.
I discuss each of the resources in turn.
5.2.1. Manpower
B.D.R. has 7 productive departments, each corresponding to a
differen~ manufacturing activity: press shop, machine shop, etc. Because
INPUTS
·OUTPUT
Exhibit 4.5
L.P. INPUTS & OUTPUTS
Demands
Sales Forecast
Inventory Requirements
RESOURCES
CORPORATE
L.P. MODEL
4.31
Supplies
Opening Manpower
Overtime restriction
Subonctract
Opening Inventory
Materials Restriction
Financial Objective
Facilities Restriction
17
Sales Mix
Production Schedule
Manpower Schedule
Overtime Plan
Subcontracting Requirement
Monthly Inventory - Sales
- Smoothing
Materials
Facili ties Plan
Financial Optimum
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each department requires a different type of skill, there is mobility of
labour within departments but not between. So manpower is not a single
homogeneous resource but 7 distinct resources. Consequently it is not
sufficient to smooth the total demand for manpower, the load in each
department must be smoothed.
The only exception to the mobility of labour within departments
is in the assembly area. This department is split into two sections,
one for F.E., the other for I.C.N., and there is no mobility between
the sections. Each must be loaded and smoothed individually. The effective
number of departments is therefore 8. Dividing the machine shop makes it 9.
The factory works two shifts and there are two rates of overtime.
The details are given in Appendix 7 on data collection.
The labour content of a product is measured in standard hours
(determined by time study and used for scheduling production and paying
labour) and is split out by productive department. A correction factor
for efficiency makes it possible to turn standard hours into the equivalent
number of man hours. In this way various relationships are established,
some of which are illustrated on the following page, see Exhibit 4.6.
For a number of reasons, capacity available should be a variable
instead of a R.H.S.:
In the medium term manpower levels can be changed (hiring
and natural wastage). There are limits restricting the rate
of change and costs associated with units of change. Parametric
pr:ogramming is no substitute in this situation.
If.capacity available is part of the R.H.S., the costs of
direct labour have to be put against the products. The effect
Exhibit 4.6
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is to mis-state the marginal cost of making an extra unit
of product, and to omit certain costs which vary directly with
manpower but not with production, e.g. holiday pay, canteen
subsidy. These last two points are elaborated in Appendix 7 on
data conversion.
The consequences of having unused capacity can only be assessed
if capacity available is a variable (unless the L.P. code
allows prices to be put against slack variables).
When capacity available is a R.H.S. separate (composite)
variables must be defined for each product made in each tranche
of capacity, i.e. normal time, overtime, etc. in order to
include the premiums associated with successive tra~ches.
In mUlti-time period models this involves many variables.
With composite product/capacity tranche variables, as soon as
the normal capacity of one department is used up, all departments
move into overtime working. Implying that, for instance, the
,
press shop is working Saturday overtime even though it has
spare capacity during the week.
. The potential size of a department in one period is related
to its actual size, and not its potential size, in the previous
period. This relationship cannot be expressed if capacity
is a R.H.S.
In a similar vein; the overtime capacity is linked to the
actual number of men in a department, not the potential number .
.Again, parametric progranuni.ngis little help. To illustrate:
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if the actual manpower used is 25 and the potential 30, the
maximum overtime available is 250 hours per week (25%), not
300.
Only by defining sources of capacity as variables with associated
costs is the model able to choose the cheapest combination of
productive resources.
One other source of capacity is subcontracting. I mention it
here because it is closely related to departmental manpower. Operations
are put out to subcontract to relieve the workload on an individual department.
An anomaly of the old system of production control was that the amount
of work planned for subcontracting was kept at 5% throughout the year,
while there was (a) spare overtime capacity, and (b) spare facilities
and equipment.
To summarise the restrictions associated with manpower-:
There w.as an upper 1imi t to the number of men that coul d be
employed in each department with existing facilities.
There were restrictions for each department on the rate of
change of manpower from one month to the next. Upwards, the
limit was imposed by the need to train and assimilate the new
men. Downwards, the restriction was due to industrial
relations problems which limited reductions to natural wastage.
There was a cost associated with changes in manpower levels.
Upwards, they were primarily advertising, training and free
clothing. Downwards, the cost was administrative.
These relationships could only be expressed by making capacity
~vailabl~ a decision variable.
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5.~.2. Finished ~1achines Inventory
In 5.1.2. I mentioned that inventory is carried for two purposess
both as a demand for and supply of resources. The factory uses inventory
as a source of stored capacity. It is one of the means of ironing out
fluctuations in production and at the same time meeting the demand for
products from marketing.
It is not necessary to define two inventory variables, for
every product/month combination, one for each purpose - the two uses can
be accommodated by a single variable.
The amount of inventory required by the factory is established
by running the model with no restriction on the level of inventory other
than the usual non-negativity constraint. This gives an levaluation basel
with which the effects of other policies may be compared.
The results of subsequent runs with different inventory policies,
either upper or lower bounds, can be set against those of the evaluation
base and the differences computed. Examples of an evaluation base and
inventory policy runs are shown in Appendix 6 on using the model .
. 5.2.3. Materials
There is no need to define as a variable in the model any material
which is in abundant supply. In this case the process of calculating the
quantities and negotiating deliveries is irrelevant to resource allocation.
The only factor of interest is the cost, and this is one component of the
direct variable cost of each product.
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There are two circumstances in which it may be necessary to
include a particular material as a variable or just as an equation. The only
condition is that it must be possible to specify the amount of it required
by different products.
The first is when the material is expensive and, for some reason,
significant stocks are held. In this situation it may be advisable to
keep track of movements into and out of the stock and include the holding
cost in the objective function.
The second is when a particular material is in short supply and
restricting production. Here the delivery schedule is important. Also
it is desirable to allow the model to'choose which of the products
competing for this particular resource should have priority. There is an
example of a hydraulic ram limiting production in Appendix 6 on using
the model.
5.2.4. Money
The objective of a company is usually taken to be the maximisation
of profits or the minimisation of costs. In either case the resource of
money is included in the model as the objective function; one of the
coefficients associated with decision variables.
Therefore there is no need to include financial variables in the
model unless there are specific financial constraints. An example would
be the requirement to reduce or maintain the overdraft at a specified
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level. This would require the definition of a variable for the cumulative
cash flow to the end of each month. The coefficients relating it to the
other decision variables would depend on the giving and receiving of
credit and the assumptions governing the payment of other expenses.
Another type of financial constraint would be to say that the
opportunity cost of funds was x% per annum. In this case, the monthly
receipts and payments in .the objective f'unction-shoul d be multiplied by
the appropriate discount factors to give the corresponding present value.
The effect of such an approach would be to place greater emphasis on
present sales compared with future ones, and vice versa for cos ts.
Having constructed the basic resource allocation model without
these two specific financial constraints, it would be easy to include
either or both. Neither were included in the model for M-F.
5.2.5. Facilities
Facilities and equipment are relevant to resource allocation in
three ways: the utilization and disposal of existing capacity and the
provision of new. The inclusion of these restrictions in the M-F model
depends on it being legitimate to express the capacity of a piece of
equipment in standard hours.
I think it is legitimate for the reasons that (a) the departmental
efficiency (standard hour performance) in part reflects the capital
intensity of production methods (130% in the heat treat department,
and 250% in the paint), and (b) no assumption is involved which is not
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implicit in the calculation of standard hours per product per department
(the latter are aggregates of 'floor to floor' times of individual
operations).
One possible complication is if the capital intensity of production
methods varies widely within a department; for example, suppose the
machine shop had both radial arm drills and numerically controlled equip-
ment. In this situation it would be necessary to split the department into
homogeneous machine groups with separate efficiency factors. This strategy
was employed for the machine shop at B.D.R., which contained two groups
of equipment, one for flow-line production, the other for batch production.
The former had an efficiency of 220% and the latter 200%. There was
mobility of labour between the two groups of machines.
With these introductory comments in mind, I go on to consider
facilities and equipment as a resource input.
The limit imposed on production capacity by the existing facilities
can be expressed as an upper limit on the number of men that can be employed
in each department. This is simpler than the alternative of having a
separate variable for machine capacity, and just as effective.
A similar approach can be applied to additions to capacity .. In
other words, the effect is to increase the number of men that can be
employed. The investment in the new capacity (a setup cost) would not be
included in the model, and the return on investment would be calculated
from the difference in profits with and without the extra capacity.
Just as it is possible to define a variable for existing capacity
in each department, a similar method oould be used for new capacity.
The only assumption being that new capacity is infinitely divisible. It
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could be argued that this assumption is not inappropriate for the medium
term planning of a large job shop. On the other hand, it could be got
round by using integer programming, but this is an unnecessarily expensive
alternative.
For an initial formulation, I do not think that the benefits
justify including facilities as a separate class of variables in the
model. The restriction they impose on production can be included indirectly.
5.2.6. Summary of Variables and Restrictions
This section consists of a list of the classes of variables and
one or two of the facts mentioned previously.
Production
Sales
Manpower
Overtime
Subcontract
Inventory
daily rates of production
marginal revenue ~ marginal cost
rates and costs of changes
linked to manpower, also premiums
overspill capacity
limit imposed by inventory policy
required for production smoothing
limit production levels
limits on existing size of departments
limits and costs on additions
Materials
Facilities
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RESULTS
1~ INTRODUCTION
On December 16th, 1971 the Assistant Managing Director of M-F
U.K., Mr. Smith, at the close of a meeting to review the research pl~oject,
decided that the Tact~cal Planning Model should be used by top management
to assist with the tactical and strategic policy issues. He made Mr.
Bevan, his personal assistant, responsible for the implementation of the
existing model and for exploring the possibilities of extending the
approach to the rest of the U.K. operations. To this end I was to work
with Mr. Bevan.
MY specific role was to document the project and to provide
operating instructionsfor the management information services (M.I.S.)
department on how to maintain the program and run the computer. The
reason for the latter was that, at that time, I was the only person in the
U.K. company with experience of operating the computer in the o.s. mode
required by MPS/360. The experience covered both the software and driving
the computer. In other words, during the development of the project, I
had been the sole interface between user and computer, and therefore
responsible for:
• model construction and maintenance
• linear programming
• MPS/360 - program
• 0.5./360 - software
• machine operation
• programming.
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The last four alone involved being familiar with 15 IBM manuals. Implementa-
tion required me to document these tasks and assign them to the relevant
functions. I am currently engaged in these activities, but no longer as
an employee of M-F. The reasons are as follows.
During November 1971 a new computer had been delivered. Bedding-
down problems necessitated M-F at first having to put work out to bureaus
and subsequently having to reinstall the old computer. Associated with,
the new computer were a number of ambitious projects to rationalise
computing facilities throughout the U.K. It was estimated that it would
.be 6-9 months before the computer facilities were operating efficiently
enough to give time to the implementation of the Tactical Planning Model.
In these circumstances, I decided to leave the company at the
end of January 1972 to write mY thesis and to document model construction
and maintenance. I agreed to become directly involved again when the
situation was more favourable. The appendices on data, model construction,
etc. will be used as the first level of documentation for t~-F.
The first stage of implementation concerns the B.D.R. factory
and from the cost/benefit analysis in section 2 can be seen to require
only part of the attention of one analyst. The second stage, extension
to the whole of M-F U.K., would involve the creation of a planning department
responsible to the assistant managing director (distinct from the existing
financial planning department) and a reorganisation of the planning cycle
and systems as outlined in Appendix 3. It follows that mY suggestions
for reorganisation and new procedures, being the second stage of implementation,
are the main non-descriptive elements of mY thesis. They represent what
I think is involved in widening the project to include the rest of the
U.K. operations.
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Because computer time is expensive, and because mere size
adds nothing to either the description or the demonstration of the model,
the conputer output in my thesis is taken from a scaled down model,
which retains the complexity of the original. However, the cost/benefit
analysis relates to the original model and was presented to M-F.
5.8
2. COST BENEFIT
The analysis, Exhibit 5.1, is based on the project implementation
plan shown in Exhibit 5.2. No'mention is made of development costs. This
is because the main development costs were manpower and computer time.
The former was covered by an S.S.R.C. grant. The cost to M-F of
computer time was insignificant as the marginal expenses were electricity
and paper: the machi~e was leased, there was spare capacity and mY time
was free.
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
SYSTEM COSTS
Implementation Costs
(i) Machine Time
3 hours program testing
2 hours system testing
5 hours at £80 per hour
(ii) Manpower Requirements
1 Systems Analyst, 7 man weeks at t2,200 p.a. 300
3 Computer Programmers, 15 man weeks at t2,000 p.a. 580
1 Project Manager, 10 man weeks at t2,000 p.a. .390
1 Project Analyst, 10 man weeks at t2,000 p.a. 390
(iii) Training Costs for Project Analyst
L.P. Formulation course - 3 days
MPS/360 Introduction course - 1 1/2 days
}WS/360 Implementation course - 1 week
Computer experience time - 4 hours
30
15
56
320
Annual Running Costs
(i) Machine Time-Monthly
delete and revise data - 1/4 hour
first solution of new model - 1 hour
2 policy runs - 3/4 hour
2 hours
24 hours p.a. at t80 per hour
Exhibit 5.1
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.400
.1,660
421
2,481
1,920
... / ...
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s :
(ii) Machine Time - Annually
1 initial solution to update
the model - I hour 80
(iii) I Project Analyst for 25% at E2,000 p.a. 500
2,500
TANGIBLE BENEFITS
Subcontract Premiums 60,000
PAYBACK
The Implementation and first year running costs are
covered two times by projected first year savings
NOTES
The programmes change the system from being card-based to disk-based.
Three programmes are required:
validation routines
coefficient generator
merge
The flow-chart for the system is given in Exhibit 5.3. The usual IBM
The programmes to be written areflowcharting conventions are used.
marked:
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3. OUTPUT
There are three types of output I wish to illustrate and discuss:
the one-page summary, the full optimal solution, the post-optimal results.
The structure is to start with observations about and conclusions
from the three types of output and then to describe and explain them.
Apart from the one-p~,ge sunmary, the examples of output are with the
relevant section on description.
3.1. One-Page Summary
The summary is reproduced as Exhibit 5.4; a listing of the
program which generated the report can be found in Appendix 8 on construct-
ing and running the model.
The report is divided into four sections: headings, financial
summary, activity summary and sales summary. The financial summary gives
details of the more volatile elements (premiums e~c.) of the line COST;
the line ~OST SALES REV. assumes that a postponed sale is a lost sale.
The activity summary is split between standard hours and men.
The diagram, Exhibit 5.5, presents the main details graphically
and gives a clearer idea of what is happening in general terms. The
translucent corrects for the different number of days in the periods.
Briefly, in-house facilities are increased at the maximum rate
until February in order to meet sales in those months and build up
sufficient inventory for sales in March. Work is subcontracted mainly
for the secondary department and to a lesser ~xtent for the primary.
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The lost sales are entirely of drills and are caused by the
cumulative supply of hydraulic rams being insufficient for the cumulative
demands of both drills and loaders. In fact some rams delivered in
the first three months are stored and used to alleviate the shortage in
February (it is cheaper to store rams than products) even though this
means losing sales in January. The lost sales in March are due to the
inventory of drills being exhausted back in January. For a more detailed
explanation of the supply/demand situation for rams, see Exhibit 5.6.
Having hit a plateau in April and May, manpower falls away as
fast as natural wastage will allow.
The high contribution (cash flow) in ~'arch is due to the high
sales (the third highest) being met by almost liquidating inventories
and there being no production costs to set against the cash inflow.
Of the big jump in standard hours between November and December,
. three are due to subcontracting work, another nine to the addition of
two more working days and six to the extra fourteen men.
3.2. Full Optimal Solution
The full optimal solution report consists of a Rows Section and
a Columns Section. The former contains ·information on: the row activity,
slack activity, upper and lower limits and the dual activity. Information
for the latter includes the column activity, input cost, upper and lower
limits and the reduced cost. Examples of the printout are shown as
Exhibits 5.11 to 5.17 on pages 5.36 to 5.42.
ERRATA
Page 5.17, Exhibit 5.6
The Lost Sales of the Drill should read , ,58, 69, -.
For Forecast Sales of the Drill instead of 101, read 161.
I'
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DELIVERY SHORTFALL OF RAMS
I Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
DRILL Lost sales
.Open Inv. 100 101 190 190 108 Forecast sales
67 122 98 106 121 Production
89 26 F .M.1.
'I
Lost sales
LOADER 86 79 117 118 110 Forecast sales
Open Inv. 74 51 l24x l24x Production
154 142 114 121 127 17+ F .M.1.
196 149 230 245 Usage
RAMS 200 220 200 200 240 Delivery
4 75 45 240 Inventory
+ F.M.I. in April is zero
x Production of the Loader is at the upper limit allowed by special
purpose equipment, including use during overtime.
Note The reason the model chooses to forego sales of drills in January
in order to produce loaders in February to sell in April (when
the loader F.M.I. is nil) is that the marginal revenue of the
latter policy exceeds that of the former, as can be seen from
calculating the effects of making 1 less loader and ·1more drill
in February.
Exhibit 5.6. .../ ...
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DRILL LOADER
b b
Sales Revenue 361.10 409.75
Costs - Production 184.65 188.97
Subcontract Premium 109.70 92.53
Holding Cost 7.20
294.35 288.70
Marginal Reve_nue 66.75 121.05
increase decrease
All departments are subcontracting work in February~ Making 1
less loader does not alter the situation. The manufacture of
1 more drill will therefore involve subcontracting work.
The result of increased drill production by 1 unit in February
would be to reduce revenue by 3:;54•.3.
Exhibit 5.6
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The information in the report is of two kinds. On the one hand
there are the activity values of all the structural and logical variables.
From these it is possible to draw up production and manpower schedules
for products and departments. Also the input costs make it easy to
derive the corresponding financial summaries. The one-page summary
shown earlier used these methods and presented aggregated data. The
reports I developed for M-F gave the individual product/department
"information.
On the other hand, the full optimal solution report gives the
marginal costs or shadow prices of the variables which are at limit
1eve 1• Margi na1 cos ts are defi ned as the rate of change in the objecti ve
function per unit change in the activity of a variable. For a maximisation
problem, the marginal costs of variables at lower limit indicate the
"amount by which the variable is 'overpriced' to be included in the optimal
solution. For variables at upper limit, the marginal costs represent
the increase in contribution from relaxing the bounds by 1 unit. Shadow
prices (dual activities) are associated with the logical variables and
indicate the rate of change in the objective function when requirements
for products or the supply of resources change.
The marginal costs and shadow prices can be used to help identify
the areas with the most profit improvement potential. One of the peices
of information missing from the report is the range over which the marginal
cost is valid, i.e. how many units can be introduced at the rate/unit
" given by the marginal cost.
'0
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Exhibit 5.7 overleaf shows one method of summarising the profit
improvement information contained in the Rows and Columns Sections of
the full optimal solution for February. The formulation of policy requires
the tables to be extended over the whole planning period and the addition
of the information from the post-optimal results. The latter is covered
below in 3.3.
The figures can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, as they are
presented, t .e. the increase in profits from the sale of an extra F.W.D.
{tl148.7),or from increasing the capacity of the special purpose equipment
for the F.W.D. by one unit (b76.9),or from installing one unit more of
general purpose equipment in the primary department (tl04.4). Secondly,
by changing the sign, the figures are also the reduction in contribution
from activity levels being less than planned. Thus if some machine in
the primary department breaks down, causing one man to have to stop
working, contribution will fall by tl04.4. On the basis of the figures
for the first four m~nths, management might decide to step-up preventive
'maintenance. Alternatively, depending on the attitude to risk, maintenance
might be cut to a minimum to maximise productive capacity during the
period before the strike with the intention of overhauling equipment while
the strike is on.
3.3. Post-Optimal Results
The post-optimal report gives the following types of information:
• The penalties of deviating from the planned activity levels.
To be more precise: the penalties are either the decrease
in the objective function per unit change in the activity
F.W.D.
DRILL
LOADER
DIGGER
PRIMARY
SECONDARY
ASSE~mLY
Notes
Exhibit 5.7
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PROFIT IMPROVEHENT/UNIT SUMMARY
(1)SALES F .M.1. J & F RAM
J. f:. f:. J.
1148.7 76.9
-3.2 66.8(2)
54.2 6.3
;,381.8 23.5
OVT. I GEN. RECRUIT-· NATURAL (3)STD. AT OVT. PURPOSE ING
HRS. 1 1/2(4) AT 2 EQUIP. PROC's WASTAGE -
J. 1. f:. 1. f:. b
0.8 31.2 9.0 104.4 - -40.0
0.8 33.8 9.5 149.7 -159.7
0.8 39.4 11.4 15.9 -115.0
(1) J & F - special purpose equipment for each product.
(2) Shown jointly but in fact extra supplies would be
used to build more Drills.
(3) The figures are the cost penalties if men leave
Jor another job before the strike.
(4) The units for both rates of overtime are standard
hours per man.
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value of each variable in the basis, or the decrease in the
objective function from variables at limit level backing
off from the limit, i.e. variables at lower limit increasing
in activity and those at upper limit decreasing.
The robustness of the optimal solution to changes in input
costs and prices. In other words, the optimal solution is
insensitive to certain movements in costs and prices and
.:,the report identifies the range over which the indifference
.operates. This is helpful when considering either the
accuracy with which to try to estimate costs or the impact
of the residual uncertainty about the estimates.
For variables at limit level, the total profit improvement
from relaxing the constraint, i.e. the number of units for
which the marginal cost is valid~
• The range of variation in activity levels over which the
basis remains unchanged.
Examples of the post-optimal reports are given in Exhibits 5.22
to 5.25. The details for February are extracted in Exhibits 5.26 to 5.29.
Each of the first three categories; deviation penalties, robust-
ness and profit improvement is considered in turn.
3.3.1. Penalties of Deviation
The brief summary, Exhibit 5.8, gives details of the more
important variables, the magnitude of the penalty (in brackets) per
unit change, the direction of change which will incur the penalty and
sometimes-a comment.
SALES:
PRODUCTION:
F.M.I.:
MANPOWER:
OVERTIME:
HIRING:
SUBCONTRACT:
Exhibit 5.8
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VULNERABILITY TO PROFIT TARGET
F.W.D. (-bl,149) and Digger (-b38l); a drop in
sales in February would be lost sales.
F.W.D. (-b77) and Digger (-b24); a drop in
February would be made-up in an earlier period.
~Severe penalties for all products, except the
Drill, for both increases and decrease. The worst
is for a drop in F.W.D. (-bl,066).
Primary (-bl04) and Secondary (-b150) should not
be allowed to drop. The high costs of training
in assembly work (bllO) lessen the consequences
of a drop in Assembly and make subcontracting
marginal work more attractive than otherwise.
At least maintain the current policy in Primary
(-b40) and Secondary (-b43).
At least maintain the current rates of increase
in Primary (-bI04) and Secondary (-bI50). Do
not hire more than necessary for Assembly (-bIlS).
Should be kept to a minimum as costs of increasing
are high, in Primary (-h84.5) and Secondary (-b12l);
the penalty is less in Assembly (-b13).
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As can be seen from Exhibits 5.22 to 5.25, the reports do give
the range over which these penalties are valid. By modifying the problem
to make a variable have the activity shown by UPPER or LOWER ACTIVITY, it
is possible to explore the consequences of changing the original plans.
The analysis in Exhibit 5.8 suggests that manpower policy has
a bigger influence on profits than might be expected. Also the training
policy of the assembly foreman does imply a different manpower policy in
.:,that department from the others.
3.3.2. Robustness
Exhibit 5.9 summarises the results for February. The full
extract is contained in Exhibit 5.28. The purpose of the analysis is
to identify the amount of variation in input costs to which the planned
activity levels are indifferent.
When a variable is at its own limit level or is restrained by
an associated variable being at limit level, any change in the input cost
tending to make it move outside the present limit will have no effect.
In other words, the optimum solution is insensitive to cost moves in
such a direction.
The figures in Exhibit 5.9 are the percent to which the pr-ice/
cost could move, not the amount by which it could do so.
The overall picture is of stability. The smallest margin for
error is associated with product costs, which only have to drift upwards
~ by 3% for the plan to change. A margin of this size can soon be
eroded when the specification of products is being changed continuously
to improve quality, add new features, etc.
SALES:
PRODUCTION:
F.M.!. :
MANPOWER:
OVERTIME:
SUBCONTRACT:
HIRING:
Exhibit 5.9
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ROBUSTNESS TO REVENUE & COST CHANGES
Company net return could fall for all products
except the Drill: F.W.D. (70%), Loader (87%),
Digger (68%).
~Product costs could rise for all products,
except the Drill, to 103%.
The plan is insensitive to any reasonable change
in holding costs.
Costs could increase in all departments: Primary
(227%), Secondary (282%), Assembly (119%).
The plan is similarly insensitive to foreseeable
changes in Overtime costs: Primary (339%),
Secondary (357%), Assembly (196%). The percentages
for Sunday overtime are higher still.
The amount of work subcontracted would remain as
planned for reductions in costs to Primary (69%),
Secondary (58%), Assembly (96%).
The number of people recruited or leaving is
insensitive to the relevant costs.
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3.3.3. Profit Improvement
The main areas for profit improvement in February are detailed
in Exhibit 5.10. The figures are taken from Exhibit 5.29 later in the
appendix.
Some of the information may appear to be intuitively obvious.
However, although it might be reasonable to expect, say, extra F.W.D.'s
~
to make an important contribution to profits, at least four other peices
of information are required:
In which month should the extra sales come?
How many extra units can be produced?
In which month(s) should they be produced?
• How much is it worth paying to secure the extra sales?
The profit improvement analysis provides answers to the first
two and the last. The model would need to be modified and rerun to
answer the third.
Before action was taken on the basis of these figures, it would
be necessary to see whether the same bottlenecks were recurring in
other periods. If production of the F.W.D. was continually bumping
up against the limit imposed by jigs and fixtures, it would be worth-
while exploring the possibilities of investment to increase their capacity.
However, if the potential savings are caused by the presence
of the strike in the following month, then the figures can be used
as a guide to what it would be worth paying to find short-term solutions
to the bottlenecks, such as increasing efficiency, cutting down on
maintenance time and so on.
TOTAL PROFIT IMPROVEMENT Sill1MARY
5.27
Profit/ Number TOTAL
Unit of Units PROFIT Comments
fj fj
SALES: F.H.D. 1149 7 8041
LOADER 54 14 756
"
DIGGER 382 14 5345
SUPPLIERS: RAM 67 448967
J & F: F.W.D.
LOADER
77
6
22
50
1694
300
CAPACITY: SECONDARY 0.8 5093 4074
RECRUITING: SECONDARY 150 5
Exhibit 5.10
750
Used to make Drills
Production is limited
by special purpose
equipment.
Does not include cost
of providing capacity.
Units are std. hrs.
5.28
4. ONE-PAGE SUM~1ARY
The report, Exhibit 5.4, is divided into four sections:
headings, financial summary, activity summary and sales summary. It
is supposed to be self-explanatory, nevertheless I will go through it
quickly in case there are any ambiguities.
I The Headings
Management Policy. The purpose is to identify the situation(s)
being analysed. This particular analysis explores some of
the consequences of a factory shut-down in March.
Planning Period. Since the model is to be used as a r~ling
plan, it is necessary to identify the limits of the planning
period. Although the model covers a 13 month period, the report
is only concerned with the first 12, so that the results are
comparable with those of the other systems. Information on
the 13th month is available from the optimal solution report
produced by MPS/360.
Sales Forecast. Sales forecasts are revised and approved by
the M.D. every month. These forecasts are the most volatile
. .data in the model. Changes in the forecast tend to affect
the whole pat~ern of resource allocation. One of the dis-
advantages of the manual system of production scheduling was
that it took over 1 month, after the sales forecast was approved,
to produce the new plans for factory activity.
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Computer Run. This is a useful guide to the time that has
elapsed since the sales forecast and a means of keeping track
of the status of the other data in the model: a necessary and
difficult process with a large model.
Days and Months. Since the year is split into four and five
week periods, some of the fluctuations are more apparent than
real.
II The Financial Summary
Despite appearances, the figures are'in pounds sterling; the
type chain does not have the appropriate symbol. The figures
in units of thousands are the integer part of the number
(truncation instead of rounding). Consequently, there are
sometimes small differences between the resul ts on the summary
and those in the full optimal solution printout. One or two
comments I make about particular variables cannot be deduced
from the one-page summary and in fact are taken from the
full optimal solution printout, parts of which are illustrated
in the next section, as Exhibits 5.11 to 5.17.
Revenue. These figures represent realisable sales not forecast
sales. In other words, sales for which there is capacity and,
in the absence ofa policy to the contrary, which are profitable.
The difference between forecast sales and realisable sales is
shown in the line Lost Sales Revenue. There is no allowance
for the giving of credit, although it would not be difficult
to build this into either the model or the report-writing
program. The figures are calculated by mul tiplyi.ng the activity
5.30
value of each sales variable by its input cost (in MPS/360
language). This means that freight is shown as a reduction
in sales revenue.
Cost. Again there are no adjustments here for credit from
suppliers. The figures are calculated by multiplying activity
values by input costs and summing by period. It is possible
to introduce data at the report-writing stage, so one development
would be to include management estimates of the remaining period
costs. The costs are low in March because of the strike. In
fact, most of the 21 should be taken out. The reason for
this particular correction not being made is explained in
Appendix 6 on using the model, which contains the example of
a strike. The costs included here are 70% of all company
expenses.
Contribution. The result of subtracting cost from revenue.
The figures highlight the effects of seasonal sales, a month
of lost productive capacity being used and increased at the
maximum rate for the first three months and surplus production
going into finished machines inventory to meet the sales in
March and April. For instance, the low contribution in
December is primarily due to efforts to double inventory
between the first two months. Strictly speaking, contribution
in this report corresponds more to cash flow than profits.
In the accounting records the cost of finished products is
first transferred to the inventory account and subsequently to
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the income statement as cost of goods sold. However, if the
planned closing inventory is set equal to the opening inventory,
the total contribution will be a good measure of profits.
F.M.I. Only finished machines inventory is included. As
there are no limits on the size of finished machines inventory,
for the present analysis, except for the first and last months
(13th not 12th), the amounts represent that required to smooth
production~ The figure in the Total column, 111, is the
straight average for the 12 months.
Premiums. Both overtime (OVTM) and subcontract (SUBCON)
premiums are included in the Cost line above. They are split
out here because, together with the inventory holding cost, they
are good indicators of the mismatch between sales and productive
capacity and of the erosion of profit margins. Together, the
two account for ~50,OOO, 16% of direct labour costs. The
reason for these variables being the first to be affected by
over or under-capacity is that manpower levels, one of the other
two restrictions on capacity, are expensive to increase and
difficult to decrease. Larger coefficients and smaller costs
in the equations for restricting the rate of change in manpower
reverse the order; the model then chooses constant rates of
overtime and a more flexible approach to hiring and firing.
The units are now pounds instead of thousands of pounds.
F.M.I. Hldg. The holding cost of finished machines inventory.
Sometimes there appears to be an inconsistent relationship
between the value of inventory and its holding cost. One
5.32
explanation is that the latter is affected by the length of
the period whereas the former is not. Another possibility
is that the value of inventory and its holding cost are expressed
in different units. It is possible for an inventory holding
cost to be shown in a month where there is no F.M.I. The
reason is that any value of F.M.I. below 1:1,000 will be
truncated to zero.
Lost SalesRev .. The model is constructed to permit production
to lead sales but not to lag them. If the sales target cannot
be met, the model treats the shortfall as lost sales. Again,
revenue is less the freight charge. The purpose of the
figures is to signal the need to revise the sales forecast, or
reverse some policy decision, as the present forecast
is incompatible with the production programme.
III The Activity Summary
The report presents information on the physical data which
generates the financial summary. Whereas the latter consists
of activity values multiplied by input costs, the former ;s
calculated from the activity values and the coefficients (matrix
elements) of the decision variables.
Standard hours. Standard hours are the best unit for monitor~ng
the overall factory workload. They are the one unit common to
the measurement of the labour content of products and of the
capacity of departments. There;s no other homogeneous measure
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of throughput. Production control does its scheduling in
these units and management thinks in them. The next two lines
on the report show how the workload of the production programme
is divided between the factory and subcontractors. When work
is subcontracted, this takes the form of individual operations
rather than whole products or major components. Work permanently
routed through subcontractors is said to be sourced from an
outside supplier (subcontracting is temporary), it does not
appear in the figures for subcontracted standard hours or premium,
and the cost is classified as direct material.
Manpower. The manpower in November 1971 is fixed, together with
the upper limit on the level of manpower in each department
(the constraint imposed by existing facilities). In fact, the
maximum manpower with existing facilities is 220. During
April, May and June two of the three departments are at
maximum capacity. At the start of the year manpower is being
increased at nearly the maximum rate. The 207 in the Total
column is the average for the period.
Overtime. These are clock hours not standard hours. The
percentage is calculated by comparison with the normal attendance
.hours. lhe maximum possible amount of overtime is about 23.5%
per man, excluding Sunday afternoons which are reserved for
short-term problems. The overtime percent illustrates the
effect of linking the amount of overtime available to the
number of men assigned to each month (the activity value of
another variable). The figures under Total are the sum of
the hours and the average of the percentages.
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IV The Sales Summary.
The last section shows the breakdown each month of the sales
revenue between the four products. Freight is included as
a deduction from sales revenue. By making the model maximise
contribution, the sales mix problem is solved at the same
time as that of production scheduling. The figures in the
last column. are the averages for the 12 month period. Notice
that in March all the drill sales are lost. Marketing had
forecast 108. In October the forecast was zero as can be
seen by reference to the Lost Sales Revenue line.
5.35
5. FULL OPTIMAL SOLUTION
This section retains the structure of the previous one:
description is followed by explanation. The MPS/360 output of the
optimal solution is divided into two parts: Section 1 concerns rows,
Section 2 columns. Together, for this model, they occupy 15 pages.
I have included three pages from Section 1 and four from Section 2.
Full details of thesys ten for assigning names to variables are given
in Appendix 8 on constructing the model. Here I pick one or two as
necessary. Both sections have similar structure and content and so
will be described together, with differences being noted.
5.1. Rowand Column Sections - Description
The two sections are illustrated as Exhibits 5.11 and 5.14.
Each section is printed as a table of eight columns with one row of
the table for each row or column of the problem. The columns in the
table are taken from left to right.
NUMBER. This is the internal serial number of the row (strictly,
the logical variable associated with the row) or column. If the work
matrix contains m rows and'n columns, the rows are numbered from 1
through m and the columns from m + 1 through m + n. These numbers are
useful principally for analysis of the iteration log line where vectors
are identified by their serial numbers. The iteration log is not shown.
NAME. (column heading: ROW or COLU~~). This is the eight-
character name given to the row/column by the user.
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STATUS (column heading: AT). This is a two-character code
denoting the status that the row or column activity (4th column) has
in the solution. Codes and their meanings are as follows:
SS - in the basis and feasible
** - in the basis and infeasible
FR. - nonbasis free
EQ - nonbasis artificial or fixed
UL - nonbasis, activity at upper limit
LL - nonbasis, activity at lower limit
ACTIVITY. This is the value that the row or column activity
t~kes in the solution. For columns, it is simply the solution value.
For rows,however, what is printed is not the solution value of the
corresponding logical variable. If the constraint is written as:
I a..x. + Ii = bij lJ J
where h. is the R.H.S. and 1. is the logical variable, the quantity
1 1
printed corresponds to:
I a .. x ,
j lJ J
The user should be aware, however, that this quantity is computed from
h. - 1. and not from the summation.
1 1
SLACK ACTIVITY (row section) and INPUT COST (column section).
These are self-explanatory.
LOWER LIMIT. The algebraically lowest value that the activity
(column 4) can take and remain feasible.
5.44
UPPER LIMIT. The algebraically highest value that the
activity (column 4) can take and remain feasible.
DUAL ACTIVITY (row section) and REDUCED COST (column section).
The dual activity is otherwise known as the simplex multiplier, and
the vector of dual activities as the1r vector. The reduced costs are
otherwise knows as dj'S. Note that the dual activity of a row is the
reduced cost of the corresponding logical variable. The dj of a
variable is the rate of increase in the objective function value per
unit increase of the variable. When optimal, therefore the dj's of
nonbasis variables at lower level are positive for a minimisation
problems but negative for a maximisation problem.
5.2. . Explanation
The reduced costs and dual variables only give the rate of
change of the objective function per unit change in the corresponding
variable. From the full optimal solution report, illustrated in
Exhibits 5.11 to 5.17, there is no indication of the range over which
the rate of change is valid. For the latter information, the post-
optimal (range) report is needed; see section 6 of the present appendix.
MY remarks about the reduced costs ~/ill ignore the fact that the
number of units which can be introduced or removed from the solution at
a particular cost/unit is unknown for the present. The rows section
of the report is considered first. The main exhibit for the rows
section is 5.12, with occasional references to the others.
5.45
5.2.1. Rows Section
Instead of discussing every row in one time period; one row,
typical of each type of equation and restriction, is selected. The
rows are identified by name and dual activity. February, month 0, has
been chosen because it is immediately prior to the strike.
73 SHTRTMTD - 0.82779 The restriction (equality after the
addition of the slack variable) expresses the relationship between
production in February and the capacity of the primary department.
Because the row is at its upper limit (UL, column three), the value
of the corresponding slack variable is zero (the entry in the column
headed 'Slack Activity'). The Slack Activity is only non-zero when
there is short-time working in the primary department during February.
The negative sign against the dual variable means that if the value of
the slack variable is increased from zero to 1, the value of the
objective function will be reduced by bO.82779. Changing the value of
the slack variable is equivalent to making compensating changes to
the capacity of the primary department; the slack variable can be
thought of as absorbing or releasing capacity. So another interpretation
of the dual activity, in the present case, is the value of marginal
increases or decreases in capacity in the primary department. From the
Columns Section, Exhibit 5.16, it can be seen that the limit of existing
facilities has been reached, Column 444, DHTRTTND. As far as the L.P.
is aware, extra capacity can only come from subcontracting. The cost of
subcontracting 1 standard hour is ~O.82779. The magnitude and sign of
the dua1 -,activity indicate that if in-house capacity could be increased,
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it would be possible to save the cost of subcontracting the equivalent
amount of work. Of course, the total saving is not ~O.82779 per unit.
From this must be subtracted the cost of providing the extra in-house
capacity. There are a number of possibilities: increasing the proportion
of men on nights, working overtime on Sunday afternoon, increasing the
efficiencyof the department through a revised bonus scheme, and so on.
Rows 74 and 75 represent similar restrictions for the secondary and
assembly departments respectively.
76 SHTRTTXD - 40.16798 The restriction limits the number of
men who can work overtime, at 1 1/2, to the number on the regular payroll.
Again, the slack has a value of zero and is interpreted in a similar
manner to Row 73 above. If the value of the slack variable SHTRTTXD is
increased from zero to 1 (now the units are men, whereas in 73 they were
·standard hours), the value of the objective function will fall by b40.l6798.
Increasing the value of the slack variable can only be accommodated by
reducing the number of men working overtime at 1 1/2, Column 445, DHTRTTXD,
Exhibit 5.16. Reducing DHTRTTXD requires a similar reduction in the
number of men working Sunday overtime, Column 446, DHTRTTZD, and equation
(h) Appendix 4. There are three ways of compensating for this double drop
in overtime capacity: either cut back production or build in an earlier
period and store or make up the deficiency by extra subcontracting. The
latter turns out to be the cheapest. The cost of subcontracting minus
the saving in direct labour costs is ~40.16798. Exhibit 5.18 overleaf
shows the calculation. In the context of the comments above, the
significance of the dual activity is that the marginal value of more
,
5.47'
overtime at 1 1/2, with a corresponding increase in Sunday overtime,
would save ~40.16798 per 78 standard hours. The marginal value of more
overtime at 11/2, without a corresponding increase in Sunday overtime
(the ratio is 2.9 : 1). can be calculated; it is ~31.6.
,DUAL ACTIVITY FOR SHTRTTXD
76 SHTRTTXD 40.16798
ROWS COLUMNS
DHTRTTND DHTRTTXD DHTRTTZD
-331.0 -58.0 -20.0
-1 1
-1 1
-82.4 -16.8 -7.6
30.0 30.0 30.0
DHTRTTSD
SHTRTTND
SHTRTTXD
SHTRTTZD
ENTRPREN
ACTIVITY
-331.0
-274.0
1.17
THE RESTRICTIONS ARE OF THE FORM:
OVERTIME MANPOWER < NORHAL :t-1ANPOWERor OVT. MEN - NORM. MEN + SLACK = 0
If the activity value of the slack variable SHTRTTXD is increase by 1
unit. either the value of DHTRTTND wi.II have to be increased or that
of DHTRTTXD decreased. DHTRTTND is already at its upper limit. In the
case of decreasing DHTRTTXD. the value of DHTRTTZD must also be decreased
according to the restriction of row SHTRTTZD. The effect of reducing the
activity values of both DHTRTTXD and DHTRTTZD by 1 is to reduce capacity
in the primary department by 78.0 standard hours. The choice is between
reducing production or increasing capacity elsewhere. Utilising existing
capacity is usually cheaper than losing sales. DHTRTTZD must fall by 1
unit in line with DHTRTTXD. Only DHTRTTSD remains. The cost of an extra
78.0 standard hours subcontracting is 1::64.5680. The saving in overtime
costs (for DHTRTTXD and DHTRTTZD) is 1::16.8+ !;7.6 = !;24.4. The overall
cost penalty of,reducing overtime and a compensating increase in subcontract-
ing is - !;64.S68 + !;24.4 = - 1::40.168.
Exhibit 5.18
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It should be remembered that although restriction 76 is expressed in
men, because DHTRTTXD also appears in restriction 73, it operates in
terms of standard hours. Thus management might wish to review the
policy of the dayshift only working 5 hours of overtime on Saturday
and 4 on Sunday. Rows 77 and 78 bear the san~ relationship to the
other two departments that Row 76 has to the primary.
79 SHTRTTZD - 8.95589 The restriction limits the number
of men available for Sunday overtime to those available for overtime
at 1 1/2. The interpretation is analogous to 76 above without the
complication of a parallel change in the capacity available at another
rate of overtime. The dual activity represents the value of not sub-
contracting 20 standard hours, and increasing the amount of Sunday
overtime correspondingly. The saving on the former is b16.556
(20.0 / 331.0 K ~274.0), the cost of the latter is b7.6, a net saving
of b8.956. There are in fact 20 standard hours per man potentially
available on Sunday afternoons.
Rows 80 and 81 are similar to 79.
82 SHYDRAMD - 66.80674 The restriction limits the cumulative
production of drills and loaders to the cumulative delivery of hydraulic
rams. The reduced cost of the slack variable means that if the value
of the slack was increased from zero to 1. the value of the objective
function would be reduced by b66.8l, because one less drill would be
produced and sold. (If the L.P. has to choose between making and selling
drills and making and selling loaders, the latter has preference.) As a
dual activity the interpretation is that if 1 more ram were made available,
5.49
821 in place of 820, one more drill would be produced and sold, con-
sequently the objective function would increase by ~66.80679. For
instance, management might want to consider airfreighting rams from
Europe for the months in which they were in short supply.
83 SFWDTMSD 2660.26278 The row and artificial variable
are associated with the balance equation (EQ column 3) for the F.W.D.
tractor. The equation is of the form:
Opening Inv. + Production - Sales - Closing Inv. + Artificial = 0
The reduced cost indicates that if the value of the artificial variable,
SFWDTMSD, is increased by 1, the objective function would increase by
t2660.26. This is the opposite of all the rows considered so far, where
increasing the slack decreased contribution. In Row 83, increasing the
value of the artificial variable upsets the identity. From Row 87 it is
obvious that actual sales of F.W.D. 's cannot be increased, they already
equal forecast sales of 40. Since sales cannot be increased, the next
most profitable course of action is to reduce production. Glancing at
the inventory of F.W.D.'s from month A (PFWDTRIA, PFWDTRIB, etc.,
Exhibits 5.14 to 5.17), it reaches a peak in 0 and drops to zero in F.
Obviously, the biggest cost saving from a free F.W.D. in February is
to reduce production in December and thereby gain the production costs
plus the inventory costs till February. . The interpretati on of the dual
activity is that if an extra F.W.D. were made available in February,
it would be possible to reduce costs by t2660.26, exclusive of the
cost of making the product available. For instance, suppose there was
spare capacity in October of the previous year, and direct labour was
5.50
underemployed. The cost of making the product in October and storing
until the beginning of month D would be ~2459.62. Reference to the
reduced cost of Column 344 PFWDTRIZt Exhibit 5.14 tends to support the
description for Row 83. The L.P. views the opening inventories as a
free good. If no limits were set on their value, the model would meet
the entire year's production needs by putting each opening inventory equal
to the cumulative sales for the year of the corresponding product.
Management is able to compare the costs incurred in 1971 by having
products available at the beginning of fiscal 1972,with the savings
generated in fiscal 1972. In this instance, an alternative approach
tu the dual activity of ~2660.26 is that it is the cost of making and
transferring 1 F.W.D. from December to February.
Rows 85 and 86 are similar to 83.
84 STRALMSD 361.1 The equation balances sales, production
and inventories for the drill. Actual sales are less than forecast sales,
Row 88, because the supply 6f hydraulic rams limits production. The most
profitable use of a free drill is to sell it, immediately. The dual
activity of ~36l.l equals the sales revenue, in the L.P. model, of a
dri 11.
87 SFWDTPSD - 1148.73722 The constraint represented is
that actual sales must not be greater than forecast sales. If the value
of the slack is increased, one less F.W.D. is available for sale;
production is cut back simultaneously according to Row 83. Contribution,
the value of the objective function, drops by ~ll48.73, equivalent to
sales revenue minus marginal cost. This view is supported by the fact
5.51
that the dual activities for Rows 83 and 87 sum to t3809 - the sales
revenue of an F.W.D. The dual activity of Rm",87 represents the loss in
contribution when one less F.W.D. is produced and sold; while that of
Row 83 is the gain when a free F.H.D. is made available, permitting sales
to be maintained and production to be reduced. As a dual activity,
~1148.74 is the increase in contribution from the production and sale
of 1 more unit. Thus, if gaining an extra sale, by salesman incentive
or customer discount, costs less than 1:1148.74,the company is still
in-pocket on the deal.
Rows 8~ and 90 are similar to 87.
88 STRALPSD Zero Since there are unfilled orders for
drills, an extra order is worth nothing. Actual sales would remain at
120~88t limited by the supply of rams.
91 SHTRTTCD 35.00 Together with 92 and 93. these are
the balance equations for manpower in adjacent months. The equation
for each department has the form:
Manpowert - Manpowel(t + 1) = Decrease(t + 1) - Increase(t + 1)
Defining variables for Decrease and Increase make it possible to limit
the rate of change (Rows 94 to 99) as well as include the costs of changing.
The significance of the dual activity is that if an extra trained man
was made available in Febr'uary, contribution would be increased by
~35.0t (saving the cost of hiring and training 1 man in the primary
department). Since the department is at the limit of existing facilities,
Exhibit 5.16 Row 444 DHTRTTND, there are no other savings. The dual
activity for the assembly department, Row 93 SASSLYCD, has the same
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explanation. The situation in the welding department, Row 92
SWELDGCD, is more complicated. The schematic on the next page,
Exhibit 5.20, shows the input coefficients and output values of
activities and dj's for the relevant section of the matrix. The
increase in size of the we ldinq department between months C and 0
is the maximum permitted by Row 95 SWELDGUD (UL), and the department
is still below the capacity of existing equipment, Exhibit 5.16,
Column 448 DWELDGND. Increasing the value of the variable SASSLYCD
is equivalent to adding a free (no hiring or training costs) man
and bypassing the restriction imposed by Row 95 SWELDGUD, because
the value of DWELDGUD is unaffected. The result of the addition of
a freeman would be to increase contribution by ~184.66. The mechanics
of the calculation are given below in Exhibit 5.19.
DUAL ACTIVITY FOR SWEDLGCD
1. Increase DWELDGND, DWELDGXD and
DWELDGZD by 1 man - Spend 106.8 129.85-1» 130.85
2. Decrease work subcontracted by
corresponding amount - Save 354.67 435 std. hrs.
3. Increase the value of DWELDGDE
by 0.02 7{ 5.0 - Spend 0.1 (2.617 - 2.597)
4. Increase DWELDGNE by 0..98 7{
99.4 - Spend 97.42 127.25 --i" 128.23
5. Decrease DWELDGUF by O.98 7{
35.0 - Save 34.30 (7.74 - 6.76)
184.65
Exhibit 5.19
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An example of a situation in which this dual activity would
be relevant is where a welder, having left for another job, applies for
re-employment.
94 SHTRTTUD Zero Restrictions 94 to 99 limit the rate
of change of manpower to a certain percentage of the men in each department
in the previous month. Since the rate of increase in the primary department
between January and February is less than the limit, expenditure on
increasing the limit (better training facilities) would be wasted. In
the welding department, Row 95 SWELDGUD, the maximum number of recruits
has been absorbed and existing facilities have not been used up. Increas-
ing the rate at which men could be added to the department would be worth
b149.66 per man. The signs of the coefficients in row SWELDGUD, Exhibit
5.20, account for the unexpected sign of the dual activity. The saving
is lower than the addition of a free man, Row 92, by the amount of the
existi.ng advertising and training costs. b35. In other words, management
could afford to pay up to a total of b184.66 (b149.66 + b3S) to get an
extra man working in the welding department in February; for instance,
by assigning an apprentice with the appropriate skills to the department
for three months on-the-job training. The value of inducing higher
rates of redundancies, Row 97 to 99, is zero as the need is for more men
not less.
5.2.2. Columns Section
Exhibits 5.15 and 5.16 supply the reduced costs of structural
variables in month D.
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432 PFWDTRPD 76.89235 Production of the F.W.D. tractor
is restrained by the capacity of its special purpose equipment. The
reduced cost indicates that if the capacity were increased to make one
more unit in February, contribution would improve by b76.89. Since the
annual capacity is sufficient, management could explore the possibility
of a productivity deal or working Saturday and Sunday afternoons.
Columns 434 and 435 are the same as 432.
433 PTRALRPD zero Since production of the drill is
limited by the supply of rams there is no need for additional capacity
on ji9s and fixtures .
436 MFWDTRPD zero Variables 436 to 439 are the actual
sales. The latter are determined on the one hand by production and
inventory, and on the other by forecast sales. The reduced costs of
production and inventory indicate the returns from increasing actual
sales when these are below forecast sales. The dual activity of the
appropriate ~ow is the value of increasing forecast sales when actual
sales equal forecast sales.
440 PFWDTRID zero for the present policy option, apart
from the first and last months. there are no limits on finished machines
.inventory other than the implicit ones of zero and infinity. Therefore,
from months A-L, inventory 'will only have a reduced cost when it is at.
its lower limit of zero. In month D, the reduced cost for Column 441
PTRALRID is -3.2. In other words, changing the number of drills in
stock from zero to 1 will reduce contribution by the holding cost.
444 DHTRTTND 104.38817 The variable represents the number
of men in the primary department. The existing facilities are one
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restriction on the number of men who can be employed. In the present
case, this limit has been reached. The reduced cost indicates that
bringing in one more man would increase contribution by bl04.39.
Two possibilities are increasing the proportion of men on nights from
the current 40%, and investing in new equipment. The reduced costs
can be used to calculate the return on the latter course of action.
The reduced cost for Column 452 has a similar interpretation but is
of less consequence. Column 448 has a reduced cost of zero because
the existing facilities are not fully utilised, and the active restraint
is Row 95, limiting the rate of increase. The dual activity of Row 95
shows the saving from relaxing the restriction on the rate of increase.
445 DHTRTTXD zero The variable for the number of men
working overtime at 1 1/2. They are limited to the number employed
for normal time, Column 444. The corresponding dual activity in the
Rows Section indicates the change in the objective function from a less
severe restriction. Column 446 DHTRTTZD refers to Sunday overtime. Its
corresponding dual activity is found in Row 79 SHTRTTZO.
447 DHTRTTSD zero There are no restrictions on the
number of standard hours that can be subcontracted.
Columns 448 to 455 repeat the sequence for the welding and
assembly departments.
456 DHTRTTUD zero Variables 456 to 458 represent the
number of men added to the respective departments since the previous
month. . There are no upper bounds on these variab1es, therefore no
reduced costs. Their values are restricted by equations 94 to 96. The
dual activities for these rows indicate the value of having higher rates
of change from one month to the next.
5.57
459 DHTRTTDD -40.0 Variables 459 to 461 represent the
number of men leaving the departments. The implicit lower bounds are
zero. The reduced cost indicates that if 1 man left the primary
department, contribution would be down by ~40.0. Exhibit 5.21 explains
the calculation for the welding department. Reference back to
Exhibits 5.19 a~d 5,20 will reveal how closely related are the reduced
costs and the dual activities of the corresponding row.
From the discussion in 5.2.1. and 5.2.2. it is seen that the
dual activities of the rows, which represent either balance equations
or restrictions on the supply of or demand for capacity, measure the
value of relaxi.ngthe active constraints. While the reduced costs of
the structural variables which are at upper or lower bound are the
changes in contribution for unit changes in the bounds. Management
is thus able to analyse the profit improvement from marginal changes
in the capacity of existing general and special purpose facilities,
from pursuing different manpower policies and so on. Section 6
provides information on the range over which the reduced costs are
valid, i.e. on the number of units which can be shifted at a given
marginal cost/unit.
REDUCED COST FOR D~~LDGDD
5.58
The consequences of increasing the activity value of D~~LDGDD from zero
to 1 are:
1 Increase the value of DWELDGDD by 1
2 Decrease DWELDGND, DWELDGXD and
DWELDZD by 1
3 Increase the standard hours sub-
contracted, DWELDGSD to offset 2
4 Decrease the number of men leaving
the department DvffiLDGDEby .02
5 Decrease DWELDGND by 0.98, fewer men
in the department
6 Increase DWELDGUF, as more men are
hired, by 0.98
Exhibit 5.21
-;.
- Spend
- Save
- Spend
- Save
- Save
- Spend
l;
5.00
106.80
354.67
0.1
97.41
34.30
-189.66
5.59
6. POST-OPTIMAL RESULTS
There are four parts to the post-optimal output. Sections
1 and 3 are for rows, and Sections 2 and 4 for columns. One example
of each is included as Exhibits 5.22 to 5.25. The structure is the
same as sections 3.0 and 4.0, description followed by explanation. The
description is not the same for rows and columns.
The MPS/360 program assumes a cost minimisation problem. Hence
the output refers to input costs, upper cost, etc. The formulation
being discussed here is for maximisation. To retain compatibility I
adopt the MPS/360 terminology. Although a mental correction is needed
for some of the headings, this is not necessary for the figures. Costs
are negative, savings are positive.
6.1. Sections 1 and 3 - Rows Sections
Exhibits 5.22 and 5.23 refer to rows at their limit levels
and rows at intermediate level respectively.
NUMBER. The internal serial number of the row.
ROW. The name given to the row by the user.
AT. A two-character code denoting the status that the row
activity has in the solution. Codes and their meanings are as follows:
BS - row activity at intermediate level
EQ - row activity at fixed level
UL - row activity at upper level
LL - row activity at lower level
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ACTIVITY. The value that the row activity has in the solution.
It is computed from b. - 1., where b.is the R.H.S. and 1.is the logical
111 1
variable.
SLACK ACTIVITY. The value of the associated slack variable.
The upper line for each row shows the activity-cost relationship
for activity decrease/cost increase:
LOWER LIMIT. The input lower limit (specified or implicit) for
this row.
lOWER ACTIVITY. The level to which the row activity may be
decreased at a cost per unit of decrease given by UNIT COST. Decrease
beyond this level has a different cost per unit of decrease. The input
row lower limit is ignored.
UNIT COST. The change in the objective function per unit of
decrease in row activity. The problem can be modified to decrease the
row activity level as far as LOWER ACTIVITY, at this cost per unit of
decrease.
lIMITING PROCESS. The name of the row or column that would
change its status if the activity level of this row were decreased
below LOWER ACTIVITY: Section 1. LIt~ITINGPROCESS will leave the basis.
Section 3. LIMITING PROCESS will enter the basis.
AT. The status associated with LIMITING PROCESS:
II - leaves or enters basis at lower limit.
UL - leaves or enters basis at upper limit.
The lower line for each row shows the activity-cost relationship
for activity increase/cost decrease:
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UPPER LIMIT. The input upper limit (specified or implicit) for
this row.
UPPER ACTIVITY. The level to which the row activity may be
increased at a cost per unit of increase given by UNIT COST. Increase
beyond this level has a different cost per unit of increase .. The input
row upper limit is ignored.
UNIT COST. The change in the objective function per unit of
increase in row activity. The problem can be modified to increase the
row activity level as far as UPPER ACTIVITY, at this cost per unit of
increase.
LIMITING PROCESS. The name of the row or column that would
change its status if the activity level of this row were increased above
UPPER ACTIVITY: Section 1. LIMITING PROCESS will leave the basis.
Section 3. LIMITING PROCESS will enter the basis.
AT. The status associated with LIMITING PROCESS.
LL - leaves or enters basis at lower limit.
UL - leaves or enters basis at upper limit.
Before. going on to Sections 2 and 4 for Columns, there are a
few comments about the significance of the information in the Rows
Sections.
Firstly, the data refer to the row activity and not the slack
activity: the converse of Exhibits 5.11 to 5.13.
Secondly, LIMITING PROCESS and AT help identify the mechanism
whic~ generated the marginal cost and the consequences of changing the
row activity. When formulating policies it is useful to know both the
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change in contribution and the compensating changes in activity values
which will occur. For instance, increasing the forecast sales of
F.W.D.'s, Row 87 SHJDTPSD, from 40 to 47 would cause production of F.W.D.'s
in December to be increased to the limit of the capacity of special
purpose equipment.
-Thirdly, the difference between ACTIVITY and UPPER ACTIVITY
(or LOWER), multiplied by UNIT COST gives the total change in contribution
caused by increasing (decreasing) the activity of the row from its present
value to UPPER ACTIVITY, i.e. in the case of F.W.D.'s (Row 87), gaining
7 more sales in February would increase contribution by about b8,OOO.
fourthly, in Section 3. Exhibit 5.23, since the logical variables
are in the basis, increasing or decreasing their.values will reduce
total contribution (if it was possible to increase contribution by
changing the value of a 1ogica1 variab1e, presently in the basis at
intermediate level, the solution would not be optimal). There is no
reason why the cost penalty from changing the row activity should be
symmetric, and, in fact, it is not.
6.2. Sections 2 and 4 - Columns Sections
The relevant exhibits are 5.24 and 5.25.
NUMBER. The internal serial number of the column.
COLUMN. The name given to the column by the user.
AT. A two-character code denoting the status that the column
activity has in the solution. Codes and their meanings are as follows:
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SS - in the basis
FR - nonbasic, free
EQ nonbasic, artificial
UL - nonbasic, at upper level
LL - nonbasic, at lower level
ACTIVITY. The value that the column activity has in the
solution.
INPUT COST. the unit cost of this variable, as specified by
the user.
The upper line for each column shows the activity-cost relation-
ship for activity decrease/cost increase:
LOWER LIMIT. The input lower bound (specified or implicit)
for this column.
LOWER ACTIVITY. The activity level that would result from
a cost coefficient increase from INPUT COST to LIPPER COST. The specified
lower bound is ignored.
UNIT COST. The change in the objective function per unit of
decrease in activity level down to LOWER ACTIVITY. The problem can be
modified to decrease the solution activity level as far as LOWER ACTIVITY
at this cost per unit of decrease.
UPPER COST. The highest cost coefficientat wh ich the variab1e
would be maintained at its ACTIVITY. If the cost coefficient increased
above UPPER COST, the activity level would decrease to LOWER ACTIVITY.
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LIMITING PROCESS. The name of the row or column that would change
its status if the activity level of this variable were decreased below
LOWER ACTIVITY: Section 2. LIMITING PROCESS will leave the basis. Section
4. LIMITING PROCESS will enter the basis.
AT. The status associated with LIMITING PROCESS:
LL - leaves or enters the basis at lower limit.
UL - leaves or enters the basis at upper limit.
The lower line for each column shows the following activity-
cost relationships for activity increase/cost decrease:
UPPER LIMIT. The input upper bound (specified or implicit)
for this column.
UPPER ACTIVITY. The activity level that would result from a
cost coefficient decrease from INPUT COST to LOWER COST. The specified
upper bound is ignored.
UNIT COST. The change in the objective function per unit of
increase in activity level up to UPPER ACTIVITY. The problem can be
modified to increase the solution activity level as far as UPPER ACTIVITY
at this cost per unit of_increase.
LOWER COST. The lowest cost coefficient at which the variable
would be maintained at its ACTIVITY. If the cost coefficient decreased
below LOWER COST, the activity level would increase to UPPER ACTIVITY.
LIMITING PROCESS. The name of the row or column that would
ch~nge its status if the activity level of this variable were increased
above LOWER ACTIVITY: Section 2. LIMITING PROCESS will leave the basis.
Section 4. LIMITING PROCESS will enter the basis.
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AT. The status associated with LIMITING PROCESS:
LL - leaves or enters the basis at lower limit.
UL - leaves or enters the basis at upper limit.
Some of the points of interest are:
Firstly, the difference between INPUT COST and UPPER COST
is a measure of the insensitivity of the ACTIVITY to cost increases.
Thus, for Column 452 DASSLYND, the optimal solution is unchanged for
'an INPUT COST anywhere between b82.49 and ~98.3. Or, to put it another
way, if labour costs in the assembly department deteriorated by up to
19%, the manpower plan would remain unchanged. Similarly, the difference
between INPUT COST and LOWER COST measures the range of insensitivity
to cost decreases. In this case, if men paid for the right to work in
the assembly department in February, only 55.02 would be employed.
The conclusion from this information is that the number of men required
in the assembly department is relatively insensitive to changes in
wage rates and that investment in new capital equipment should not be
one of management's priorities.
Secondly, the difference between ACTIVITY and UPPER ACTIVITY
(or LOWER ACTIVITY), times UNIT COST, gives the total change in contribution
obtainable at the rate/unit given by UNIT COST. So, for Column 434
PLOADRPD, if production were increased from 124 to 174.4, the total
increase in contribution would be about h300. In fact, production
of the loader is limited by special purpose equipment. Investment to
increase the capacity of such equipment for the loader by 40% would
, generate a saving of 1:300in February alone.
5.70
. Thirdly, the difference between UPPER COST and LOWER COST,
for a given variable, indicates the range of INPUT COST over which the
optimal solution would remain unchanged.
Fourthly, the difference between LOWER ACTIVITY and UPPER
ACTIVITY indicates the consequences of INPUT COST drifting outside
the range between UPPER COST and LOWER COST. If INPUT COST exceeds
the limits of UPPER or LOWER COST, ACTIVITY will take on the value of
LOWER or UPPER ACTIVITY respectively and there will be a change of
basis. The variable changing its status is given in the column LIMITING
. . .PROCESS. Thus, UPPER and LOWER ACTIVITY give the range of ACTIVITY
over which there will be no change of basis.
6.3. Explanation
Just Qne example is taken from each of the four Exhibits 5.22
to 5.25 to illustrate the significance of the figures. The row or
column number comes first, and then the name of the logical or structural
variable.
82 SHYDRAMD, Exhibit 5.22. The restriction limits cumulative
production of drills and loaders to the cumulative supply of hydraulic
rams •. The row ACTIVITY is 820, the same as the UPPER LIMIT, and the
SLACK ACTIVITY is zero. This means that to the end of February,
cumulative production equals cumulative supply. The figure of 887.12
under UPPER ACTIVITY signifies that production is being restrained by
1ack of rams. The difference between the row ACTIVITY of 820 and the
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UPPER ACTIVITY of 887 gives the number of extra rams which could be used.
The bottom UNIT COST is the positive figure k66.8. Contribution would
be increased by ~66.8 for each extra ram supplied, up to a maximum of
67 additional rams. Only 67 are required because that is the number of
extra drills which can be made in February before the limit imposed by
jigs and fixtures is reached (production is currently 121, the upper
limit 188, Exhibit 5.15). Supplying more than 67 additional rams in
February would be of no help. The lost sales in earlier months cannot
be redeemed. After March the supply of rams keeps pace with demand.
Under LIMITING PROCESS, the bottom entry is PTRALRPD (production of .
drills in February). It is at UL. Consequently when the cumulative
supply of drills reaches 887, the production of drills will be a~ upper
limit and further rams redundant. The report thus confirms the analysis
based on the full optimal results in Exhibit 5.15.
The total saving from extra rams is the saving/unit (~66.8)
times the number of units (887 - 820), giving b4476. Management now
has some idea of the premium it would be worth paying to obtain an extra
67 rams by, for instance, finding another source, or diverting them from
another customer. The 808.999 under LOWER ACTIVITY is the level to
which cumulative delivery could drop at a cost/unit of b66.8. Therefore,
management has a guide to the consequences of deliveries falling below.
their present inadequate level. When deliveries are down to 809,
workload in assembly would have dropped far enough to remove the need
for subcontracting (LIMITING PROCESS: DASSLYSD; AT : LL).
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94 SHTRTTUD, Exhibit 5.23. The restriction limits the rate
of increase of manpower in the primary department. It has the form:
kDHTRTTND > DHTRTTUD (where k = 0.11)
The figure 1.45551 under ACTIVITY is the row activity, in this
case kDHTRTTNC - DHTRTTUD. As can be verified from Exhibit 5.15 and 5.16,
DHTRTTUD has a value of 1.66170 and DHTRTTNC of 28.34. Thus, the
matrix coefficients of the optimum solution are derived:
28.34 *.11 - 1.66170 + SHTRTTUD = 0
- 1.66170 + SHTRTTUD = 0
1.4553 + SHTRTTUD = 0
The UNIT COST is the change in the objective function per unit
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change in row activity. The lower line is for increases in row activity.
Increasing row activity (equivalent to adding a small amount
to the R.H.S.) decreases the value of DHTRTTUD. And vice versa for
decreasing row activity. Therefore, increasing the number of men added
to the primary department in February increases costs by bl15. Conversely,
reducing the number of men added to the department increases costs by
only b16. The reason why moves in neither direction increase contribution
is because moves away from optimal activity by a variable in the basis
cannot be beneficial.
432 PFWDTRPD, Exhibit 5.24. The column variable represents·
the number of F.W.D.'s produced in February. The fact that the entry
for ACTIVITY is the same as that for UPPER LIMIT indicates that production
is being held back by jigs and fixtures. The difference between 72.03578
(UPPER ACTIVITY) and 50.0 (ACTIVITY) is the number of units which could
be produced at a saving/unit given by the bottom UNIT COST of b76.9, i.e.
5.73
a total saving of ~1694. The UPPER LIMIT is ignored. When production
reaches 72, DHTRTTSB leaves the bais at lower limit.LL. In other words,
the effect of increasing production in February, without a corresponding
increase in sales, is to reduce production in December. The INFINITY,
under LOWER COST, means that however small the cost of one F.W.D., no
more than 50 would be made. The UPPER COST of - ~24l7.0 is the maximum
to which INPUT COST could rise and ACTIVITY remain at its present value
of 50. If INPUT COST rose above UPPER COST, ACTIVITY would fall to LOWER
ACTIVITY (43). The ratio of UPPER and LOWER COST to INPUT COST measures
the insensi~ivity of the optimal solution to changes in input costs.
446 DHTRTTZD, Exhibit 5.2S. The column variable represents
the number of men working Sunday overtime in the primary department.
Row 79, SHTRTTZD, limits those working Sunday to those working Saturday.
The l,ogical variable SHTRTTZD is at its lower limit. The number working
Saturday is 29.9 (Column 445 above). The LOWER LIMIT is zero (implicit
bound). There is no explicit upper limit; it is provided via SHTRTTZD
by DHTRTTXD. Taking UPPER LIMIT, UPPER ACTIVITY, etc. first: since
ACTIVITY equals UPPER ACTIVITY there is no possibility of an increase
in activity whatever the LOWER COST. For LOWER LIMIT, etc.: if the
INPUT COST rose above UPPER COST, DHTRTTZD would immediately drop to
zero and the whole of Sunday overtime work would be SUbcontracted. There
are two reasons: firstly -b16.6S represents a cost per standard hour as
expensive as subcontracting, bO.83. Secondly, once the internal cost
exceeds that of subcontracting there is no profit motive for retaining
any work for Sunday. SHTRTTZD, which was at upper limit level, immediately
enters the basis at UL. The UNIT COST of -b8.96 is the increase in cost
per unit .decrease in ACTIVITY.
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The four Exhibits 5.26 to 5.29, summarise the data for February
under the headings of: penalties of deviation from planned activity levels
(2 exhibits), robustness to cost changes, profit improvement.
Two of the questions one can ask about an optimal solution are:
• What changes can be made without affecting activity levels?
• What changes can be made without affecting the basis?
In planning terms these correspond to enquiring about the room
for manoeuvre on the one hand without changing either the components
(F.W.D. production in February) or their activity (50), and on the other
without changing the components (the F.W.D. will be produced in February.
but not 50 of them).
Of the analyses performed so far, penalties of deviation and
profit improvement assume no alteration in the basis, and robustness
assumes no change to the activities.
The entries for UPPER and LOWER ACTIVITY are the limits of ACTIVITY
change which wi11 not require a basis change. Moreover, the figures
are only valid on a one-at-a-time basis; that is,they assume that every-
thing other than the figure being changed is constant, apart from the
value of the objective function. Consequently, it is not correct to add
up a series of reduced costs and draw conclusions about the results of
simultaneous changes.
To explore the consequences of making simultaneous changes,
parametric programming should be used. MPS/360 allows parametric programming
of the R.H.S. and objective function individually or together. Such
analyses usually require basis changes. Two examples of their use would
be to investigate the results o'factual sales being 5%, 10% and 15% below
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forecast, and of actual costs being similarly above estimates. Changes
in bounds and matrix coefficients are more difficult to make, but still
easy enough to be practical.
Thus there are several extensions to L.P., of direct relevance
to planning, which I have not included, because to do so would mean
more exhibits and tedious comparison of results from one page to another,
and so on.
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6.3
USES
1. INTRODUCTION
The Tactical Planning Model has many applications. Some involve
the addition of new variables and rows and the redefining of coefficients.
Others can be accommodated by changing the bounds or the R.H.S. vector.
With one exception, the examples which follow are in the second category.
Although most of the policies discussed originate within a
single department (e.g. a sales promotion scheme by marketing), their
consequences are not similarly confined .. One of the roles of the planning
model is to make possible a quick global view: determining the consequences
not just for the function which originated the policy (which in itself
may be something of an innovation), but also for the major decision
variables of the whole company.
It is the global analysis which gives the departments the chance
of seeing how a certain policy decision will affect them and of formulating
their own inputs in time to influence the course of events ex ante instead
of ex poste. One alternative to the simultaneous consideration of the
inputs of all interested par~ies is the sequential, and often manual,
planning methods of the majority of companies.
The examples in this appendix use the scaled-down model of
Appendix 5~ based on the data in Appendix 7. The scaling has been achieved
by reducing the number of products to 4 and the departments to 3. The
planning horizon of 13 months has been retained, as have all the types of
restriction.
6.4
The appendix starts by outlining the 6 policy issues, then analyses
each in turn and concludes with a section on using the model (as opposed
to uses of it).
The sequence for evaluating the policies is: establish the
planning base, incorporate the policy parameters into the model, run the
modified problem, and finally compare the new results with the planning
base to give the marginal effects attributable to the policy.
Only the one-page summary results, together with a comparison
against the planning base, are shown for each policy. There is no
analysis of the changes in robustness and so on. The objective is to
illustrate some potential uses of the model and to give a brief indication
of the consequences for the main decision variables.
6.5
2. SOME CORPORATE PLANNING PROBLEMS
Suppose that for the policy-making stage of planning, corporate
planners have been notified of a number of issues which will be raised
and for which they must supply data.
The specific issues are:
• The managing director wishes to have a finished machines
inventory of zero at the end of fiscal 1971 to help window-
dress the balance sheet.
The marketing and production control departments are in
sharp disagreement over the former's policy for finished
machines inventory.
• The industrial relations department anticipates a strike
that will close the factory, probably during March.
• Marketing are trying to develop a promotional scheme to sell
more drills in the months when sales are below 90 units.
• The purchasing department have misgivings about a supplier's
ability to meet the present, inadequate commitment for
deliveries during fiscal 1972, and thinks that the situation
could deteriorate by a further 15%.
A new product is due to be introduced in the coming fiscal
year. There are several points still outstanding; (a)
should it be made-in or bought-out?, (b) how will possible
errors in the volume estimates affect this decision?, and
(c) does the marginal analysis for this product accurately
reflect the different possibilities?
6.6
These are not hypothetical problems. They represent some of
the more frequently recurring issues with whi ch top management at M-F
were all too familiar.
The modifications to the base model necessary to accommodate
the policy issues, the results of reoptimising the model and the
comparison with the planning base, will be discussed in turn.
At the end of the appendix is a brief explanation of the
contents of the one-page summary. Appendix 5 has a more detailed version.
Before looking at the different policies, the results of the
planning base will be presented.
2.1. The Planning Base
The planning base used for these examples is the result of
running the model on the data contained·in Appendix 7. before the inclusion
of any new action. In practice this means that (a) the only upper bounds
are on the maximum size of departments and the rate of production of
individual products, (b) the opening and closing inventories have been
fixed (the former is not the M.D.'s zero figure), and (c) the opening
manpower has been set at the figure anticipated as the result of present
policies.
The results are illustrated as Exhibits 6.1 and 6.2. The latter
is a schematice of the main constituents of the one-page summary. The
points of interest are: n~ lost sales (the delivery of rams is adequate).
no subcontracting, moderate overtime (on only one occasion is Sunday
used) and a zero inventory in two months.
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6.9
Some of the questions raised by the one-page summary can only
be answered by reference to the full optimal solution produced by MPS/360.
The relevant ~lPS/360 output has not been included for each of the six
policy issues because the objective is to supply examples of applications
not of computer listings.
2.2. Zero Initial Inventory
In the normal course of events B.n.R. would build up finished
machines inventory towards the end of the fiscal year to prevent activity
falling too low in a period that would otherwise be short of work and
to accommodate the rapid increase in sales at the start of the fis·cal
year in November.
" The desire to window-dress the balance sheet, on the part of the
M.D., requires the very opposite of the 'policy dictated by considerations
of profit, industrial relations and customer loyalty. In 1971, activity
would be reduced by a policy of maintaining inventory levels, so that
running down involves a considerabl cut-back. Then on November 1st the
men are required to work full overtime, and even that will not enable
production to satisfy the sales forecast.
However, .ignoring the effects on the current year's operations,
the corporate planners have to establish (a) the increased premiums,
(b) the loss in contribution and (c) the loss in sales revenue, which
will result from implementing the M.D.'s policy •. They may then either be
able to persuade the M.D. to reduce the severity of the plan, or suggest
a sum that it would be worth paying to distributors to hold the inventory
6. la
originally planned for year-end by bringing forward their purchases.
The latter scheme would tend to make the current year bear the burden
of rescuing the balance sheet, whereas the M.D.'s plan would benefit this
year's balance sheet at the expense of next year's profits.
The only adjustment to the planning base necessary to reflect
the M.D.'s policy is to set the opening inventory of each product to zero.
The results are shown in Exhibit 6.3 and compared with the
planning base in Exhibit 6.4. The latter contains the planning base
and the first three policy issues. Four components of the annual results
are illustrated: contribution, average inventory, overtime premium
and lost sales revenue. The planning base is the left-hand column
of each quadrant and is distinguished by cross-hatching, except in the
lower-right where its value is zero. The subsequent columns indicate
the deviation of the policy variable from the corresponding value of
the planning base. The purpose is to give some idea of the magnitude
and the relative importance of the figures. The column immediately to
the right of the planning base refers to zero initial inventory.
CONTRIBUTION: Down to 93% of the planning base of ~2.299m.
An absolute drop of b158,OOO.
F.M.I.: Down to 73% of the planning base. A saving in holding
costs of ~2,433.
OVT. PREMIUM: The average percentage of overtime is up from
8.67% to 11.42%. and the premium correspondingly to 132%.
LOST SALES REV: Up from zero to b79,803. In al1.221 drill
sales are lost.
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At first sight it may seem peculiar that losing sales worth
b80,OOD is associated with a fall in contribution of nearly twice that
amount. In fact there are five main components to the reduction in
cash flow during the planning period:
Products originally scheduled to be made in the earlier
period are now made in the planning period, fiscal 1972.
• A total of 221 drill sales are lost.
· .Overtime premiums are up.
· Manpower is higher by 1 man in two months.
Inventory holding costs are down.
Exhibit 6.5 quantifies each component. It is not possible
to reconcile the figures completely from the M.D.ls report because of
truncating errors.
The policy of window-dressing the balance sheet will reduce
cash flow in fiscal 1972 by ~158,000, and increase it in 1971 by at
least 1:113,012.
The effect on the two profit and loss accounts and balance
sheets depends on the accounting practices of the company over
such things as charging indirect factory expenses to inventory, and
so on.
However, in general, the M.D. IS scheme would tend to reduce
profits in 1971 by the amount of factory overhead that would otherwise
be charged to inventory. Profits for 1972 would be down by the extra
premiums and the loss in sales of the drills.
6.14
LOSS OF CASH FLOW FOR POLICY OF
NO INITIAL INVENTORY
1. Product Costs of Opening Inventory: b
.5 F.W.D. 's at b2340.12 11700.6
.67 Drills at b184.65 12371. 6
.154 Loaders at b188.97 29101. 4
.100 Diggers at 1:.598.39 59839.0 113012.6
2. Lost Contribution on 221 Drills
• 221 Drills at b176.45 ·38995.5
3. Increased Overtime Premiums 6280.0
4. Increased Manpower in August & Sept~ 183.2
158471. 3
5. Less Saving in Inventory Holding Costs 2433.0
Loss in Contribution 156038.3
Exhibit 6.5
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2.3 Minimum Inventory Policy
The marketing department used to formulate an inventory policy
on the basis that the number of units of each product in inventory at
the end of one month should be a fixed percentage of the following
month's sales. The policy met with little approval from the factory
and generated a running battle over whether there was sufficient capacity
and if so whether it was desirable.
In the absence of the planning model, the problem was compounded
by marketing's distrust of production control's calculations and the
inability of either to quantify the cost should the policy be implemented.
In fact, when the manager responsible for setting inventory levels learnt,
for the first time, as a result of the planning model, that the cost in
premiums, extra labour, holding costs and so on, was b300,000 per annum,
he decided that the benefit/cost ratio was less than one.
The planning base establishes the inventory required for production
smoothing. The minimum inventory required by marketing is expressed as
lower bounds on the activity values of the inventory variables .
.The effect of putting a lower limit on F.M.I. so that it is at
least half the following month's sales is shown in Exhibit 6.6. and
compared with the planning base in Exhibit 6.4.
The results illustrate the interactions between sales, inventory,
production and rams: sales and inventory are competing for capacity; the
increased demand for drills and loaders exceeds the supply of rams. In
consequence, 109 drill sales are lost. Of course, it is unlikely that
marketing would turn away customers while there were drills in stock.
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The analysis brings home two facts that it might otherwise be difficult
to establish. First, marketing's policy for sales and inventory are
mutually exclusive. Secondly, even if marketing sells drills instead
of storing them, costs will be up by about 1:33,000 (increases in-holding
costs + overtime premium). As it stands, the main differences between
the inventory policy and the planning base are:
CONTRIBUTION: Down to 96% of planning base by a drop of
1:100,000.
F.M.!.: Up to 338%, with a corresponding increase in :holding
costs of 325%.
OVT. PREMIUM: The incidence of overtime is up from 8.7% to
14.3% as the hours increase to158%. The premium itself shows
a b.igger increase of 162%, as more expensive tranches of capacity
are used.
LOST SALES REV: -A total of 109 drill sales are lost, reducing
revenue by about 1:39,000.
Perhaps one of the unexpected outcomes is that peak and average manpower
are down. I wonder whether either marketing or production control would
have anticipated that an inventory policy could involve more overtime
and less men. The explanation is:
• The model is not allowed to run down opening inventory,
which in the planning base keeps overtime low in the first
three months.
• Apart from being expensive to recruit, having men
underemployed is also expensive, and the rate of attrition
is low. Therefore, the tendency is to hold down peak
manpower.
6.18
Effective manpower (men + overtime) is, in fact, higher
for the minimum inventory situation than the p1anning base
in the months up to and including February.
Having higher inventories than required for smoothing
may be expensive, but the result is to further smooth the
fluctuations in activity. The inventories anticipate sales,
forcing the model to take more preparatory action than would
otherwise be the case. Further smoothing would be achieved
by raising the inventory level above one-half, or requiring
it to precede sales by two months rather than one.
Finally, despite higher activity at the beginning of the year,
no subcontracting is called for because of the shortage of rams. If the
delivery of rams was increased a certain amount of subcontracting might
be needed. This could be checked by rerunning the model with the new
delivery schedule.
2.4. Factory Shutdown
The timing and duration of a strike are probably easier to
predict when wages contracts run for a fixed period of several years
than when there is a less formal understanding to review wages annually.
The model can be used before and after the event. In the
latter case the purpose is to replan the allocation of resources once a
strike has occurred - an example of an operational event generating
the need for tactical planning. In the former, the model would be used
to determine the sensitivity of the plans to an anticipated strike,
6. 19
leading to modification of the original plans or the preparation of
contingency plans.
Suppose that the industrial relations department forecasts
a strike which sill shut the factory for March. The simplest method of
building the strike into the model is to set production in March to
zero by using the bounded variable technique. Ideally the manpower
variables or their cost coefficients should also be set to zero as a
majority of the costs associated with labour will not be incurred while
the men are on strike. Of the two, it is not a good idea to set only
the manpower variables to zero as this would cause the equations limiting
the rate of change of manpower to make the solution infeasible. To
prevent infeasibility by altering the matrix elements of the equations
limiting the rate of change of manpower would require first the deletion
and then the addition of entire columns of the L.P. matrix. On the other
hand, the cost coefficients could be set to zero by parametric programming
of the objective function. But the gain from adjusting the manpower
variables does not seem worth the effort of either strategy.
My solution is to leave the manpower variables alone and to
correct the financial summary after the solution has been obtained.
The outcome of a possible strike has been considered at some
length in Appendix 5; the Roman numerals are for this previous use. The
M.D. 's summary is reproduced as Exhibit 6.7, with the comparison still
on"Exhibit 6.4. The factory is working at maximum capacity plus subcontract-
ing up until the strike: manpower is increased as fast as possible, full
overtime is worked, and the limit of existing facilities is all but
reached in April with manpower at 219. The building up of inventory to
cover both the strike in March and peak sales in April involves the loss
of 235 drill sales.
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CONTRIBUTION: Down to 96% by a drop in contribution of
b85,000.
F.M.I.: Up to 257%, due entirely to the need to increase
stocks of finished products in the first four months.
OVT. PREMIUM: Up to 158% of the planning base, with the
percentage of overtime up from 8.7% to 13.4%. However, the
average masks the fact that Sunday overtime is fully used until
the strike.
LOST SALES REV.: Approximately b85,000 in lost sales revenue
is caused by the cumulative supply of rams being insufficient
to produce both drills and loaders. The cumulative shortfall
occurs in February. The model ,gives priority in all months
to the loader because of its greater contribution to fixed
costs and profits. The method of allocating the remaining
rams to dri11sis to backward schadule from capacity, i.e.
starting with February to lose as few sales as possible in
each preceding month.
If management decides not to anticipate the strike but to
reschedule production and sales if and when it occurs, there is the risk
of losing all the sales in March (bO.48Sm) and some in April because
F.M.I. in February is zero. It would be interesting to combine the
two policies of strike and minimum inventory. Possibly it would be
a reasonable compromise between excessive premiums (from anticipating
the strike) and undue vulnerability (from not anticipating it).
Unfortunately, because of the expense of computer runs, it was impossible
to explore combinations of policies.
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2.5. A Sales Promotion Scheme
The marketing department wishes to increase the company's
market share of seeding equipment by selling drills in the off-seasons.
There are several months where sales and production are low and it is
thought that an inexpensive promotional scheme will achieve marketing's
objective as well as stabilise production rates.
One of the advantages of a maximisation model is its ability
to determine whether the marginal revenue of a proposal to, say, increase
sales, exceeds marginal cost. Without the model there was no general
method, at M-F, for doing the calculations. There are two aspects of a
promotional scheme which are of interest in the present example. "Ihe
first is, should the course of action be pursued at all? The second
is, when should it be stopped?
The ability to answer these questions could well influence the
manner in which marketing formulate and implement their sales promotion
schemes. For instance, a promotional scheme may be undesirable because
there is insufficient capacity or because the promotional expenditure
plus the premiums exceed marginal revenue. Alternatively, there may
be the opportunity for more profit provided extra sales are won selectively.
In the latter case, a bonus incentive scheme for salesmen, which could
be quickly stoppped or only applied to the first so many units, would
be preferable to full-page inserts in the national press. The questions
of capacity and profitability, neither of which can be resolved by marketing
alone (to base calculations on direct variable profit would clearly be
wrong), make it important that marketing liaise closely with the production
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people before deciding on their plans for advertising and sales
promotion.
Since the model maximises profits by dropping unprofitable
sales, there are two approaches. One is to increase substantially the
sales forecast for the drill throughout the year and allow the model to
choose those which are profitable. The other is to increase the forecast
only in those months when few drills are sold. In both cases it would
be necessary to prevent substitution of drills for other products by
fixing the activity values of the sales variables at their previous
levels.
The output of the model quickly informs management how many
more units can be sold, in which months and how much can be paid per
unit to secure the extra sales.
Exhibit 6.8 shows the report and 6.9 the comparison. For
once marketing appears to have a good id.ea! Selling more drills evens
out the overall workload so that after the first two months it fluctuates
between 3.8 and 4.5 thousand standard hours per day; the average for the
year is 4.0. Average manpower is higher because now there is no need to
allow it to fall away at the end of the year, with the expense of building
it up again at the beginning of the next. Although total standard hours
are up by eleven thousand, this is achieved without adverse movement in
any of the other indices of activity.
CONTRIBUTION: Up to 102% of the planning base. An increase
of b36,OOO.
F.M.!.: Down to 91% of the planning base, with a saving of
b883 in holding costs.
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COMPARISONS WITH PLANNING BASE
CONTRIBUTION F.M.I.
~'m h'OOO
1.
1.·34 ~'405- 1'30 4,............._ -------I
2.·l~ r-0-
5- r-
1
O- r-
I
Iq
S- lotS ~1 42. «<I I t I
~
-
/,
200
2.
2.
150
1. 100
O. 50
OVT. PREMIUM LOST SALES REVENUE
~'OOO 6lj·1. h'OOO
50 ~41·9' 250
40 200"q.~
30 150
20 Iq·q
Iq.';J-
4 100
~
c:;;:' . c,o''lo
).'3
10 I 50
BASE DRILLS RAMS BUCKET BASE DRILLS RAMS BUCKET
(ZERO)
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OVT. PREMIUM: Virtually unchanged, with a drop of 1:164.
LOST SALES REV.: The figures for lost sales are completely
misleading. In fact, an extra 171 drills have been sold.
Lost sales show up because the model was given excessive
potential sales from which to choose. Whereas in the
planning base there was a stock of 171 rams at year end, the
present scheme uses them all.
In the process of selling more drills and rescheduling their
production, the production schedule of the loader is changed (sales are
<
unaltered). Marketing's scheme achieves several purposes: activity
is smoothed) contribution is increased, more drills are sold and the
supply of rams used up. Marketing should employ a selective method
for generating the increased sales because both the timing and quantity
are important. The present forecast supply of rams is only sufficient
for additional sales of 171 units. To procure this number of extra
customers it would be worth paying nearly ~200 per machine if there
were no incremental costs other than those included in the model.
The example illustrates the importance of a method of coordinating
the plans of marketing and production control. In this case the coordination
would identify the months, quantities, increased contribution and vulnerability
(from a drop in the supply of rams) of a scheme to promote drills.
2.6. A Supplier Problem
The inability of a supplier to deliver material at the rate
necessary to sustain production raises a number of issues. One is, how
much is it worth fo~going in discounts for bulk purchases, by splitting
6.27
the order between two or more suppliers? Another is, how should the
inadequatedeliveries be allocated to the products competing for supplies
in order to maximise profits? Incidentally, this last question is
difficult to answer with a cost-minimisation model. A third is the
question specifically dealt with in this section, namely, how sensitive
is the plan to a reduction of 15% in the deliveryschedule?
This problem could be tackled by parametric programming of the
R.H.S., whereby a change vector is defined, and a series of solutions
obtained, corresponding to successive changes of 5% in the orig~nal
forecast.
An alternative approach, the one adopted, is to modify the
elements of the R.H.S. vector which represent the supply of rams.
The results are in Exhibit 6.10 and the summary in 6.9. In
all, 470 drill sales are lost. The resulting drop in workload reduces
both peak and average manpower as well as overtime. F.M.I. is the
only variable to be unaffected.
CONTRIBUTION: Down to 97%, with a drop of h66,OOO.
F.M.I.: Virtually unchanged.
OVT. PREMIUM: Down to 82%, a saving of about h3,500.
LOST SALES REV.: A big jump to h169,742 as 470 customers
are turned away. In two months not a single drill is shipped
from the factory.
There are at least four ways in which the information from the
analysis could be used. Firstly, as a motive to seek out an additional
source of supply. Secondly, as a guide to manpower planning.' Thirdly;
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to warn marketing not to promote dri11s . Fourthly, to advi se the
marketing and public relations departments of the need to appease
disappointed customers.
2.7. A New Product
The example illustrating the role the Tactical Planning Model
plays in product line decisions has been kept until last as it is the most
complex and substantial.
The background to the sotry is that a hypothetical new product,
the 40-7 Bucket, is planned for introduction at B.D.R. during the coming
fiscal year. The analyses assume that there is enough spare general
capacity at the plant to make both the bucket and the increased sales of
an existing product, the digger, which will result from its introduction.
This assumption on capacity has been questioned. On the outcome hang a
number of issues.
Before looking at the example in detail, I want to make some
comments about the relationship between strategic and tactical planning
in the context of M-F, and then discuss the validity of marginal analyses
in general and M-F1s new product analyses in particular.
Product line dects tons are often regarded as strategic and this
influences the information considered necessary for analysis. This was
the case at M-F, where there were five stages in the process of introducing
a new product, and for each stage an analysis and, except the last stage,
a decision. The first two analyses were based on little more than Iback-
of-the-envelopel estimates of costs, volumes, sales price and investment;
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the other three, althouqh on firmer estimates and more detailed, retained
. .
the same scope of analysis and description of variables.
. .
The argument
that this was quite sufficient to identify the two extremes, the non-starter
and the jackpot, may be true, but in the agricultural machinery business
most products occupy the middle ground.
It is theoretically possible that a new product could be acceptable
strategically and unacceptable on the basis of a tactical analysis. Two
pieces of evidence indicated that something was wrong with M-F's old
system of strategic marginal analysis. The first was that the profitability
of projects tended to deteriorate as the estimates were improved with each
successive analysis. Secondly, even the final promise of profits seldom
materialised. In part this was caused by shortfall in sales volume, but
also by cost and investment overrun.
It would be possible to accept a project strategically and reject
it tactically because of the different time units, variables and relation-
ships involved in the two approaches. For example, with M-F's new product
procedure, 'where will the product be made?' came late in the evaluation
process; 'what other products will be made at the same plant?' probably
not at all, and 'what are the sales patterns of all the products at the
plant?', not until the new product had been introduced. In fact, if
properly used, strategic and tactical planning are complementary. The
results of tactical projections should be weighed against strategic
objectives, and strategic plans should be checked for tactical consequences.
A marginal or impact analysis is based on the primary assumption
that'it is possible to estimate the significant changes in the values of
eXisting variables which result from a new course of action. My suggestion
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is that, apart from the special case where a project constitutes a
(nearly) self-contained subsystem, this assumption is usually false.
In the first place, it is difficult to identify the important variables
without building a model of some description. Secondly, the precise
nature of the relationships between the variables probably comes to
light after the model has been used on several occasions. Typically,
first time thr.ough,some relationships, are omitted, some of the coefficients
are incorrect and so on. For example, a few of the errors in M-F's new
product analyses were: direct variable costs were not appropriate for
either tactical or strategic planning, the coefficients describing the
products should have been standard hours per department, the labour costs
,generated by a product are not independent of the sourcing decision I 1 etc.
The Tactical Planning Model makes it possible to approach the
problem of isolating the effects of a particular action programme through
a global analysis: the marginal analysis is obtained by differencing
global analyses.
The new product analysis M-F might have produced for the 40-7
Bucket is shown as Exhibit 6.11. This is the summary which goes to the
New Product Development Committee and does not, of course, include the
detailed working papers. The more obvious relationships are easily
verified. It is not necessary,for the present example,to explain how
all the figures are calculated. The points of interest are:
• This is the third analysis, Stage 3, the one immediately
prior to the commitment of funds to fixed investment.
• Period costs are all non-directly variable costs. The
factory overhead, in this instance, does not include any
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INVESTMENT
I4'OOO
SPENT OR TO BE
COMMITED COMMITED TOTAL
A. FIXED ASSETS
• Production Tooling 50 50
Equipment - General
- SpeCial 23 23
73 73
B. OTHER INVESTMENT
Development - Design 100 44 144
Maintenance - Design 15 15
Marketing Introduction 30 30
Manufacturing Preproduction 9 ~ 9Prototype 11 11
Other
100 109 209
UNIT PRICE, COST AND PROFIT
BUCKET DIGGER
f:; t
Company Net Return 94.10 1198.00
Less D.V.C. - Material 36.85 560.10
Labour 9.15 40.40
Other 6.40 28.30
Packing 3.55 6.30
Freight 10.00 10.60
Direct Variable Profit 28.15 552.30
% D.V.P. to C.N.R. 30.0% 46.1%
DEPARTMENTAL STANDARD HOURS
PRIMARY SECONDARY ASSENBLY TOTAL
Bucket 7.42 33.69 10.86 51.97
Exhibit 6.11 cont.
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costs associated with direct labour. The colloquial
expression for the manner of estimating these costs is
that they have been 'eyeballed'.
Impact on digger - the introduction of the 40-7 Bucket
will have a favourable impact on the sales of the digger,
an existing product. The effect is estimated as a 2%
increase in sales volume per annum. Reference to the
sales forecast in Appendix 7 on data collection will
show this line to be the result of multiplying 2% of the
I
sales forecast per annum, from the introduction of the
bucket, by the direct variable profit of the digger.
Fixed Assets (Investment section) - the investment in-
general purpose equipment is nil.
. Other investment - this is expensed.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the assumption
about spare capacity on general purpose equipment has been questioned.
This assumption has influenced three estimates: (a) the investment in
general purpose equipment, (b) the period costs, and (c) the impact
on the digger.
It is not possible to check the validity of the assumption or
to generate the correct figures on the basis of either a marginal or a
strategic analysis. The reasons are:
• The choice of time unit, 1 year, masks the capacity problems
of seasonal sales.
Direct variable cost, the only coefficient associated with
products apart from C.N.R •• is not capable of reflecting
6.35
the demand for any resource other than money.
• The marginal approach has precluded analysis of the
interactions between products as they compete for resources.
Capacity available in the separate departments should have
been specifically included in the analysis.
In other words. the issues associated with the question of
capacity can only be resolved by a medium-term global analysis.
The 40-7 Bucket is easily fitted into the Tactical Planning
Model: its opening inventory is zero, the departmental standard hours
are known, sales begin in February. The results are compared wlth the
planning base to see the effects of providing capacity for both the
bucket and the extra digger sales.
Exhibits 6.9 and 6.12 give the main results: there is not
sufficient capacity (the welding department is the worst offender),
marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue if two departments are working
Sunday and the third is subcontracting work.
CONTRIBUTION: Up to 104% by b94,OOO.
F.M.I.:Up to 131%.
OVT. PREMIUM: Up to 277% of the planning base as the average
percent goes from 8.7% to 21.4%. In only 3 months does the
percentage fall below 20%.
LOST SALES REV: About half the potential bucket sales are
lost. The reduction in revenue is just short of bO.25m.
Both standard hours and manpower are higher than the planning
base. In fact the 1,094,000 standard hours produced by the factory
t
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represent the maximum in-house capacity starting from an initial manpower
of! 174. From March all departments are at the 1imit of exi sting facil ities.
The model confirms that some of the assumptions of the new product
analysis are incorrect. One possible reaction is that the same conclusion
could be reached without the model, by a simple calculation of the supply
and uses of capacity. In this particular, unsubtle instance, that is
obviously true. But typically the case is not so clear cut and working
out a production and manpower schedule is required. Morevoer, the schedule
must be recalculated for each combination of products that could be
sourced from B.D.R., and for each combination the sensitivity of the
schedule to uncertainty in the sales forecasts ,must be worked out. I
suspect that one of the reasons why the calculation was not done at M-F
during the evaluation phase of new product introductions, was the difficulty
of doing it once (scheduling took over one man/month); another perhaps was
a lack of awareness of how sensitive the results could be to some of the
factors omitted from the analysis.
Returning to the three estimates which are in most doubt:
(a) more. general capacity is needed in all departments, (b) the period
costs omit entirely what could be substantial premiums, depending on (a),
and (c) the impact on the digger should not have been calculated in terms
of direct variable profit ..
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3. USING THE MODEL
This section briefly considers three topics which are worth a
mention. The first because there is often confusion over it; the second
because there is often conflict; the last because an earlier reference
obliges me.
Respectively, they: distinguish the L.P. from deterministic
simulation; suggest that the corporate planners are responsible for
building, running and maintaining the model; show how the model: could
be part of a more traditional planning system such as I.P.C.
3.1. The Model
The model can be used in two entirely different modes: the
discretionary and the non-discretionary: In the latter, the model IS
room for manoeuvre is limited by the parameters of the policy issues
management wishes to evaluate. In the former, the model is given as
much freedom as possible: in practical terms this means that the only
limits on the activity values of variables are the two facilities
restrictions, on the capacity of general and special purpose equipment,
and the figures for opening -manpower and opening and closing inventory.
Optimising the model with these minimum restrictions establishes
the planning base: the Ido-noth~ngl situation of Integrated Planning
- -
arid Control (LP.C.).- Changes to the planning base are the result of new
management action. Whether the new action is promotional expenditure to
increase sales or investment to reduce costs, etc. the proposed new
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actions are evaluated and the new plans derived by putting the changes
into the model, rerunning and so obtaining a new global picture. The
effects of the new action are the differences between the new results
and the planning base. In other words, marginal analyses are the result
of differencing global analyses. This is in contrast to the approach
which attempts to produce marginal analyses directly by estimating only
the changes in the values of the decision variables caused by the new
action. In fact, marginal analyses will frequently be based, not on the
relationships between variables, but on estimates of their consequences.
The example in this appendix on the new product illustrated some of the
inadequacies of the direct marginal analysis.
To recapitulate: the first step is to establish the planning
base; the second is to evaluate proposed new management action by comparing
the results of running the model under the new assumptions with the planning
base.
Each policy issue, except the 40-7 Bucket, involved reducing
the boundaries of the feasible region. The advocates of deterministic
simulation might say that the effect was to so restrict the degree of
freedom that the model was little more than a budget compiler. If this
was true it would be difficult to justify the expense of an L.P. programme.
In the event, the feasible region, having been reduced by including
the policy issue, is still large. Anyone in doubt should attempt to
check out the optimal solution. Sometimes it is difficult to trace why
the model has adopted an unexpected allocation of resources.
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3.2. The Corporate Planning Department
One role of the corporate planning department is to adapt the
basic model to accommodate proposed new action. To real ise the full
potential of the model requires a knowledge of its construction and of
the working of L.P. It is possible for the corporate planning department
to view the model as a black box, maintained and run by the M.I.S.
department. I am not aware of any general arguments in favour of the
latter approach. The effect tends to be either that the model is used
only for a few well-defi ned and frequently recurri ng situati OilS or that
its versatility is retained and at least one other interface ;'S added
to impede the flow of information between top management and the model.
In both cases the results seem inferior to the alternative of combining
the skills and knowledge in a single department.
The basic model, as I have described it, contains the variables
which, in the normal course of events, represent the main components of
the resource allocation process. Howev~r, there will be a continual
stream of new planning situations: at one time cash flow will be important;
at another buying out of the piece-rate system; at a third setting up
a new assembly plant; at a fourth minimising fluctuations in production
(see Gass); all these can be accommodated by modifying the basic model.
But adapting the model becomes more difficult with each additional inter-
face between the user and the model: lines of communication are lengthened,
the probability of delays and errors increased.
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3.3. The Planning Model and I.P.C.
Costs are frequently described as being either engineered or
managed. Broadly speaking, the former correspond to direct variable
costs and the latter to indirect costs.
The relationships implied by engineered costs in manufacturing
industry are suitable for inclusion in a model for several reasons:
• Mostly they are linear over the whole range of variation
of the relevant variables (standard hours per product per
department) or can be split into piecewise linear segments
(direct labour costs) .
. They are more characterised by stability than tns tabt lt ty.
Cha.ngesto them should be I engineered I and a formal procedure
established to make sure that people know what the changes
are, what they affect, what .they cost and when they cut-in.
Therefore, it is possible to revise the coefficients in the
planni.ng model as significant changes occur.
Managed costs are more difficult to predict and revise. At
M-F these were split out by budget centre and estimated by the man responsible.
One of the problems was to supply the head of budget centres with information
they felt was needed on the independent variables. Many of the independent
variables were directly or indirectly part of the planning model. An
example of the former is the overtime worked in the secondary department
in July, and of the latter, the number of material handlers in the primary
department.
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The planning model can be used to provide estimates of independent
variables during the formal planning cycle as well as at other times when
a revised plan is to be sUbmitted.
The model does not reduce the discretion of management to manage
indirect costs. Rather, the two systems are complementary in that the
model provides better estimates on which the other plans can be built.
The responsibility, project and time-period accounting of I.P.C.
should benefit from the improved handling of the relationships between
the dependent and independent variables of engineered costs .
•
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4. DESCRIPTION OF THE M.n.'s REPORT
This topic is considered thoroughly in Appendix 5.
The report is divided into four sections, see Exhibit 6.7:
headings, financial summary, activity summary and sales summary. Each
is described briefly.
I Headings
• Pri.nted in the top 1eft-hand corner is the name of the
proposed action programme which is being analysed, and the end
points of the planning horizon.
• The report only covers the first 12 months of the 13 month
time horizon of the model. This is to retain compatibility
with the existing internal and external planning and reporting
•
procedures. Information on the 13th month is available from
the output of the L.P. package.
• Some of the variations in the figures are due to the different
number of working days each month. The numbers refer to the
normal working week and do not include overtime.
II Financial Summary
The financial summary - this is divided into two parts. The
first contains the aggregation of all the financial data
(activity level * input cost) into the main financial categories.
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Revenue, cost and contribution are an identity: they are
. .not lagged by the giving and receiving of credit. F.M.!.
is the value of finished machines inventory at the end of the
month. The second part gives details on three components of
the cost line above (the purpose of the fourth - lost sales
revenue - will be explained in a moment). They are the
more volatile elements of the cost of production and indicate
when the level or rate of change of activity are causing
workload problems: their significance is that heavy premiums
{
•
or a h.igh F.M.!. holding cost can quickly erode the profitability
of the marginal sale. One innovation is the possibility
of reading off both the value of inventory and the holding
cost. caused by different policies. At M-F these tended
to be discovered after the event from the size of the overdraft
and the bank charges. The last item in the section - lost
sales revenue - represents the value of the sales foregone,
because to make the products would either have been unprofit-
able or impossible. There is nothing to prevent management
from givi.ng priority to part of the sales forecast, or indeed
from forcing the model to meet the entire forecast. This can
be achieved by setting minimum bounds on the value of the
sales variables or by changing the sales restriction to an
equality.
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III Activity Summary
•
The activity summary - the information in this section
expresses the level of activity in non-financial terms.
Standard hours are the units in which the capacity of
the factory and the work generated by a production progranme
are measured. Thus people will say 'we have never had
more than x million standard hours out of the factory'.
The total standard hours called for by a production;
p~ogramme (products * standard hours per product) can be
supplied by the factory or by subcontractors - the next
two lines show the split. Manpower cannot be calculated
directly from the production schedule. The reason being
that the tendency for manpower levels to follow fluctuations
in workload is modified by the costs of hiring and firing
and the limits on the rates of change; with the result
that the manpower in any month is a compromise between
short-term fluctuations and long-term trends. Overtime
percent is the ratio between the total overtime hours
and the total normal attendance hours (40 hours per week
per man).
IV Sales Summary
• The sales summary - the percentage breakdown by products of
the monthly sales revenue. This is the optimum sales mix
given the original sales forecast and the production facilities.
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7.4
DATA
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes in detail the data required to construct
the tactical planning model at the M-F plant of B.D.R. The volume of
data has been kept down by reducing the number of products, departments
and so forth, while retaining the complexity of the operations at B.D.R.
Section 2 identifies the departments that generate the information,
suggests forms suitable for data collection and discusses why the data
is needed. Section 3 explains any calculations that are necessary before
the data is suitable as input to the model and gives worksheets for
carrying out these operations.
The justification for going into such detail is that firstly it
makes it possible, together with the information on coding variables in
Appendix 8 (Construction and Running), to follow the input listing in
the latter appendix. Secondly, it gives a feeling for the process of
data preparation to a would-be model-builder. And lastly, it makes it
easier to appreciate how the model works and therefore the limitations
and possible extensions.
The final section gives some definitions of terms with which the
reader may be unfamiliar, or which are peculiar to M-F, or which current
usage has made ambiguous.
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2. DATA COLLECTION
2.1. Production Control
The task of production control in the planning process is to turn
a requirement for products (basically a sales forecast plus finished
machines inventory policy) into an acceptable production programme. The
requirement for products is really a request for capacity. The production
programme and its manpower plans represent the supply of capacity. Produc-
tion control, working within the limits of existing facilities, together
with changes already planned, picks out the shortfalls and excesses of
capacity and thereby triggers off requests for additional productive
resources. The result of production smoothing is a schedule by month
showing the direct manpower in each department, the number of each type
of product produced and the finished machines held in inventory for production
smoothing purposes.
Thus, the two key functions of production control in the planning
process are:
to smooth production
to identify changes in resources that would assist production
smoothing.
As production smoothing is the major activity of production control,
I will spend a little while considering what it is and how it affects
resource allocation, before going on to the 'nuts and bolts' of production
control 'data. The subject is also treated in Appendix 1 Section 4.
Typically, the throughput of a factory is limited by a series of
bottlenecks. A production programme represents a compromise between the
finished products requested by sales, and the restrictions imposed on
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production by the different bottlenecks. In the literature this is called
'the production smoothing problem'. For a detailed discussion, the reader
ought to go to a book specialising on production. I am not concerned,
for the moment, with how this compromise is reached, but rather with
understanding the structure of the problem, the way it affects the alloc-
ation of resources and how to decide what. data is needed to solve it.
The potential capacity of a factory is determined by these bottle-
necks. The justification for talking about the machine shop, the welding
department, etc. is that a group of similar operations (corresponding
to an area of specialisation in equipment and labour skills) represents
the major potential bottlenecks. In fact there are two forces at play that
can hold up production:
labour loading
. machine loading.
This is another way of saying that production can be limited by
either not having the right men or not having the right eqipment: thus,
.the production smoothing problem has two components.
Doing labour loading and machine loading at the departmental level
is correct if, broadly speaking, there is mobility of labour and versatility
of equipment within the department, implying that it is at the departmental
level that bottlenecks appear. However, where there is a lack of
mobility or of versatility, bottlenecks can be generated within a depart-
ment either by a particular group of machines - the radial arm drills -
or by a particular class of skilled worker - the capstan lathe operators.
Production smoothing then has the task of ensuring not only a smooth flow
of work through the machine shop, but also through the radial arm drills,
and so on for each bottleneck.
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The final complication that must be mentioned is that there is a
qualitative difference between labour loading and machine loading. In
the latter case there are no industrial relation problems from having
machines idle, so the restriction imposes only an upper limit on machine
utilisation, whereas in the former, the restriction operates in both
directions and the objective is to minimise fluctuations.
Before glancing at one method of ta2kling the production smoothing
problem, the position can be summarised as follows:
the objective of production smoothing is to minimise the
fluctuations in activity of each group of workers while
staying within the capacity limitations of each distinct
. group of machines.
The question is how to solve the problem in the light of the role
production smoothing plays in the process of resource allocation.
As already mentioned, there are two components to the production
smoothing problem - labour and machine loading - that can be solved
either consecutively or simultaneously. The latter implies a large
problem. At M-F production control produced manpower plans first and
then did machine loading. The influence production smoothing had directly
on the allocation of existing resources and indirectly on the allocation
of new resources, was not explicitly recognised by the planning system,
no perceived by the corporate planners. The result was to leave production
smoothing entirely in the hands of production control. The corporate
planning department accepted the factory production schedules, manpower
plans, etc. without enquiring too closely about how they were derived
and the assumptions behind them. Such an approach is equivalent to
treating the factory as a black box: the box happened to account for
most of the company's resources, however measured.
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Another method is to say that the factory is far too important
a recipient of company resources to be outside the influence of the
corporate planners, but, on the other hand, there is no desire to take
over the role of production control. One answer is for the corporate
planners to construct a small model of the factory, which generates
overall production plans that are acceptable to the factory and which
solves the labour and machine loading problems simultaneously.
In the event, it is possible to tackle the two problems simultaneously
and to keep the complexity and size down to a reasonable level. The trick
is to treat the machine lo~ding problem as a subset of labour loading. A
careful choice of variables and data permits the control of the maximum
capacity of the former and fluctuations in the latter.
The procedure is as fo11ows: ;dent; fy the equi pment bottl enecks
(radial drills, 500 ton press •...• ); break down the standard hours
required to make each product over these equipment bottlenecks; group
the equipment bottlenecks into units amongst which there ;s mobility of
labour; treat the labour assigned to each unit as the level at which the
labour loading problem operates.
This approach has a number of advantages:
. either lack of manpower or lack of equipment is able to choke
off production,
the two problems are solved simultaneously in the sense that
both sets of restrictions are satisfied by the solution,
the production smoothing problem is kept down to manageable
proportions.
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The onl~ disadvantage is that when this information is turned
into the appropriate equations, it is not possible to have a uniform
system as there will be a number of variants:
departments in which there are no individual equipment bottle-
necks, and where capacity is 1imited by manpower
departments which divide into two or:more equipment bottle-
necks in wh ich ;
(a) there is no mobility of labour between the equipment
groups (in this case each equipment group is treated
as if it were a department)
(b) there is mobility between all the equipment groups
(c) . there is mobility between some of the equipment groups.
It must be emphasised that this approach only works because the
equipment groups are combined into units within which there is mobility
of labour . The following di aqrams show the last three possibilities:
EXHIBIT 7.1
LABOUR AND MACHINE LOADING
MACHINE SHOP MACHINE SHOP MACHINE SHOP
I DRILLS I
SPECIAL
IUT~sl.__P_URP_O_S_E_,
DRILLS
4> I SPECIAL
I W PURPOSE
LATHES
(a) (b) (c)
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Applying the rules; in each of the cases, (a), (b) and (c), the
conventional machine shop is divided into three main 'machine groups'
(bottleneck groups) whose capacity is controlled separately; in (a) the
three machine groups are treated as three distinct labour units - there
is no mobility of labour between machine groups; in (b) the three groups
are treated as a single labour unit - there is complete mobility of labour;
in (c) the drills and lathes are treated as one labour unit and the special
purpose equipment as another.
To simplify the forms and subsequent discussion, I will assume
that there are no machine gr.oup bottlenecks within departments, and that
there is complete mobility of labour within departments, i.e. both
machine groups and labour units correspond to the divisions into departments.
The reader can expand the data collection procedure to accommodate any
complications he comes across in practice. From mow on I cease to refer
either to machine groups or labour units as distinct from the conventional
productive departments.
2.1.1. Capaci ty Requi red per Product
Production planning requires the definition of a reasonably stable
relationship between products and the manpower necessary to make them
(their men-equivalent). The relationship has four components: standard
hours, adjustment for spares and scrap, standard hour performance, and
hours available per man. The schematic relationship ;s shown next.
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PRODUCTS
J
([Standard -7- (1Hours
MEN
Scrap & Spares\l
Rate }J
I
Standard ) . Hours Available
Hour Performance 7 per Man
" t I
Input Hours Clock Hours
(
Convert from)
Output Hours (
Convert from )
Standard Hours
Production control is responsible for supplying all the data
involved in this equation, by which products are transformed into their
men-equivalents. The next two tables show how the data could be co llectcd.
DEPARTMENTAL STANDARD HOURS
PRODUCTS
DEPARTMENTS
Primary Secondary Assembly TOTAL
48.05 136.36 95.20 279.61
18.40 44·.29 65.83 128.52
12.70 77 .25 14.61 104.56
23.22 132.08 53.02 208.32
FWD
Drill
Loader
Digger
Table 7.1
OTHER DEPARTMENTAL INFORMATION
Scrap Rate
Spares
Standard Hour Perf.
Primary Secondary Assembly
1% 5% 1%
4% 6% 1%
207% 220% 255%
Table 7.2
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Now, perhaps, is the time to mention that since the model is a
multiperiod model, much of the data (and especially that in the bow previous
tables) is replicated for each time period. This is not an assumption
that lies behind the construction of the model, which might be the case if
a matrix generation programme was used, but instead, reflects the inability
or reluctance of most of the departments to give more accurate estimates.
A good example is the standard hour performance. Clearly, the figures for
this are important and could account for swings in manpower of anything LIP
to 50%. It is known that the introduction of a new product has a considerable
adverse effect on the performance figures as the build-up of new parts
occurs. The accuracy of the plans would be significantly improved if it
were possible to estimate both the magnitude of the initial advers.e impact
and the duration of the climb back to normal operating conditions.
Thus far, the data has been collected to calculate the requirement
for capacity in each productive department. The next step is to derive
the capacity available.
2.1.2. Capacity Available per Department
This divides into two parts: firstly, the average number of hours
available per man in each period - the capacity available per man, and
secondly, the maximum capacity available, which is determined by the
existing capacity at the beginning of the planning period, the maximum
capacity of each department with the existing equipment, and finally, the
limits on the rate of change in capacity from one period to the next -
upwards and downwards. ~lhereas in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 above the data was
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the same for all time periods, this is emphatically not the case for
the capacity available per man.
There is no alternative but to list all the relevant factors. To
help stave off boredon, I reiterate the motivation for the first part of
the present section - to gather the data from which to calculate the
average number of hours available per man,in each period, both in normal
time and for the several different rates of overtime. To avoid unnecessary
repetition, it should be noted that this information is required for each
period:
the number of working days and the number of weeks (the year
is split symetrically into 4 and 5 week periods)
the number of shifts worked in each department
the proportion of men on each shift
the length of each shift
the number of overtime hours each shift can work
the number of overtime hours, or the percentage of overtime
hours, that are reserved for accommodating operational problems
- and therefore are exluded from the calculation of the number
of hours potentially available per man.
Table 7.3shows the data required on the number of working days and
the length of the months throughout the period. The full significance of
some of the entries in this table will become apparent later on. For the
moment, suffice it to say that the 'month' code is necessary for the
definition of variables in the L.P. programme, and this might as well be
done by production control as anyone else.
Table 7.3
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7.15
SHIFT AND OVERTUrn INFORMATION
Days Nights
Percentage on Shift 60% /fO%
Length of Shift 8 hours 10 hours
Days/Nights per Week 5 4
Hours/Week 40 40
Potential Overtime Hours at: 1 1/3.
1 1/2 5 10
. 2 8
Reserved Overtime Hours at 2 4
Table 7.4
Table 7.4 applies to all departments. Clearly, if different
practices were followed in one or more departments, this information
would need to be collected on a departmental basis. In fact, at the
division of the company where this study was carried out, the heat treat-
ment department (for the purpose of the illustration in my thesis, combined
wi th the press and forge department to form the primary department), worked
three eight hour shifts due to the necessity of keeping the cyanide ovens,
etc. at a constant temperature. This arrangement had repercussions on
the number of potential overtime hours, and so forth. One must be aware
of the possIbili ty that certain sections 'of the productive labour force,
for one reason or another, do not work the same hours, nor are they paid
in the same manner, as the others. Incidentally, because of the difficulties
of setting 'allowed times' for case hardening a part, the heat treatment
department was paid on a day rate, instead ef the piece-rate system used
fer the other productive departments.
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The reason for collecting data on the dt fferent rates of overtime,
1 1/3, 1 1/2 and so forth, is to permit the calculation of the cost and
size of successive tranches of capacity. The tranches correspond to over-
time during the week (1 1/3), overtime on Friday night and Saturday
morning (11/2) and overtime on ·Sunday (2). The ratios refer to the
premiums paid on the day wage' (the attendance element, as opposed to the
bonus or rate-of-working element) to induce people to give up their
leisure time. It reflects, for instance, the notion that Sunday has a
higher utility as leisure than Saturday and therefore the premium must
be higher for the former than for the latter. Interestingly, this approach
is at variance with the advertisement for a Sunday newspaper which had
as its copy 'Don't go to pieces on Sunday, read the .•••.
the order of the premiums should be changed.
I turn now from the data on capacity available per man to that on
,I..... . Perhaps
the capacity available per department. At the start of the planning
period in question, there will be a certain number of production workers
in each department, thus determining the initial capacity. There are a
number of approaches to this initial figure:
it could be the inevitable result of current management
policies - to increase, reduce or maintain the existing
1abour force
it could be the existing labour force, with the assumption,
of no change
it could be treated as a variable to be determined by a
series of 'what-if' questions, and would therefore imply
the labour policies to be pursued in the meantime.
Table 7.5 gives the relevant figures for the simplified model of B.D.R.
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Potential capacity, as mentioned ear1ier, can be limited either
by a shortage of men or by a shortage of equipment. This is the next
issue to be resolved. For each department there is a certain number of
men who can be accommodated without additional investment in facilities
- called the 'maximum manpower' -of a department, see Table 7.5.
Now the only missing informati on is the rate at whi ch departments
are able to change their level of manpower. Usually this is expressed
as a rate of change from ~ne month to the next. In the upward direction,
the limit is imposed by the need to hire, train and assimilate the new
recruit. In the downward direction, the limit can be set by either of
two extremes - wi th and wi thout redundancy. In the first case the
potential rate of change is high and so is the cost. In the second,
the rate, fixed by natural wastage,is low, and so is the cost. MY
recommendation is that for the downside,production control should be
asked for information about natural wastage. Firstly because in the
normal course of events·redundancies should not be part of the day-to-
day running of a factory, and secondly because the rate of redundancy
that a company can tolerate is a general management decision. If manage-
ment wishes to evaluate the consequences of such a policy, the model can
be modified accordingly.
SIZE OF DEPARTMENTS AND TURNOVER
Starting Manpower at 1/11/72
Maximum Manpower
Max. Rate of Increase
Max. Rate of Decrease
Primary Secondary Assembly
23 lO6 45
30 135 55
_12% 8% 10%
0.65% 2.00% 0.45%
Table 7.5
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There is a complication which has been glossed over - it is the
choice between working in 'effective manpower', i.e. so many men's
worth of work, or in 'men on the books', i.e. headcount. The difference
is explained by non-attendance, for whatever reason: oversleeping,
absenteeism, illness, etc. Production control is more interested in
the figure for 'effective manpower' than headcount, so it is preferable
to work with the former rather than the latter. Clearly, it is a trivial
matter to convert one set of figures to the other ..
The final data provided by production control concerns the
limits.imposed on production by 'jigs and f ixtures ". These are special
purpose pieces of equipment used to locate parts that are being welded
together etc. Some jigs and fixtures are peculiar to an individual
product, others are common to several proQucts, but not the whole product
line. The effect of these jigs and fixtures is to.limit the maximum rate
of production either of individual products or of groups of products.
Such equipment exists mainly in the secondary and assembly areas,
and production control is asked to identify only the severest restriction
for each product or group of products. The figures are given in Table 7.6.
LIMITS ON RATES OF PRODUCTION
Drill
GROUPS OF PRODUCTS
}
INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTS
FWD
Drill
2.0
.7 .5
5.0
10.5
3.2
Maximum Daily Rate of
Production
Loader
Digger
Bucket
10.0·Loader
Table 7.6
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It would be a mistake to leave production control without mentioning
the versatility of the model to cope with irregularities; for instance,
from time to time there may be some unexpected restriction on production
caused by the inability of a supplier to meet his delivery schedule.
This restriction can easily be incorporated into the model provided it is
possible to express both the supply of and the requirement for the part
(raw material, etc.) in units per product. The example in Appendix 6.
illustrates the effect of an inadequate delivery schedule of a hydraulic
ram. The addi tiana 1 informa tion requi red is shown in Table 7.7, page 7.14.
To summarise the reason for getting so heavily involved with
production control data: the tactical plans produced by production control
influence directly or indirectly the allocation of a major part of the
company's resources and therefore its profitability. If corporate planning
wishes to ensure that overall plans are (a) consistent and (b) optimal,
then it must be possible to evaluate both the trade-offs and the vulner-
abilities of different courses of action without playing a 'what-if'
game at arm's length with production control: a game biased heavily in
favour of the latter.
The ·objective is made realisable by a careful definition of the
data required: both labour and machine capacity are expressed in standard
hours; productive facilities are divided first into bottleneck groups
(of similar machines) and then into labour units (within which there is
mobility); the two loading pro~lems are solved simultaneously.
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And last of all, the provision of productive capacity is treated
as a variable, and the role of resource allocation ;s to continue changing
the supply of capacity either until a restriction is encountered, in which
case one wishes to know how much it is worth paying to remove the restriction,
or until the profit from an extra sale is less than the additional cost.
2.2. Finance
2.2.1. Product Costs
The cost accounting section of the finance department is responsible
for maintaining a standard costing system. The standard cost of.9 product
is set at the beginning of the year and differences between standard and
actual costs are accumulated in variance accounts. The procedure for
revising the standard costs is:
Last year's standard
+ Labour variances
+ Environmental forecasts
+ Design and Methods changes
+ Specificatioi changes
= New standard cost
At first glance it shoul~ .be possible to go from production control's
standard hour data through to the cost section's standard cost. In practice
the figures can only be reconci led at one point in the year - the time when
the new standard costs are established. Only at that moment are production
control and the cost section working with the same data.
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From then on, production control updates its figures to reflect
any significant change that occurs due to design and methods or specific-
ation. The objective is to calculate accurately the capacity required
to meet a sales forecast.
Yet another source of discrepancy are changes in the product; vity
of the factory. This alters the relationship between
standard hours & clock hours
·and therefore between
products & men
which were assumed when the standard costs were set up.
A final point before looking at the forms and the data is that
the company uses a direct costing system.
The chief characteristic of a direct costing system is the
division of costs into those that are directly variable and those that
are not,i.e. the latter are defined by exception and are written off in
the period in which they are incurred. Under this approach there is no.attempt to allocate either semi-variable or fixed costs. Of course, for
planning purposes management wishes to know which costs are truly fixed,
in that they are part of shutdown expense, those which are to all intents
and purposes fixed provided the company stays in business, and those
that vary, but not directly with volume.
The advantage of a direct costing system is the identification
of the marginal cost of making one more unit of production. No one would
claim this to be the whole of the story, of course some other costs will
be affected, but it is argued that direct costing gives a much better
indication of the marginal cost than does full absorption ~osting .
. .
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So the cost data is generated by a standard, direct, costing
systern.
Table 7.8 below
split out by main categories.
shows the standard cost of each product
DIRECT VARIABLE COSTS
.Material
Labour
Labour Allowances
Processing Supplies
Packing
Freight
TOTAL D.V.C:
Table 7.8
UNIT COST S~~RY
FWD Drill Loader Digger_.
b ..b b b
2267.97 167.60 172 .05 560.10
55.03 23.50 18.85 40.40
27.00 9.50 8.45 17.40
20.00 6.20 4.40 10.90
19.40 0.50 3.65 6.30
47.00 8.90 6.25 10.60
2436.40 216.20 213.65 645.70
The cost section is able to read the data in Table 7.8 straight
from the product cost sheets. Before using the information it is necessary
to know what costs are included in each of the categories. The definitions
are given at the end of the present appendix.
2.2.2. Labour Costs
Wrapped up with the cost of employing direct labour is the question
of how they are paid. Whether or not a piece-rate system is used, it is
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fairly common for there to be a fallback pay to protect the men from the
consequences of stoppages that are beyond their control. In addition,
there are frequently overtime and night-shift premiums. The cost section
should be asked for the details. Those fat the B.D.R. factory are given
in the following table.
PAYMENT OF DIRECT LABOUR
Method of
Payment: Piece-rate + Premiums
Description: Flat rate plus bonus incentive linked
to rate of working plus premiums for
night shift and overtime working
Components
of Wage:
Cost
Category
Day Wage*Attendance Hours }
+ National Awar d seLi.meTaken (clock) D.V.C.
+ Basic Wage ~Time Earned (std. hrs)
+ Day \\1ageIt Ovt.Premo /If Attendance Hrs.}
+ Day Wage", N.S. Premo *' At tendance Hrs. PeriodCosts
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Day Wage, National Award and Basic Wage are three hourly rates
of pay which are negotiated to the fifth decimal place of a
pound.
Notes:
(a) ~s the flat-rate attendance
(b) and (c) the bonus
(d) the premium for overtime, and
(e) the premium for night shift.
The last two are to do with when the work is done not the rate
of working .
Table 7.9
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Since most systems for paying direct labour have more than one
component, it is important to discover what these are and how they are
calculated. For instance, at B.D.R. there were three components: a
combination of being available for work, of rate of \'JOrkingand time of
working. To ensure that the system is understood and the labour costs
correctly related to the factors which generate them, the cost section
should be asked for a written description of the method of paying direct
labour. The next table explains the principles governing the system at
B.D.R.
PRINCIPLES OF METHOD OF PAYMENT
There are three basic components that go to make up the wages
of direct labour:
(a) the Day Wage
(b) the Bonus - National Award
Basic Wage
(c) the Premiums - Overtime
Night Shif.t .
The Day Wage is a flat rate of bO.4 per attendance hour.
The Bonus is based on the actual time taken, in clock hours,
and the output produced, in standard hours.
The Premiums relate to when the work is done. They are calculated
as an addition to the Day Wage and are expressed in these terms,
i.e. 1 1/2 stands for time and one-half (1 1/2cb.4), of which
the normal Day Wage is represented by the 1, and the premium by
the 1/2.
The Overtime Premium Rates are 1 1/3 - overtime during the week
1 1/2 - Friday night & Saturday
morning
- Sunday
The Night Shift Premium is
2
1 1/3
Table 7.10
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Fortunately, one is not concerned with the intricacies of the
system - just with identifying the basic elements, discovering how they
are generated and where they are posted in the accounts.
While it is not possible to establish a procedure to elicit the
correct answers in a w ide variety of different industries, it is possible
to reiterate the motive that prompts the questions. This is to identify:
the marginal cost per product
the marginal cost per man.
And although the direct costing system comes closer to achieving these
objectives than any other system, it would be a mistake to assume either
that the data was necessarily suitable for planning or that some fundamental
corrections could not easily be made.
The next series of costs are all available, but probably require
some digging out. They are concerned with the marginal costs of different
manpower policies.
The first item is the cost of employing one man for each month of
the planning period, whether or not he works. This cost is important
because in the situation where sales are temporarily falling off, manage-
ment wishes to evaluate the relative merits of:
firing and rehiring
building up inventories
having men underemployed ..
The cost of employing a man, irrespective of his output is made
up of such things as:
holiday pay
canteen subsidy
national health and insurance
nightshift premium
fall back pay.
7.26
The first three are proportional to the length of the month,
the last two to the number of working days in the month. The cost section
is asked for information on the costs that vary with the length of the
month; those that vary with the number of days are calculated in section
3 of this appendix. The former are in Table 7.11.
FIXED LABOUR COSTS
Fringe Benefits
Fringe Benefits + Holiday Pay
4 weeks 5 weeks
Length of Hanth
10.0
29.9
12.5
32.4
Table 7.11
There remain four miscellaneous costs. It is unlikely that the
cost section has the data immediately available, although it may be fairly
easy to calculate, depending on the detail permitted by the chart of
accounts, and the manner in which the entries are aggregated. In fact,
this emphasises one of the major strengths of the tactical planning model;
for the most part it uses data already available within the company. By
reorganising some of the data and using L.P. techniques it ;s possible to
secure a considerable improvement in the quality of corporate plans.
The significance of the following data will become more apparent
at the formulation stage of the tactical planning model. The data outstanding
is gi~en in Table 7.12 overleaf.·
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COST OF LABOUR TURNOVER
Cost of Increasing Manpower
DEPARTMENT
Primary Secondary Assembly
b b b
35.0 35.0 110.0
5.0 5.0 5.0Cost of Decreasing Manpower
Subcontract Premium
Inventory Carrying Cost
bO.635/standard hour
.'20% of D.V.C. per annum
Note: The Costs of Increasing and Decreasing Manpower refer
to the one-time costs per man. The former is made up
of such items as: advertising, free safety equipment,
training, etc. The latter is the notional administrative
expense when someone leaves.
Subcontract premium is the preffilumincurred over and
above direct variable cost when one standard hour of
work is subcontracted.
Table 7.12
2.3. Marketing
The information from marketing is used to generate the requirement
for capacity and to help evaluate the relative merits of increases in
sales and capacity.
Of all the departments supplying data, marketing revises its
estimates m6st frequently, probably monthly, and is the source of most
requests for sensitivity analyses, e.g. what happens if the export order
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from Brazil comes through?, when is the soonest we could make a few more
dri 11s?, and so forth. These are the situati ons in whi ch management
wants reass urance that meeti n9 the orders is profi tab 1e , rather than
accepting the sales-oriented rule-of-thumb lif itls feasible, make itl.
Marketing is responsible for supplying the data on:
sales forecasts
retail price and distributor discounts
opening inventory at the start of the planning period
finished machines inventory policy,
and the forms are illustrated in Table 7.13 overleaf.
2.4. General
These forms only suggest the sources of information. Some person,
some department in the organisation should be responsible for planning
and controlling these variables. If the source I have suggested pleads
ignorance or indifference, then the rightful owner must be tracked down.
It could be that several departments claim ownership; for instance, finished
machines inventory is held for a variety of reasons, the factory uses it
as stored capacity, while marketing wants a buffer against the unexpected.
One of the best ways to help resolve conflicts is to evaluate the consequences
of the two policies, and hope that profit figures speak louder than
prejudices.
Before leaving data collection and going on to data conversion,
I must point out that this is not an exhaustive list of the data required.
It does indicate the type of data available at B.D.R. to form a suitable
basis of a resource allocation model.
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However, additional data will be necessary before the model can be used
to help solve problems created by the unique combination of events that
characterise each planning exercise. The new data may be as t~ivial as
revising the sales forecast or inventory policy, or the more substantial
process of adding a new product or productive department.
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3. DATA CONVERSION
3.1. Introduction
The awareness that data conversion is necessary is an important
step in the process of setting up a planning system. All too often
tactical planning is seen merely as the extension of operations planning.
This mistaken approach to tactical planning overlooks the fact
that departmental data is often generated, aggregated, recorded, processed
and presented with the objectives of the department in mind. Much is
heard in management science circles about the classic pitfall of sub-
optimisation, without mention of the fact that changing the scale of
processing, substituting a company objective for a departmental one, is
only part of the story. The pOint is that the raw data generated by the
departments is often not suitable for corporate tactical planning because
the departmental objectives have biased the data, not in any sinister
,way, but as a natural consequence of the process of systems analysis
done at the level of the department. See Appendix 2 for full details.
Mere departmental data can be inadequate on a number of counts:
Detail - the basic data may be perfectly sound, but the degree
of ,aggregation wrong. This is not serious if the data is too
detailed; on the other hand, the need for a different breakdown
or more detail can present considerable obstacles. For
example, production control keeps a record of departmental
standard hours for labour loading. The data serves their
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particular purpose reasonably well. However, for corporate
planning the departmental hours need to be adjusted for
wasted labour and the departments need to be subdivided into
major machine groups.
Assumptions - the adage goes II believe that I may understand,
not, I understand that I man b~lievel. The assumptions that
lie behind the data for operations planning may be irrelevant
for tactical planning. A certain amount of questioning is
necessary to ensure that the grosser errors come to light.
This implies that the corporate planning group has, at the
very least, a working knowledge of the activities and technology
of the rest of the organisation. An example is one of the
assumptions that is used in the calculation·of standard costs:
a constant relationship is assumed between products and men,
thus:
product --+ standard hours _...,clock hours --+men
Of course, the whole sequence is riddled with assumptions
about producti vity, des ign changes, and so forth, but the
least plausible and most important is the last:
clock hours -+ men
While this is true in the upward direction, as production is
increased more labour is used, it is not true in the downward,
as production falls off labour is not necessarily reduced
pari passu.
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The problem is that the planned cost of direct labour is derived
from production plans and goes into least of goods sold' (and
inventory), it is not calculated from manpower schedules.
Moreover, putting the whole cost of direct labour against the
product does not allow management to weigh up the consequences
of having men temporarily underemployed. The error is to class-
ify as directly variable per unit of product an expense which,
in fact, varies directly with the number of attendance hours.
Omissions - the data provided by the departments is invariably
of an operational nature. The factors to be weighed and the
room for manoeuvre are not necessarily the same for both tactical
planning and operations planning. This suggests that certain
data required for tactical planning may not be available, e.g.
the costs of hiring and firing .. These costs were established
by (a) going through the records of the personnel department
to check the invoices for advertisements for direct labour
(the accounts lost this figure amongst advertising in general),
(b) asking the shop floor supervisors about their training
practices, (c) asking the cost section for information on Imake-
uplpay, and (d) enquiring from the factory safety department
about the free issue of overalls, boots and goggles.
Interactions - many of the important linkages remain unperceived
or unquantified, for whatever reasons: difficulties with
processing, complexity or ignorance.
With the preamble out of the way I turn to the details of data
conversion.
7.34 .
3.2. Production Data
References are given to trace the raw data back to the tables
in the earlier part of this appendix.
The first adjustment is to the departmental standard hours in
order that they show the true capacity required to produce one unit of
each product. The basic data is in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
ADJUSTED DEPARTMENTAL STANDARD HOURS
F.W.D.
Drill
Primary Secondary Assembly Total
-----
50.56 152.70 97.13 300.39
19.36 49.60 67.17 - 136.13
l3.36 86.51 14.91 114.78
24.43 147.91 54.10 226.44
Loader
Digger
Table 7.14
The mechanics of the calculations are to increase the original
estimates of departmental standard hours, first to allow for the production
of spares and then for wasted labour.
Taking the figure for the standard hours of the F.W.D. in the
primary department:
48.05
adjusted for
spares
1
= 50.05
1
adjusted for
scrap
1
original
estimate
! 1
50.56
1-.04
t
1-.01
t
spares rate scrap rate
, 7.35
In other words, the motive is to discover the labour input
requi red for one unit of output.
The next step is to calculate the capacity available per man
on normal time, and two rates of overtime. Here the original data concerns
the proporti on of men on nights, the effi ciency and so forth. Having
decided to work in standard hours (the capac ity required is expressed in
these units), the equations for November in the primary department,
using Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 are:
(a) Normal attendance hours - 40 hour week
Primary
Secondary
Assembly
a b c d e
average
days/ hours/ attend. standard std.hours
month day hours hour avail./man
avail. /man .performance /month
a *- b c * cl
20 8 160 2.07 331
2.20 352
2.55 408
(b) Overtime at 1 1/2 - Friday night and Saturday morning
Days
Nights
f g h i J
% ov t ,hrs. average prop .out. std.hours
on avail. / hrs .ava il. avai1./man avaiL/man
shift week /man/-veek /week /month
f * g h ~;:..40 e * i-
60 5 } 58 Prim.7 0.175 62 Seed.40 10
71 Assy.
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Cc) Overtime at 2 - Sunday, dayshift only
Days
k 1 m n 0
% ovt. hrs. average prop .ovt. std.hours
on avail. / hrs. avail. avail. /man avail. /man
shift week /man/week hveek /month
k * 1 m+40 e 3{n-
60 4 2.4 : 0.06 20 Prim.
21 Seed.
24 Assy.
It should be remembered that the objective of these calculations is
to establish the size of the trenches of capacity available. Each tranche
is successively more expensive. Table 7.'15 gives the results for the whole
planning period.
The last factor limiting production is the 'j~gs ahd fixtures'
restraint. This is expressed as the maximum production per day' of individual
products and of groups of product~i when there are shared special purpose
production facilities. In this case it is only necessary to convert the
daily rate into the corresponding figure for each month of the planning
period. Table 7.16 illustrates the results of the process.
3.3. Cost Data
The motive is to identify the costs.which vary directly with each
variable: products, manpower, etc., in order to establish the true marginal
cost of the decision variables.
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A product can be in one of three categories:
finished machines inventory
production
sales
Product costs recorded by the company, direct variable costs,
include freight and some labour charges wh~ch are not directly proportional
to the level of production.
Freight expenses are incurred when pr6ducts are shipped, not when
they are produced. The other correction is a,little more complex.
There are three components to the payment of direct labour:
day wage
premi urn
bonus
The first is for being present, irrespective of when this is or
whether any work is done. The second is for when the man is present:
nights, overtime. The last is for the rate of working, the productivity.
Premiums are not included in direct variable cost; they are classified
as an indirect (period) cost. However, the other two are included. It
is reasonable to assume that when a man is working he does so at his
customary rate. In other words, when products are made, bonus costs
are incurred - the bonus is rightly'classified as directly variable. On
the other hand, the day wage has nothing to do with the level of production,
it is a payment for being present, not for working. Therefore the day
, 'wage component must be taken out of the standard direct variable cost
as recorded by the costing system.
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The adjustment is made by using a similar process to that by which
the standard costs were built up:
standard
hours
clock
---tl' hours =
day wage·element
in d.v.c.
The first link, from standard hou~s to clock hours? employs the
standard hour performance. The calculation is based on the total standard
hours for each product, rather than the depar~mental figures, and an average
of the standard hour performances. The result is marginally different from
that obtained from the individual departmental calculations.
UNIT MARGINAL COST SUM}~Y
F.W.D.
Drill
-a b c d e
clock day wage adjusted
std. cost freight std.hrs. hours element d.v. c.
(in a) c 7-227 d }{b.4 a-b-e
b b hours hours b t
2436.4 47.0 279.6 123.2 49.3 2340.1
216.2 8.9 128.5 56.6 22.6 184.7
213.7 6.3 104.6 46.1 18.4 . 189.0
645.7 10.6 208.3 91.8 36.7 598.4
Loader
Digger
Table 7.17
Reference Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10
The inventory carrying cost is calculated next. This is based
on the original direct variable cost, excluding freight. The carrying
cost is related to the length of the period and not to the number of
working days. Since the year is divided into four and five \'/eekperiods
there are only two costs to be calculated for each product.
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UNIT INVENTORY COST SUMNARY
F.W.D.
Drill
Loader
Digger
.2436.4
216.2
213.7
645.7
a
std. cost
Table 7.18
Reference Tables 7.8 and 7.12
b c
freight adjusted inventory cost
std. cost 4 week 5 \\reek
a - b c * .0154 c 1{ .0192
b b b b
:
47.0 2389.4 36.8 45.9
8.9 207.3 3.2 4.0
6.3 207.4 3.2 4.0
10.6 635.1 9.8 12.2
And finally the freight charge is treated as an expense incurred
when the product is sold and shipped.
UNIT COMPANY NET RETURN SUMMARY
I
F.W.D.
Drill
Loader
Digger
Table 7.19
Reference Tables 7.8 and 7.13
adjusted
company company
net return freight net return
b b b
3856.0 47.0 3809.0
370.0 8.9 361.0
416.0 6.3 409.7
1198.0 10.6 1187.4
. ,
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Having identified one of the costs that is proportional to the
number of attendance hours, the day wage, it is necessary to calculate
the other costs that vary in a similar manner.
To be preci se, there are three types of cost that vary with manpower:
.costs that are directly proportional to the number of men,
for example fringe benefits
costs that are directly proportional to the number of hours,
- the day wage
costs that, given knowledge of when the hours are worked,
are directly proportional to the number of hours, - the premiums.
The cost of having a ma~ available for work each month is made
up of fringe benefits, night shift premium, and day wage. This is called
the cost of normal time. It is the basic cost of employing a man. If
the man does any work other costs will be incurred: bonuses and perhaps
overtime premiums.
Of the last two, the former is part of the cost of production and
the latter part of the cost of overtime working, neither have anything to
do with the decision of whether or not to employ another man. This process
of putting costs against the variables which generate them is vital if
the relative merits of different policies are to be compared.
Table 7.20shows the calculation of labour costs for the whole
period. The entries are explained below:
(a) normal time - this is the 'average attendance hours available
per man/month' - as shown in Table 7.15.
- the day wage cost is simply the day wage (h.4) multiplied
.by the hours available in each month
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- the night shift premium is calculated as follows:
Day ~
Wage
N.S.
Premium
~ Proportion of
men on N.S.
Attendance hours
~ available/man
b.4 ~ .33 * .4 * 160 = b8.S
(b) overtime at 1 1/2 - 10 hours on Friday night (the nightshift
receive the overtime premium but not the nightshift premium),
and five hours on Saturday morning for the dayshift
- the day wage - as above
the overtime premium is calculated as in the example:
Day
Wage
Overtime
~ Premium ~
Attendance hours
available/man
b.4 ~ •5 28 = bS.6 .
I
(c) overtime at 2 - although there are 8 hours of overtime at this
rate potentially available, 4 are reserved to meet operational
<,
problems. This leaves 4 hours at the discretion of tactical
planning:
the day wage - as above
the overtime premium - since this is 'double time' it means
that the premium equals the day wage.
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4. DEFINITIONS
Standard Hour
An average man working at a normal and sustainable rate for 1
clock hour will produce 1 standard hour of output.
Standard Hours per Product
The labour content of a product is the sum of the 'floor to floor'
times of all its component parts. The floor to floor or 'allowed' time
of a part (or operation) is established by time study methods and assumes
a certain normal rate of working - as mentioned above. Since an allowed
time is established for each distinct operation, it is a simple matter to
derive the work generated in each department by the completion of 1 unit
of finished product - this summary is given in Table 7.1 called Departmental
Standard Hours.
Standard Hour Performance
The factor which links the actual output of the average man and
the theoretical output of the normal man is called the Standard Hour
Performance. There is a large discrepancy between the labour content
of a product measured in standard hours, and its labour content measured
in clock hours. This discrepancy is caused by two factors: in the first
place, the allowed time is particularly generous, and secondly, the
7.46
average man works harder than normal because of the bonus element of
the piece rate system. 'These two factors together make it plausible
for a man to produce 2.5 standard hours of output in 1 clock hour. We
would say, in this case, that the standard hour performance was 2.5 or
250%.
Scrap Rate and Spares
The scrap rate of an individual department is the amount of
labour expended on parts that are subsequently scrapped. Because of the
hiJ.genumber of parts and the different routings through, say, seven
productive departments, it is impracticable to attempt to adjust the
labour inputs for a department to compensate for subsequent wastage in
other departments further down stream in the manufacturing process.
Production control increase the size of each batch of parts for
the production of spares. This is achieved by a straight percentage
increase on the size of the batch scheduled for finished products. The
figure represents the percentage of the batch that will be used for
spares.
Direct Materi a1
This is made up of: vendor price, packing, import duty (where
applicable), overseas inland freight, ocean freight, inland freight for
U.K., miscellaneous materials (paint, petrol, etc.), subcontract premium,
1iterature.
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Direct Labour
The standard cost is divided into three: basic standard time
for primary operations and for assembly operations and the standard rate.
The components of the first are: pick-up pieces from tote tray, pick-up
and lay-aside single pieces, load and unload, process time, clean fixtures,
operator check piece, tool change allowance, tool adjustment allowance,
materi a1 handl ing (by operator), move to next machine centre, personal -
fatigue - auxiliary. The second establishes the cost of assembly operations.
The third, standard rate, is the departmental bonus element.
Direct Labour Operating Allowances
A standard rate is established for each department comprising:
training time, waiting and idle time, process waiting time associated
with multiple assignments, non-standard work, make-up time, fitting short-
ages, clocking allowance, rectification and off-line repair for assembly
lines.
Processing Supplies and Scrap
These are such items as: welding gases, oxygen, cutting oils,
acids, shot, sand, cutting tools, grinding wheels, abrasives.
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. ~1ake-Up Pay
When a 00rker is unable to earn bonuses$ through no fault of his
own, his wage is 'made-up' to the average level of the other workers in
the same department. There are many reasons why he might be prevented
from earning bonuses: the operation has no: agreed "al l owed time'; the
raw material is of the wrong specification; the machine will not reach
its designed performance level, etc.
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CONSTRUCTION & RUNNING
•
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1. CODING SYSTEM
The program, MPS/360, requires the naming of columns and rows.
Variable names can be from 1 to 8 characters in length (alphameric,
no embedded blanks). For ease in punching cards, reading the output
and writing the report-generating program, all names use the whole
field of 8 characters. It is best not to use any special characters
(slash, dollar, etc.) in a variable name as they tend to have pre-
empted meanings in computer proarams (delimiter, multiplication, etc.).
The following pages describe the system .
•
8.3
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1. COLUMN VARIABLES - start punching in card column 5
The first column identifies the main categories of variables
P
M
D
production and inventory
monthly sales
department
Production - Columns 2 through 6 inclusive define the product
F W D T R four wheel drive tractor
T R A L R drill
L 0 A D R loader
D I G G R digger
- Column 7 distinguishes between production and finished
machines inventory
•
P
I
product;i.on
inventory
Monthly Sales - Columns 2 through 6 as for production above
- Co1umn·7 is padded
P
Department - Columns 2 through 6 define the department
H T R T T
W E L D G
ASS L Y
~rimary department
secondary department
assembly department
8.5
Column 7 distinguishes between the different
tranches of capacity and defines the variables
for the changes in the size of departments
N normal working week
X overtime at 1 1/2
Z overtime at 2
S subcontract
U increases in size of department
D decreases in size of department
The last column defines the month. An alpha code is preferable to
numeric
•
A
~ month
M
1.1. Examples of Column Names
P F W D T R P A - production of F.W.D. 's in November 1971
M T R A L R P M - sales of drills in November 1972
p L 0 A D R I F - inventory of loaders in April
D W E L D G N H number of men in secondary dept. in June
D A S S L Y Z C - number of men working Sunday overtime in
assembly in January
8.6
D H T R T T U K - number of men who joined primaries at the
beginning of September
D W E L D G S B - number of men's worth of work subcontracted
for welding in December
D H T R T T D I - number of men who left primaries at the
beginning of August
D A S S L Y X C - number of men working overtime at 1 1/2
during January
2. ROW NAMES start punching in card column 15
The first column identifies the variable as being the name of an equation
or row
s row name
•
The last column identifies the time period, as for columns
A
> month
M
The other columns identify· the types of equations
Sales Restriction - Columns 2 through 5 inclusive define the products
F W D T four wheel drive tractor
T R A L drill
L 0 A D loader
D I G G digger
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Columns 6 and 7 indicate potential sales
P S sales
Production, Sales, Inventory identity - Columns 2 through 5 inclusive
are identical to the definition of products in
the sales restriction above
Columns 6 and 7 distinguish these as monthly
production, inventory, sales identities
M S monthly production, sales, inventory
identities
Material Restriction - Columns 2 through 7 inclusive define the row
name for this restriction
•
H Y D R A M hydraulic ram restriction
Capacity Restriction - For total capacity, columns 2 through 7 inclusive
identify the equations
H T R T M T primary department
W E L D N G secondary department
A S S M L Y assembly department
For the premium tranches of capacity, columns 2
through 6 define the departments
H T R T T primary
W E L D G secondary
A S S L Y assembly
8.8
Column 7 defines the premium capacity tranches as
before
x overtime at 1 1/2
z overtime at 2
Manpower Changes, Identity - Columns 2 through 6 define the departments
as for the premium tranches of capacity
- Column 7 specifies a balance equation for manpower
(
changes
C balance equation
Manpower Changes, Rates - Columns 2 through 6 define the departments as above
• - Column 7 identifies whether the change is upwards
or downwards
u upwards
D downwards
2.1. Examples of Row Names
S FWD T P S A - potential sales of F.W.D. 's in November 1971
SDI G G M S L - production, inventory, sales identity for
diggers in October
SHY D R A M E - cumulative supply of rams to the end of
March
8.9
S H T R T M T I total capacity in primaries during July
S W E L D G X K - capacity in secondzry for overtime at 1 1/2
in September
S A S S L y Z F - capacity in assembly for overtime at 2
in April
S W E L D G C J balance equation for changes in manpower for
secondary in August
S H T R T T U C - restriction in rate of increase in manpower
for primary between December and January
S A S S L Y D D - restriction on rate of decrease in manpower
for assembly ben~een January and February
•
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2. INPUT LISTING
The following pages in this section contain a complete listing
of the input data deck for the MPS/360 program.
The data refers to the factory strike. The furthest left-hand
column corresponds to card column 1 of a punch card. Each column of
print corresponds to the appropriate card column, numbering from the left.
Punching up a deck from this listing will therefore reproduce the results
in Appendices 5 and 6.
For the 05/360 and MP5/360 job control and control language
program cards necessary to run the program, reference should be made to
the relevant IBr~ manuals listed in the bibliography.
To generate the one-page summary report, the report-writing
program listed in section 3 is necessary ..
•
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INPUT LISTING
I'
FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
NAME ElEC
ROWS
l SHTRTMTA
l S WflDNGA
l SASSMLVA
l SHTRTTXA
l S WELDGXA
l SASSLY'XA
l SHTRTTZA
L SWELDGlA
L S ASSL V lA
L SHVDRAMA
E SFWDTr'lSA
E S TRAlt1SA
E SLUADMSA
E SDIGGMSA
l SFWDlFSA
l STRAlPSA
L SLOADPSA
l SDIGGPSA
L SHTRlMTB
l SWELDNGB
L SASSMLY8
L SHTRTTXB
l SWELOGXB
L SASSLYXB
L SHTRTTlB
L S WELDGlB
l SASSLYZa
l SHY DRI\i'lB•E SFWDTMSB
E STRAlMSB
E S lOADMS 3
E SDIGGMSB
L SFWDTPSB
l STRAlPS8
L SlOADPSB
L SDIGGPSB
E SHTRTTCB
E Sl-lElOGCB
E S ASSl vee
G SHTRTTUB
G S VlELDGUB
G SASSLYUB
G SHTRTTDB
G SWELOGDB
G SASSlYOB
l SHTRT/vlfe
l SWElONGC
l SASSHLYC
L SHTRTTXC
L S WElOGXC
l SASSLYXC
l SHTRTTIC
L S WELDGlC
L S ASSLY le
L SHYDRAMC
E SFlwn~sc
E S TRALMSC
E S LOADMSC
E SOIGGMSC
l SHWTPSC
l STRALPSC
L SlOADPSC
L SOIGGPSC
E SHTRTTCC
E S WELOGCC
E SASSLYCC
G SHTRTIUC
G S WELOGUC
G SASSLYUC
G SHIRTTDC
G SWELOGDC
G S ASSL VOC
L SHTRIMTD
L S WElONGO
L SASSi'''1LYD
l SHTRTTXD
l SWELOGXD
l SASSLYXO
l SHTRTIlD
L S WELDGlD
l SASSlYlD
L SHVORAMO
E SFWDTMSD
E STRALMSD
E S lOADtvlSD
E SDIGGMSD
l SFWDTPSD
L STRAlPSD
L SLOAOPSD
l $DIGGPSD
E SHTRTTCD
E SWElDGCD
E SASSlVCD
G SHTRTTUD
G SWEL[)GUD
G SASSLYUD
G SHTRTTDD
G SWELDGDO
G SASSLYDO
l SHTRTMTE
L S WELDNGE
l SASSMlVE
L SHTRTTXE
l SWELDGXE
L SASSL YX E
l SHTRTTlE
8.12
INPUT LISTING
FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
l S \·JELDGIE
L SASSLVZE
L S HY DRAt~E
E SFwDTMSE
E STRAlMSE
E S LOADMSE
E SDIGGMSE
L SFWOTPSE
L STRALPSE
L S LOADPSE
L SDIGGPSE
E SHTRTTCE
E S WELDGCE
E SASSLYCE
G SHTRTTUE
G SWELOGUE
G SASSL VUE
G SHTRTTDE
G S WElDGDE
G SASSLYDE
l SHTRTMTF
L S WELDNGf
L SASSMLYF
L SHTRTTXF
L S WELDGXF
l SASSl YI~F
L SHTRTTIF
L SWElDGlF
L S ASSLY IF
L SHYORAMf
e SFWDTMSF
E s TRAlMSF
E S LOADHSF
E SDIGG~1SF
l SFWDTPSF
L STRALPSF
L SLOAOPSF
L SDIGGPSF
E SHTRTTCF
E SWElDGCF
E S ASSL YCF
G SHTRTTUF
G SlrJELDGUF
G SASSlYUF
G SHTRTTDF
G S wELDGDF
G SASSL YDF
l SHTRTtHG
l SWElDNGG
L SASSHlYG
L SHTRTTXG
L S WElDGXG
l SASSLYXG
L SHTRTTZG
8.13
INPUT LISTING
FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
l S WELDGlG
L SASSLYlG
L SHYORAHG
E S FiWTi1SG
E S TRAL~lSG
E S lUtlOl"lSG
E SDIGGt·\SG
L SFWOTPSG
L STRAlPSG
L SLUAIJPSG
L SOlGGPSG
E SHTRTTCG
E S ~"'[LIJGCG
E SJ\SSlYCG
G SHTRTTUG
G S WELDGUG
G SASSLYUG
G SHTRTTOG
G S WELDGLJG
G SASSlYOG
L SHTRTMTH
l S vlElDNGH
L SA.SSMlYH
l SHTRTTX H
L S I.JELDGXH
L SASSlYXH
l SHTRTTlH
L S\-JELDGZH
L SASSLYZH
L S HYDRAfvlH
E S FIWH1SH
E S TRAU1SH
E S LUAOf1SH
ESDI GGMSH
l SFHOTPSH
L S TRAL PSH
L S lUAOPSH
l SOrGGPSH
E SHTHTTCH
E S WElOGCH
E SASSlYCH
G SHTRTTUH
G S WELDGUH
G SASSLYUH
G SHTRTTUH
G SWElOGDH
G SASSlYDH
L SHTRTMTI
L S WElDNGl
L SASS'1L Y I
l SHTRTTXr
L S WELDGXl
L SASSLYXI
L SHTRTTZI
INPUT usn NG 8.14
FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
L SWElDGlI
l SASSl YZI
L SHYDRMH
E SFWDTMSI
E STRALt1S1
E S LOADMSI
E SDIGG~1S1
L SFWDTPSI
L S TRAl PS I
L SlOADPSI
L SDIGGPSI
E SHTRTTer
E SWElOGC I
E SASS LYC r
G SHTRTTUI
G S WElDGU I
G SASSlYUI
G SHTRTTD I
G S WELDGD!
G SASSlYDl
L SHTR Tt-H J
l S WElDNGJ
L SASStvllYJ
l SHTRTTXJ
l SWElDGXJ
l SASSlYXJ
L SHTRTTZJ
L SWElDGlJ
l SASSlYlJ
L S HV DRl\i'\J
E SFWDTfvlSJ
E STRAlMSJ
E S LOADt'lSJ
E SOIGGMSJ
l SFHOTPSJ
l STRALPSJ
l SlOADPSJ
l SDIGGPSJ
E SHTRTTCJ
E S .-JELDGCJ
E SASSlYCJ
G SHTRTTUJ
G SWELOGUJ
G SASSLYUJ
G SHTRTTDJ
G SWELDGOJ
G SASSLYDJ
l SHTRTMTK
l SWELL)NGK
l SASSMLYK
l SHTRTTXK
l S WELDGXK
l SASSLYXK
L SHTRTTlK
8.15
INPUT LISTING
fACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
l SWELDGlK
l SASSLYIK
l SHYDRAMK
E SFWDTt·1SK
E S TRAU,ISK
E SlOAOMSK
ESDI GGt-1SK
l SFh'DTPSK
l STRAlPSK
l SlOADPSK
l SDIGGPSK
E SHTRTTCK
E S WElDGCK
E SASSLYCK
G SHTRTTUK
G S ~JELOGUK
G SASSLYUK
G SHTRTTDK
G S WELDGDK
G SASSlYDK
L SHTRTHTL
l SIoJELONGl
L SAS$~lLYL
l SHTRTTXL
L SWELDGXL
L SASSLYXL
L SHTRTTZL
L S WELOGZL
L SASSLYZL
L SHYDRAMl
E SFWOrMSl
E STRALMSL
E SlOADMSL
E SOIGGMSL
L SFWOTPSl
l STRALPSL
"L SLOAOPSL
L SDIGGPSL
E SHTRTTCL
E S WELOGCL
E SASSLYCL
G SHTRTTUL
G SWELDGUL
G SASSLYUL
G SHTRTTDL
G SWELDGDL
G SASSLYDl
L SHTRT!HM
l SWELDNGM
L SASSHLYM
L SHTRTTXM
L S WELDGXM
L S ASSL YXM
l SHTRTTZM
INPUT LISTING 8.16
FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
8.17
INPUT LISTING
FACT ORY STRIKE: IN MARCH
l SWELDGZM
L SASSLYll-1
L SHY DRAt-it.,
E S HIDT 1"15t-1
E S TRAL ~lSM
E S LOA D~·1Sr~
E S Dr GGMSt-1
L SFWDTPSM
L S TRAL PSM
l SlOADPSM
l SDIGGPSM
E SHTRTTCM
E SWELDGCM
E SASSLYCM
G SHTRTTUM
G S \-JElDGUt"
G SAS5LYUH
G SHTRTToM
G S WELOGDM
G SASSLYDM
N E NTRPREN
COLUI1NS
PFWoTRIZ SFWoT t1S A 1.00 000
PTRALRIl STRAL MS A 1.00000
PlOA[)RIZ SLOADMS A 1.00 000
POIGGRIl SoIGGMSA 1.00 000
PFWDTRPA SHTRT .'1T A 50.56000 SWELONGA lS2.70000
PH/OTRPA SASS,...,lYA 97.13000 SF kOH1 SA 1.00000
P flWT RPA ENT RP RE N - 2340.12000
PTRALRPA SHTRHH A 19.36000 SWELoNGA . 49.60000
PTRALRPA SASS,...\LYA 67.17000 SHYDRM'lA 1.00000
PTRALRPA SHY DR.Al1 B 1.00 000 SHVURAMC 1.00000
PTRALRPA SHYO~M1D 1.00 000 SH YuRAt~E 1. 00000
PTRALRPA SHY ORArIF 1.00 000 SHYORAMG 1.00000
PTRALRPA SHY DR AHH 1.00 000 SHYiJRAt-1 I 1..000 00
PTRALRPA SHYORM1J 1.00 000 SH't'DRAt1K 1.00000
PTRALRPA SHYDRAML 1.00 000. SHYORAMtvI 1.000 00
PTRALRPA STR AL ~lS A 1.00 000 EN TI{Pk EN 1ti4. 65000
PLOADRPA SHTRTMTA 13.36000 S\oJELDNGA 86.51000
PLOADRPA SASSMLYA 14.91000 SHyoRAMA 1.000 00
P LOAORPA SHY DR M1B 1.00 000 SHYDRAMC 1.00000
P LOADRPA SHyoR At10 1.00000 SHYDRM~E 1.0001.10
PLOAORPA SHYORAMF 1.00000 SHYDRAI~G 1. 000 00
PlOADRPA SHYDRAt-1H 1.00000 SI1YuRAMI 1.00000
PLOADRPA SHYDRM1J 1.00000 SH YDRMIK 1.00000
PLOADRPA SHY DR.Ai'1L 1.00000 SHYORAMt1 1.00000
PlUAORPA SLOAD~1SA 1.00000 ENTRPREN 1as, 97000
PoIGGRPA SHTRTMTA 24.43000 SwELDNGA 147.91000
POIGGRPA SASSHLYA 54.10000 SO IGGMSA 1.00000
POI GGRPA ENTRPREN 598.39 000
MFWoTRPA SFWDT MSA 1.00 000 Sf kDTP SA 1.00000
MHiDT RPA ENT R.PREN 3809.00000
tv1TRALRPA STRALMSA 1.00000 STRALPSA 1.00000
MTRALRPA ENTRPRE:N 361.10000
8.18
INPUT LISTING
FACTOR Y Sf RI Kc IN MARCH
MLOAORPA SLOADt~S A 1.00 000 SlOADP SA 1.00000
f"iLOADRPA ENTRPREN 409.75000
MOl GGRPA SDIGGHSA 1.00000 SDIGGPSA 1..00000
MDIGGRPA ENTHPREN 1187e40000
PF~~OTRIA SF~WT I'IS A 1.00 000 Sf hDTMSB 1.00000
PFwOTRIA ENTRPREN 36.80000
P TRALRI A STRAL MSA 1.00000 STRALI>1SB 1. 00000
PTRALRIA ENTRPREN 3.20 000
P lOADRI A SLOAOMS A 1. 00 000 SLOADMSB 1.00000
P LOADR lA ENTRPREN 3.20000
PDIGGRIA SDIGGl-1SA 1.00000 SD IGGI"1 SE 1.00000
PDIGGRIA ENT RP RE N 9.80000
OHTRT TNA SHTRT MTA 331.00 000 SHTRTTXA 1.00000
DHTRTTNA SHTRT re B 1.00 000 SHTRTTUB .11000
DHTRfTNA SHTRTTOB .01000 ENTRPREN 82.40000
DHTR r TXA SHTRTMTA 58.00000 SHIRT TXA 1.00000
DHTRTTXA SHT RfT lA 1.00 000 ENTBPREN 16.80000
OHTRT TZA SHTRTMT A 20. 00 000 SHTHTTlA {I.OOOOO
DHTRTTZA ENT RPREN 7.60000
DHTRTTSA SHTRlMTA 331. CO000 ENTRPREN 274.00000
DWELOGNA S\~ELONGA 352.00 000 $fiELDGXA 1.0000(:)
DWELDGNA SWELDGCe 1.00 000 SWELOGUe .07000
DWELDGNA SWELD GO t3 .02000 ENTRPREN 82.40000
DWElDGXA SWELDNGA 62. 00 000 SIoiElDGXA 1.00000
DWElDGXA S~'IElOGlA 1.00000 ENTRPREN 16.80000
OWElDGlA SWELDNGA 21.00000 SWELDGlA 1.00000
OWELDGZA ENTRPREN 7.60000
DWELDGSA SWElDNGA 352.00000 ENTRPREN 287.00000
DASSLYNA SASSNlYA 408.00000 SASSL YXA 1.00000
DASSLYNA SASSL YC B 1.00000 SASSLYUe .100 00
DASSLYNA SASSLYDB .01000 ENTRPREN 82.40000
DASSLYXA SASS~l L'r' A 71.00000 SA SSL '( XA 1.00000
DASSLYXA SASSLYZA - 1.00000 ENTRPREN 16.80000
DASSlYlA SASSr1lY A 24.00000 SASSLYLA 1.00000
DASSLYlA ENTHPREN 7.60 000
DASSLYSA SASSMLY A 408.00 000 f.NTRPREN 323.00000
P HJDTRP8 SHTRTtH B 50.56000 SWElONGo 152. 70000
P FWOTRPB SASSI'll Y B 97.13000 Sf tiD H1Sll 1.00000
PH/DTRPB ENTRPREN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPB SHTRT MT B 19.36000 SWELDNGB 49.60000
PTRALRPB SASSI~LYB 67.17000 SHYDRAMB 1.00000
PTRAlRP8 SHYDRAI-1C 1. 00000 ShYDRAMD 1.00000
PTRALRPB SHY DRM1E 1.00 000 SHYDRAt·\F 1.00000
PTRALRPB SHYDRM1G 1.00000 SHYDRAMH 1.00000
PTRALRPB SHYDRA.'1 I 1.00000 SHYDRAMJ 1.00000
PTRALRPB SHYORAMK 1.00000 SHYDRANL 1. 000 00
PTRAlRPB SHYDRAMM 1.00000 STRALMSB 1.00000
PTRAlRPB ENT RPREN 184.65000
PlOAORPB SHTRTMTB 13.36000 SwELDNGB 86.51000
P lOAORPB SASS~1LY8 14.91000 SHYORAMB 1. 00000
P lOAORPB SHYDRArK 1.00000 SHYDRAMD· 1.00000
PLOAORPB SHYORAME 1.00000 SHYDRAMF 1. 000 00
P lOADRPB SHYDRAMG 1.00000 SHYDRAf~H 1.000 00
P lOADRPB SHY DRAM I 1. 00000 SHYDRAMJ 1.00000
I
8.19
INPUT LISTING
FACTORY Sf RI KE IN t>lARCH
PLOADRPB SHY DRMiK 1.00 000 SHYORAI1l 1.00000
PlOAORP8 SHY DRMH1 1.00 000 SLOAOMSB 1.00000
P LOAORPB ENTRPRcN 188.97000
POI GGRPB SHTRT('1TB 24.43000 Sw ELDNGB 141.91000
PDIGGRPB SASSr~L '( B 54. 10000 SOlGGt-1Sd 1.00000
p OIGGRPB ENTRPREN 598.39000
MFWDTRPB SFI~OTPSB 1.00000 Sf\\OTNS8 1.00000
MFWOT RPB ENTRPREN 3809.00000
NTRAL RPB STRAL MSB 1.00000 STRALP S13 1. 00000
I-1TRALRPB ENTRPREI'J 361. 10 000
MlOAORPB SLOAOt-1S B· 1. 00 000 SLOADP S8 1. 00000
MLOADRPB EIHRPREN 409.75000
MlJIGGRPB SDI Gt;f-lS B 1.00 000 SDIGGPSB 1.00000
MOIGGRPS ENTRPREN 1187.40000
PfWDTRIB SFHOT MSB 1.00000 SF"DTt1 se 1.00000
PFWDTRIB ENTRPREN 45.90 000
PTRALRIB STRALMSB 1.00000 STRALMSC {1.00000
PTRALRIB ENT RP REN 4.00 000
PLOADRIB SlOADI'1S B 1.00000 SLOAOMse 1.00000
P LOAORI B ENTRPREN 4.00 000
PDI'GGR16 SDI GGMSB 1.00 000 SO1GGf'1se 1.00000
PDIGGRIB ENTRPREN 12.20 000
DHTRTTNB SHTRTMT B 36/t. 00 000 SHTRTTXB 1.00000
DHTRTTNB SHTRTTCd 1.00000 SHTRTTce 1.00000
DHTRTTNB SHTRT TUC .11000 SHTRTTDC .01000
DHTRTTNB ENIRPREN 92.20000
OHTRTTXB SHTRT rH B 64.00000 SHTRTTXB 1.000 00
DHTRTTXB SHTRTTlB 1.00000 ENTRPRH-i IB.60000
o HTRTTlB SHTRT~nB 22.00000 SHTR TT lB 1.000 00
DHTRTTlB ENTRPREN 8.40000
DHTRTTSB SHTfU MT B 364.00000 ENTRPREN 301.40000
DWELDGNB SriELDNGB 387.00000 $YlELDGXB 1.00000
DWELDGNB SWELDGC 8 1.00000 SWELUGCC 1.00000
o WELOGNB SWELDGUe .07000 SWElDGOC • 02000
Dl-IELDGNB ENTRPREN 92.20000
OWEl.OGXB SwELONGB 68.00000 SWELOGXB 1.00000
DWELDGXB SWELDGlB 1.00 000 EtHi{PREN 18.60000
DWELOGlB SwELDNGB 23.00000 SnELUGlB 1.00000
DWElDGlB ENTRP REN 8.40000
DWELOGSB SrI ELO NGB 387. 00000 ENTRPREN 315.40000
DASSLYNB SASSMLYB ._ 449.00 000 SASSLYXB 1.00000
DASSLYNt3 SASSLYCB 1.00000 sxsst vcc 1.00000
DASSLYNd SASSL YUC .10000 SASSL YDC .01000
OASSlYNB ENTRPREN 92.20000
DASSLYXB SASSt~lY B 79.00000 SA SSL Y xs 1.00000
DASSLYXS SASSL YlB 1. 00000 ENTRPREN 18.60000
DASSLYlB SASSMLYu 27. 00000 SASSlYlB 1.00000
DASSLYlB ENTRPREN 8.40000
OASSLYSB SASSMLYB 449. 00000 ENTRPR EN 355.40000
OHTRTTUB SHTRTTCB 1.00000 SHTRTIUB 1. 00000
OHTRTTUB ENT RP REI~ 35.00000
DWElOGUU SWELDGC B 1.00000 SwELOGUU 1.00000
DWELDGUB ENT RPREN 35.00000
DASSLYUB SASSL YC B 1. 00000 SASSL'iUS 1.00000
8.20
INPUT LISTING
FACT ORY SHUKf IN MARCH
DASSLYUB ENTRPREN 110. 00 000
DHTRTTDB SHnHTC B 1.00000 SHTR TIDS 1.00000
DHTRTTDB ENTRPREN 5.00000
DWELDGDB SWElJGC B 1 ..00000 SWELOGOB 1. 000 00
OWEl.DGDB ENTHPREN 5.00000
o ASSL YOB SASSLYCB 1.00000 SASSL YOB 1.00000
DASSLYOB ENTRPREN 5.00000
P F~WT RPC SHT RI (va c 50.56000 SwELONGC 152.70000
P FWOT RPC SASSr'lLYC 91.13000 SF ~IOrH SC 1.00000
PfWDTRPC ENTRPREN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPC SHT RT I'll C 19.36000 SWELDNGC 49.60000
PTRALRPC SASS~1L YC 67.17000 SHYDRAtvlC 1. 00000
PTRALRPC SHYDRAMD 1. 00 000 SHYDRA~1E 1. 00000
PTRALRPC SHY DRMlf 1.00 000 SHYDRAl4G leOOOOO
PTRALRPC SHY ORA}~H 1.000GO SHYDRAM I 1.00000
PTRALRPC SHY ORMIJ 1. 00 000 SH YDR/II"iK 1.00000
PTRAlRPC SHY DRA(VlL 1. 00 000 SH YDRA~H1 1.00000
PTRALRPC STRALMSC 1.00 000 ENTt{PREN i a», 6:5000
P LOADRPC SHTRHHC 13.36000 SWELONGC 86.51000
P LOADRPC SASSt~l YC 14.91000 SHYORAIK 1.00000
PLOADRPC SHYDRMllJ 1.00 000 SHYORAI\1 E 1. 00000
P LOADRPC SHYOR M1F 1. 00 000 SHYDRM1G 1.00000
P LOADRPC SHYDRMlH 1. 00 000 SHYORAI'l I 1. 00000
P lOADRPC SHY ORAl>lJ 1. 00 000 SHYDRAMK 1.000 00
P LOAORPC SHY DRAML 1.00 000 SHYORAM~ 1.00000
.p LOADRPC SLOAI.H\S C 1. 00 000 ENTRPKEN 188.97000
PDIGGRPC SHTRltHC 24.43000 5WElUNGC 147 ..91000
PDIGGRPC SASSMlYC 54.10000 Si) r GGi'i se 1.00000
P 01 GGRPC ENfRPREN 598.39000
MFWDTRPC SFWOTf'.1SC 1. 00 000 SFhDTPSC 1.00000
MFWDTRPC ENTRP REN 3809.00000
MTRALRPC STRALMSC 1.00000 STRALP se 1. 00000
MTRALRPC ENTRPREN 361.10000
MLClADRPC SLOAOf>,S e 1. 00 000 SLUADP SC 1. 00000
MLOADRPC ENTRPREN 409.75000
MOl GGRPC SDI GGMSC 1.00 000 SO IGGP se 1.00000
MDIGGRPC ENTRPREN 1187.40000
PHWTRIC SfW OTMSC 1. 00 000 SF ~D T11SD 1.00000
P FWDT RIC ENTRPREN 36.80000
PTRALRIC STRAU-4S C 1.00000 ST RALM SO 1.00000
P TRALRI C ENTRPREN 3.20000
PLOi\DRIC SLOAUMS C 1.00000 SLOADHSO 1.00000
PLOAURIC ENT RP REN 3.20000
POIGGRIC SOIGGMSC 1. 00 000 SO IGG~1 SO 1.00000
POIGGRIC ENTRP REN 9.80000
DHTRTTNC SHTRTMTC 331.00000 SHTRTTXC 1. 00000
DHTRTTNC SHTRT TCC 1.00000 SHTR TTCD 1. 00000
DHTRTTNC SHTRTTUD .11000 SHTRTTDD .01000
DHTRTTNC ENTRPR.EN (32.40 000
OHTRTTXC SHTiUMTC 58.00000 SHTR TT XC 1. 000 00
DHTR r r xc SHTRTTle 1. 00000 ENTR PR EN 16.80000
DHTRTTIC SI1T RT '''IT e 20.00000 SH TR r T le 1.00000
DHTRTTIC ENTF<.PREN 1.60000
DHTRTTSC SHT RT MT C 331.00000 ENTRPREN 274.00000
B.21
INPUT LISTING
FACTORY STRI KE IN t'1ARCH
DWELDGNC SWELDNGC 352.00000 SWEl DGXC 1. 00000
DWELDGNC SWELDGCC 1.00000 Sw EL OGeD 1.00000
lHiELDGNC SVIELD GU0 • 07 000 SWElOGOO .02000
DWELDGr-JC ENTRPREN 82.40000
DWELOGXe SWELDNGC 62.00000 SWELDGXC 1.00000
DWELOGXe $WELDGIC 1.00000 HHRPREN 16.80000
DWELOGlC SWELDNGC 21.00 000 S}~El OGle 1.00000
D~4ElOGlC ENTRPRcN 7.60000
Ol-4ELOGSC ShEllJNGC 352.00000 ENTRPREN 287. 00000
DASSLYNC SASSI-1 L Y C 408.00 000 SASSL Y XC 1.00000
DASSLYNC SASSLYCC 1.00000 SA SSL YCO 1.00000
DASSLYNC SASSLYUD .10 000 SASSL YOO .01000
DASSLYNC ENTRPREN 82.40000
DASSL YXC SASSMLYC 71.00000 SASSLYXC 1.00000
DASSLYXe SAS SL Y l e 1.00000 EN lRPR EN 16.80000
DASSL Y lC SASSi'1LY C 24.00000 SASSLYlC 1.00000
OASSLYlC ENTRPREN 7.60000
D ASSL YSC SAS SMLY C 408. 00 000 ENTRPREN 3~3.00000
DHTRTTUC SHTRTTCC 1.00000 SHTRTTUC 1. 00000
DHTRTTUC ENTRPREN 35. 00000
DWElDGUC SWELDGCC 1. 00 000 SWELOGUC 1.00000
OWELDGUC ENTRPREN 35.00 000
DASSLYUC SASSL vee 1.00000 SASSlYUC 1;00000
DASSL vue ENT RP RE N 110. 00 000
DHTRTTDe SHTRTTCC 1.00000 SHIRTTDC 1.00000
DHTRTTDC ENTRPREN 5.00000
o WELDGDC SwELDGCC 1,.00000 SWELDGDC 1.00000
DWElDGDC ENT RP RE I~ 5.00000
DASSL YDC SASSL YC e 1.00600 SA SSL vue 1.000 00
OASSLYDC ENTRPREN 5.00000
PFWOfRPD SHTRTMTO 50.56000 SWElONGD 152.70000
PFWOTRPO SASS~'lLYl.) 97.13000 SFwOTMSO 1.00000
PHJDTRPO ENTRPREN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPO SHTRT /'-1T0 19.36000 SWELONGD 49.60000
PTRALRPD SASSMLVO 67.17000 SHYDRMW 1.00000
P TRAL RPD SHY ORMI E 1.00 000 SH YDRAI~f 1.00000
PTRAlRPD SHYORM-1G 1.00000 SH YORM4H 1.00000
PTRALRPO SHY DRAM I 1.00000 $H'tDRAMJ 1.00000
PTRALF~PD SHYORAfviK 1.00000 SHYDRAMl 1. 00000
PTRALRPD SHY ORAM~1 1. 00 000 STRALl~ so 1.00000
PTRALRPD ENTRP REN 184.65 000
P LOAlJRPD SHTRT f-1T0 13.36000 SWELONGO 86.51000
P lOAORPO SASSi\1LY U 14.91000 SHYDRA~lD 1.00000
P LOAORPO SHY DRAt1 E 1.00000 SH YDRM1F 1.00000
PLOADRPD SHY ORAMG 1.00000 SHYORAMH 1.00000
PlOAORPD SHY ORAtvl I 1.00000 SHYDRAMJ 1.00000
P LOADRP 0 SHYORM1K 1.00 000 $HYDRAML i.ooooo
P lOAORPD SHYORAMl'i 1.00000 SlOADMSO 1.00000
P lOAORPD ENTRPRcN 18B.97000
POI GGRPO SHTRT ~H0 24.43000 SWELDNGO 147.91000
POIGGRPD SASSI'lLY 0 54.10000 SDIGGMSD 1.00000
PDIGGRPD ENTRPREN 5913.39000
t·1FWDTRPO SFWOTI"ISD 1. 00 000 SFL-IOTPSO 1.000 00
HFWDTHPD ENTRPKEN 3809. 00000
INPUT LISTING
8,22
FACT ORY ST RI KE IN MARCH
''1TRALRPD STRALHSO 1.00000 SlRALPSD 1.00000
~ITRALRPD ENT RP RE N 361.10000
MLOAORPO SLOALH1S 0 1.00 000 SLUAOPSD 1. 00000
MLOADRPD ENT RP REr'~ 40<). 75000
MDIGGRPD SDIGGr-1S0 1.00000 SOIGGPSD 1. OOUOO
r~OI GGRPD ENTRPREN 1187.40000
PfWDTRI0 SFWDT IvIS 0 1.00 000 SFYiDTMSE 1.00000
PFWDrRID ENTRPREN 36.80000
P TRAL RID STRALMSD 1.00000 STRAU1SE 1.00000
PTRALRID ENTRPREN 3.20 000
PLOAOR1D SLOADMS 0 1.00 000 SLOAOr",SE 1.00000
P LOAORI 0 ENTRPREN 3.20000
POI GGRI 0 SDI GG~lS 0 1.00000 SOIGGMSE 1.00000
PDIGGRIO ENTRPREN 9.80000
DHTRTTNO SHTRTMTO 331.00000 SHTRTTXO 1. 00000
DHfRTTND StH RT TC 0 1.00000 SHTRTTCE 1.00000
DHTRTTND SHTRT TU E .11000 SHTHTTOE .01000
DHTRTTNO Er'lTRP REI~ 82.40 000
OHTRTTXO SHT RT MT l) 58. 00000 SHTRTTXO 1.00000
DHTRTTXD SHTRT T z o 1.00000 ENTRPREN 16.80000
DHTRTTLD SHTRT~1TD 20.00000 SHTRTTlD i.OOOOO
DHTRTTlD ENTRPREN 7.60000
DHTRTTSD SHTRT MT D 331. 00000 ENIRPREN 2 74~ 000,00
DWELUGND ,SWELDNGD 352.00000 SWElDGXD 1.00000
DWELDGND SWELO GCo 1. 00 000 Sl-IEL DGeE 1.00000
DWELDGND SWElDGU E .07000 S~JELDGDE .02000
D~JELUGND ENTRPREN 82.40000
DWElDGXO SwELDNGD 62. 00 000 ShELDGXO 1.00000
DWELUGXD SWELD Gl 0 1.00000 ENTRPREN 16.80000
OWELDGlD SWELQ NGD 21. 00 000 St'lELOGlD 1.00000
DWELDGZD ENTRPREN 7.60000
DWElDG$O S~~ELDNGO 352.00000 ENTRPREN 287.00000
DASSLYNO SASS:·j LV 0 408.00000 SA SSL '( XO 1.00000
DASSLYND SASSL yeo 1.00000 SASSL veE 1.00000
DASSL YND SASSLYUE .10 000 SA SSL YDE .010 00
DASSLYND ENTRPREN 82.40000
OASSL YXO StlSSfilLYD 7i.OOOOO SA SSL Y XD 1. 00000
DASSL YXO SASSLYlD 1.00000 EN TRPR EN 16.80000
OASSLYZo SASSr1LY 0 24.00000 SASSLYlD 1.00000
DASSLYlD I::NTRFREN 7.60000
DASSLYSD SASS~ILYD ._ 408. 00000 ENTRPR EN 323.00000
OHTRTTUO SHTRTTCO 1.00000 SHTRTTUD 1.00000
DHTRTTUD ENTRP REN 35. 00 000
DWELDGUO SwELOGCO 1.00000 S~iEL DGUD 1. 00000
DWELDGUD ENTRPREN 35.00000
DASSLYUO SASSL YCD 1.00000 SA SSL 'VUD 1.00000
DASSLYUD ENTRPREN 110.00000
OHTRTTDu SHTRTTCD 1.00 000 SH TR TIDD 1.00000
DHTRTTDD ENT RP RE r-.J 5.00 000
o WELUGOD SWELDGC D 1.00 000 SwElDGDD 1. 00000
OWElUGDD ENT KP REN 5.00 000
DASSLYDD SASSL YCD 1. 00 000 SA SSL YDO 1.00000
DASSLYDO ENTRPREN 5.00000
P FWDTRPE SHTRTMTE 50.56000 ShELONGE 152.70000
8.23
INPUT LISTING
FACTORY STRIKE IN l"IAHC H
PHJDTRPE SASSMLV E 97.13000 Sf~OTMSE 1.00000
PFWUTRPE ENTRPKCN - 2340.12 000
PTRALRPE SHTRHH E 19.36000 ShEL ONGE 49.60000
PTRAlRPE SA$Sr-lLY E (>7.17000 SHYDHAHE 1.00000
PTRALRPE SHY DR Ar1 F 1.00 000 SHYDRAHG 1.00000
PTRALRPE SHYDRM1H 1.00000 SHYDRAt~ I 1.00000
PTRALRPE SHY ORAi~ J 1. 00 000 SHYURAHK 1.00000
PTRALRPE SHYDRM1l 1.00000 SHYDK ..\MI"i 1.OOuOO
PTRALRPE STRAL t-1SE 1.00 000 ENTI~PR.EN 18't.65000
P LClAIJRPE SHTRfMTE 13.36000 Sw EL DNGE 86.51000
PLOADRPE SAS S~ILY E 14.91000 SHYDRAI'lE 1.00000
PLOADRPE SHY DRAM F 1. 00 000 SHVDRA/>lG 1.00000
PLOADRPE SHY ORM1H 1.00000 SHYORAt1 I 1.00000
PlOAORPE SHYOR AMJ 1. 00 000 ~HYORAj"1K 1.00000
PLOADRPE SHY DR At'lL 1.00000 SHYDRAMM 1. 000 00
PLOAORPE SLOADMSE 1.00 000 ENTRPREN 188.97000
POIGGRPE SHTRft'1TE 24.43000 Sw EL ONGE llt7.91000
PDIGGRPE SASS~1LY E 54.10000 SlIIGGMSE ' 1.00000
PDIGGRPE ENTf{P REN 598.39 000
MfWOTRPE SFWOT MS E 1. 00 000 SF~OTPSE 1.00000
~;\FWOrRPE ENTRPREN 3309.00000
MTRALRPE STRAL "IS E 1.00000 STRALPSE 1. 000 00
t~TRAL RPE ENTkPREN 361. 10000
~1l0ADRPE SLOAOMSE 1.00000 SLOAOP SE 1.00000
MLOADRPE ENTRPREN 409.75000
I-IOIGGRPE SlJIGGMSE 1.00000 SOIGGPSE 1.00000
t-1IJI GG RP E ENT RP RE:N 1187.40000
PH/DTRIE SHoJDT MS E le 00000 SF ~Dn~SF 1.00000
P HWTRI E ENTRP REN 45.90 000
PTRALRIE STRAU'IS E' - 1.00000 STRALMSF 1.00000
PTRALRIE ENTRPREN 4.00000
PLOADRIE SLOAUMS E 1.00000 SLOADMSf 1.00000
P LOADRI E ENfRP REN I....00 000
P DIGGRI E SOIGGt-'ISE 1.00000 SDIGGMSF 1.00000
PDIGGRIE ENT RP REN 12.20 000
DHTRTTNE SHTRT HT E 397. 00 000 SHTRTTXE 1.00000
DHTRTTNE SHTRTTCE 1.00000 SHTRTTCF 1. 00000
DHTRTTNE SHTRTTUF • 11 aGO SHTRTTOF .01000
DHTRTTNE ENT RP RE N 99.40000
DHTRTTXE SHTRr MT E 69.00000 SHTRTTXE 1.00000
DHTRTTXE SHrRTT lE 1.00000 ENTRPREN 20.40000
DHTRTTlE SHTRT MT E 24.00000 SHTR TT lE 1.00000
DHTRTTZE ENTRPREN 9.20000
DHTRTTSE SHTRTt'lTE 397. CO000 ENTRPREN 328.80000
OWELDGNE SYIELDNGE 422. 00 000 ShELDGXE 1.00000
DWElDGNE SWELDGCE 1.00000 SWELOGCF 1.00000
DWELDGNE SWELDGUF • 07000 S~ELDGOF .02000
DrJELDGNE ENTRPREN 99.40000
DWcLDGXE SI>JELDNGE 74. 00 000 SWELDG)(E 1.000 00
DwELDGXE SwELDGZ E 1.00000 ENTRPREN 20.40000
DWELDGlE SWELDNGE 25.00000 SWELDGlE 1.00000
DWELDGZE ENTRP REN 9.20000
DWELDGSE S~<4ELDNG[ 422. 00 000 EN TRPR EN 343.80000
DASSLYNE SASSMLYE - -490.00000 SA SSL YXE 1. 000 00
8.24
INPUT LISTING
FACTORY SI" RI KE IN t-1ARCH
DASSlYNE SASSL YC E 1.00000 SASSl YCF 1.00000
DASSlYNE SASSl YLJF .10000 SASSlYDf .01000
DASSLYNE ENTRPREN 99.40000
DASSLYXE SAssr·1LY E 86.00000 ::iASSlYXE 1.00000
Dt>.SSL YXE SASSL Y LE 1.00000 ENTRPR EN 20.40000
DASSL Y z s SASSMLYE 29. 00 000 SASSlYIE 1.00000
DASSLYlE ENTRPREN 9.20000
DASSL YSE SASSI-IlYE 490. 00000 ENTRPREN 387.80000
DHTRTTUE SHTRTTCE 1.00 000 SHTRTTUE 1.00000
DHTRTTUE ENTRPREN 35.00000
DWElDGUE S~~ELDGC E 1. 00000 SWElOGUE 1.00000
DWcLDGUE ENTRPREN 35. 00000
OASSLYUE SASSL YC E 1.00000 SASSLYl.;E 1.00000
DASSLYUE ENTRPREN 110 e 00000
DHTRT TOE SHTRT re E 1.00000 SHTRTTLJE 1. 000 00
DHTRTTDE ENTRPREN 5.00000
DWELUGDE SI1ELO GCE 1.00000 S~JEL 0 GLJE 1.00000
DWELDGlJE ENTRPREN 5.00000
DASSLYDE SASSL YC E 1. 00000 SASSLYDE 1.00000
DASSLYDE ENT RP REN 5.00000
P FWDTRPF SHTRHHF 50.56000 SWELDNGF 152.70000
P HJDT RPF SASS~ilYF 97.13000 SFwDTt1SF 1.00000
PHWTRPF ENT RPREN - 2340 .12 000
PTRAL RPF SHTRT I'H F 19.36000 SWElDNGF 49.60000
PTRALRPF SASSMLY F 67 ..11000 SHYORAt·1F 1.000 00
PTRALRPF SHYDRAHG 1.00 000 SHYDRAt-lH 1.00000
PTRALRPF SHYDRAM I 1. 00000 SHYDRAHJ 1.00000
PTRAlRPF SHYDR MIK 1.00000 SHYDRAML 1.00000
PTRALRPF SHYDRMlt·! 1. 00 000 STRAlMSf 1.00000
PTRALRPF ENTRP REN 184.65000
P lOAORPF SHTRTt·H f 13.36000 SWELDNGF 86.51000
PLOADRPF SASSf·1LYF 14.91000 SHYDRAt-1F 1.00000
P lOADRPF SHYDR MIG 1.00000 SHYDRA~iH 1.00000
PlOADRPF SHY DRAM I 1. 00000 SHYDRt\~\J 1.00000
P LOADRPF SHY lJRM1K 1.00000 SHYDRAl~L 1.00000
P lOADRPF ShYDrzAMM 1.00 000 St GAOl'! Sf 1. 00000
P LOADRPF ENTRPREN 188.97000
POIGGRPf SHTRn'lT F 24.43000 StiELDNGf 147.91000
POIGGf~PF SASSt1LYF 54.10000 SDIGGr1SF 1. 00000
P OIGGRPF ENT RPRE N 598.39000
MFWDT RPF SFWUTMSF 1.00000 SFhDTPSF 1.00000
MHJDT RPF ENT RP REN 3809.00000
I-1TRALRPF STRAl MSF 1. 00000 STRAlP SF 1.00000
MTRALRPF ENT RP REN 361.10000
MLOADRPF SlDAU·'·1S F 1. OJ000 SlOADP SF 1.00000
MlOADRPF ENTRPREN 409.75000
MDIGGRPF SDI GGMSf 1.00000 SDIGGPSF i .ooooo
MDIGGRPF ENTRPREN 1187.40000
PFWDTRIF SFWDT 11SF 1.00000 SF\WTM SG 1. 00000
P FWDT RI F ENTRPREN 36.80000
PTRALRlf STRAlI'\S F 1.00000 STRALMSG 1. 00000
PTRALRIF ENT RPREN 3.20000
Pl.OADRIF SLllADMS F 1.00000 SI. OAOM SG 1.000 00
P LOAORI F ENTRP REN 3.20000
8.25
INPUT LISTING
FACT DRY Sf RI KE IN MARCH
PDIGGRIF SDI GGt·1SF 1.00000 SUIGGMSG 1.00000
POIGGRIF ENTRPREN 9.80000
DHTRTTNF SHTRTHTF 315.00000 SHTRTTXF 1.000 00
DHTRTTNF SHTRTTCF 1.00000 SHTRTTCG 1.000CO
DHTRTTNF SHTRTTUG .11000 $HTRTTOG .01000
DHTRTTNF ENT RP REN 78.80000
DHfRfTXF SHTRTtH F 55.00000 SHnnTXf 1.00000
DHTRTTXF SHTRTTlF 1.00000 EI'JTRPREN 16.20000
D HTRTT IF SIiTRTlvJTF 19.00 000 SHTRTTIF 1.00000
OHTRTTIF ENTHPREN 7. 20 000
DHTRTTSF SHTRTI~T f 315. 00 000 ENTRPREN 260.80000
OWELDGNF SWELDNGF 33'-t. 00 000 SWEL OGXf 1.OOCOO
OWElOGNF SWElDGCF 1. 00 000 S~IELDGCG 1.00000
DWELDGNF SWELOGUG .07000 SWEL DGOG .02000
o viE i.o GNF ENTRPREN 78.80000
D~~ELOGXf SWELl) NGF 58.00000 ShEl.DGXF 1.00000
DWElDGXF SWeLL) Gl f 1.00 000 ENTRPREN 16.20000
DWELDGlf SWELuNGf 20.00000 SWELDGLF < 1.00000
DWELDGlF ENTRP REN 7.20000
DWELDGSF Si-JELlJNGF 33ft. 00 000 EN TRPIU:N 272.80000
lJASSLYNF SASSML\' F .. 388.00000 SA SSL YXF 1.00000
DASSLYNF SASSLYCF 1. 00000 SASSLYCG 1.00000
DASSLYNF SASSL YUG • la 000 SA SSL \lOG .. 01000
DASSLYNF ENr RPRE I~ 78.80000
DASSLYXF SASSMLYF ~ 68.00000 SA SSl Y xf 1.00000
DASSLYXF SASSLYZF 1.00000 ENTRPREN 16.200 00
DASSlYlF SASSt-tlY F 23.00 000 SA SSL Y IF 1. 00000
DASSLYlf ENTRPREN 7.20000
DASSLYSf SASSI1LYf 38B. 00 000 ENTf{PREN 306.80000
DHTRTTUF SHTRTTCF 1. 00 000 SHTKTTUF 1. 00000
DHTRTTUF ENT RPREN 35. 00 000
DWEL[)GUF SWEL[)GCF 1.00 000 SWELDGUF 1.00000
DWELDGUF ENTRPREN 35.00000
DASSLYUF SASSLYCF 1. 00 000 SA SSL YUF 1.000 00
DASSLYUF ENTRPREI~ 110.00000
o HTRTTDF SHTRT TeF 1.00000 SHTR TTDF 1.00000
DHTRTTDF ENTRPREN 5.00000
Dv/EL[)GDF SWELD GCF 1.00 000 SViELDGCF 1.00000
DHELOGDF ENT RP Ri: N 5.00000
DASSL YOF SASSL YC F 1. 00000 SA SSL YDF 1.00000
DASSLYDF ENT RP REN - 5.00 000
PFWOTRPG SHT RT t'lT G 50.56000 SWELONGG 1~2.70000
PHWTRPG SASSI-tl Y G 97.13000 SF1IO H1 SG 1.00000
PHJDTRPG ENT RP RI:::N - Z340.12000
PTRALRPG SHTRT MT G 19.36000 SwELONGG 49.60000
PTRALRPG SASSMLYG 67.17000 SHYDRAMG 1.00000
PTRALRPG SHY DRAl-IH 1.00 000 S~1YORAt~ I 1.00000
PTRALRPG SHY DRANJ 1.00000 SHYDRAMK l.COllOO
PTRAlRPG SHY ORM1L 1.00000 SHYDRAMN l.OOGOO
PTRAlRPG STRALMSG 1.00000 ENTRPREN 1 (j4. 650 00
P LOADRPG SHTRT MTG 13.36000 sw El DNGG 86.51000
P LOADRPG SASS~'LY G 14.91000 SHYlJRAt-'G 1.000 00
P LDADRPG SHYDKAI~H 1.00 000 SHYDRA1>11 1.000 00
PlOADRPG SHYDRMiJ 1.COOOO SHYor~AMK i.ooooo
8.26
INPUT LISTING
FACT DRY ST RI KE IN tMRCH
PLDADRPG SHY DRAML 1.00000 SHYDRAM~1 1.00000
PLDADRPG SLUADMS G 1.00000 fNTkPKEN 188.9"7000
PDIGGRPG SHTRTMTG 24.43000 SWEL ONGG 147.91000
PDIGGRPG SASSf.1LYG 54.10000 SOlGGI~SG 1.00000
PDIGGRPG ENTRPREN 598.39 000
~1FWOr RPG SFWOT t·1SG 1.00000 Sf~O TP SG 1.00000
~1FWDrRPG ENTRPREN 3809.00000
,..1TRALRPG STRALNSG 1.00000 STHALPSG 1.00000
1>1TRALRPG ENTRPREr~ 361.10000
HLOADRPG SLDA0HSG 1.00000 si, DADP SG 1. 00000
MLOADRPG ENTRPREN 409. 75 000
M01 GGRPG SDI GGMSG 1.00000 SOIGGPSG 1.00000
11.101GGRPG ENTRP REN 1187.40000
PFWOTRIG SHWrM~G 1. 00 000 Sf\<;l) H1SH 1..00000
PFWOrRIG ENTRPREN 36.80000
PTRALRIG STRAl t.,S G 1.00000 STRALNSH 1.00000
PTRALRIG ENT K? RE N 3.20000
P LOADRI G SLOADt1SG 1. 00000 SLOAD;'! SH 1 1. 00000
PLOADRIG ENTRP REN 3.20000
PDIGGRIG SDIGGMSG 1. 00000 SO IGGI~ SH 1.00000
PDIGGRIG ENTRPREN 9.80000
DHTRTTNG SHT RT MTG 331.00000 SHTRTTXG 1.00000
DHTRTTNG SHTRTTCG 1.00000 SHTRTlCH 1.00000
DHTRTTNG SHTRT TUH .11000 SHTf\TTDH .01000
DHTRTTNG ENT"RP REN .,. 62.40000
DHTRTTXG SHTRHHG 58. 00000 SHTRTTXG 1.00000
OHTRTTXG SHTRTrZG 1. 00 000 HHf<.PREN 16.80000
DHTR r r z c SHTRft-lT G 20.00000 SHTRTTZG 1.00000
DHTRTTlG ENTRP REN 7.60000
DHTRTTSG SHTRTMTG 331. 00 000 ENTRPREN 274.00000
DWELOGr~G SwELD·NGG 352.00000 ShElDGXG 1.00000
DWELOGNG SWELO GCG 1.00000 :$.tI EL 0 GCH 1.00000
DWELDGNG SWElDGUH .07 000 S~~EL DGOH .02000
DWElDGNG ENT RP REN 82.40000
DWELDGXG SwElDNGG· 62.00000 SWELDGXG 1. 00000
DWELDGXG SWELDGlG 1. 00000 ENTkPR E:N 16.80000
DWELDGZG SrJELDNGG 21.00 000 SilclOGIG 1.00000
DWELOGlG ENT RPRE N 7.60000
DWElDGSG SWELl) NGG 352.00000 EN TRPREN 287. 00000
DASSLYNG SASSMlYG 408.00000 SASSl YXG 1.00000
DASSLYNG SASSL YCG - 1.00000 SASSL YCH 1.00000
OASSLY!\JG SASSL YUH .10000 SA sst, YDH .01000
DASSLYNG ENTRP REN 82.40 000
OASSLYXG SASSMU'G 71.00000 SASSL YXG 1.00000
DASSLYXG SASSLYZG 1.00000 EN H<'PR EN 16.80000
DASSLYlG SASSMLYG 24. 00 000 SASSL YIG 1.00000
DASSLYlG ENTRPREN 7.60000
OASSLYSG SASS~llY G 408. 00 000 EN TRPREN 323.00000
DHTRTTUG SHTRTTCG 1. 00000 StiTf{ T TUG 1.00000
DHTRTTUG £:NTRP REN 35.00000
DHELDGLJG SWELD GCG 1.00000 SWELDGUG 1.00000
DwELDGUG ENTRPREN 35.00 000
DASSlYUG SASSL YC G 1.00 000 SA SSl YUG 1.00000
DASSLYUG ENTF-PREN 110.00000
8.27
INPUT LISTING
fACT ORY ST R IKE IN f-1/\RCH
DHTRT TOG SHTRTTCG 1.00 000 SHTRTTOG 1. 00000
OHTRTTDG ENTRPREN 5.00 000
OWElDGDG SHELOGCG 1.00000 SHElDGDG 1.00000
DWELDGOG ENTRPREN 5. 00 000
DASSLYDG SASSL YC G 1. 00000 SASSL rOG 1.00000
OASSLYDG ENTRPKEN 5.00000
PH..OTRPH SHTRT MT H 50.56000 SWELDNGH 152. 70000
PFWDTRPH SASSt1U' H 91.13000 SfhDTHSH 1.00000
P fWDT RPH ENT RPREN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPH SHTRTMTH 19.36000 S~JElONGH .Lt9.60000
P TRALRPH SASSMl Y H 67.17000 SHYDRAMH 1.00000
PTRALRPH SHYDRM1 [ 1.00000 SHYDRAt~J 1.00000
PTRALRPH SHY ORAMK 1.00000 SHVDKAML 1.00000
PTRALRPH SHYOR AMM 1.00000 STRALt~SH 1.00000
PTRALRPH ENTRP REN 184.65 000
PLOADRPH SHTRlMTH 13.36000 SWELONGH 86.51000
PLOADRPH SASSMlYH 14.91000 SHYURM1H 1.00000
PlOADRPH SHY ORM' 1 1.00 000 SHYDRAMJ { 1.00000
PLOAORPH SHYDRM1K 1.00000 SHYDRAML 1.00GOO
P LOAORPH SHYDRMH., 1.00 000 SLOADMSH 1.00000
P lOADRPH ENTRP REN 188.97000
P Dl GGRPH SHTRT HT H 24.'t3000 SWELDNGH 147.91000
POI GGRPH SASSMLYH 5'h 10000 SO IGG~\SH 1: 000 00
PDIGGHPH ENTRP REN 598.39000
~1fWDTRPH SfW DT ~'SH ~ 1.00000 SfWOTPSH 1.00000
MfWOTRPH ENTRP REN 3809.00000
MTRAlRPH STRAL MSH 1.00000 STRALPSH 1.000 00
MTRALRPH ENTRPREN 361.10000
MlOADRPH SLOAD~1S H 01. 00 600 SLOAOP SH 1.00000
MLOAORPH ENTRPREN 409.75000
MOIGGRPH SDI GGo~1SH 1. 00 000 SDIGGPSH 1. 000 00
MOl GGRPH ENTRPREN 1187.40 000
PFWDTRIH SFWlJT MSH 1.00000 SFhOTMSl 1.00000
P FWOTRIH ENTRPREN 45.90000
PTRALRIH STRAl MSH 1. 00000 STRALM SI 1.00000
PTRALRIH ENTRP REN 4.00000
PLOAORIH SLOAO t-lSH 1.00000 SLOADM SI 1.00000
PLOADRIH ENT RP REN 4.00000
PDIGGRIH SDI GGi"1SH 1. 00 000 SOIGGMSl 1.00000
POIGGRIH ENT RP REN 12.20000
DHTRTTI~H SHTRT I'IT H - 331. 00000 SHTRTTXH 1.00000
DHTRTTNH SHTRTTCH 1.00000 SHTR TTC I 1.00000
DHTRTTNH SHTRT TU I • 11000 SHTH.TTDI .01000
DHTRTTNH ENTRP REN 104.80000
DHTRTTXH SHTRT HT H 58.00000 SHTRTTXH 1.00000
DHTRTT XH $HTRTTZH 1.00 000 ENTRPREN 16.80000
DHTRTTZH SHTRTI'1TH 20.00000 SHTRTTZH 1.00000
DHTRTTlH ENT RP REN 7.60000
DHTRTTSH SHTRT f-1TH 331.00000 ENTRPR EN 274. 00000
DWELOGNH SWELDNGH 352.00000 SWELOGXH 1.00000
DWELDGNH swELD GCH 1.00000 SWCLDGCI 1.00000
DWELDGNH SWELDGUI .07000 SWElDGDI .02000
DWELUGNH ENTRPREN 104.80000
DWElOGXH SWELONGH 62.00000 SwELDGXH 1.00000
INPUT LISTING 8.28
FACT OR Y Sf RI KE IN I-IARCH
DWELOGXH SWELDGZH 1.00000 ENTRPREN 16.80000
OWELOGlH SWElONGH 21.00000 SWElDGZH 1.00000
DWElOGlH ENTRP HEN 1.60000
DWELDGSH SwELONGH 352. 00000 ENTRPREN 287.00000
DASSLYNH SASS~llYH 408. 00000 SA SSl V XH 1.00000
DASSlVNH SASSL YCH 1.00000 SASSl YCI 1. 00000
OASSLyr\lH SASSL YU I .10000 SA SSl VDl .01000
DASSL YNH ENTRPRE N 104.80 000
DASSLVXH SAssr-i LY H 71.00000 SA SSL Y XH 1.00000
DI\SSL VXH SASSLVZH 1.00000 EN TRPkl:N 16.80000
DASSLYZH SASSMLY H 24·. 00000 SA SSL Y lH 1.00000
DASSLVlH ENTRP REN 7.60 000
DASSL VSH SASSt>iLYH 408.00000 EN TRPREN 323. 000 00
DHTRTTUH SHrRfrCH 1. 00000 SHTR TTUH 1.00000
OHTRTTUH ENTRPREN 35.00000
DWELOGUH SWELDGCH 1.00000 S~IELDGUH 1.00000
DWELDGUH ENTRPREN 35.00 000
OASSLYUH SASSL 'fCH 1.00 000 SASSL YUH { 1. 00000
DASSLYUH ENTRPREN 110.00000
D HTRT TOH SHTRTTCH ... 1.00000 SHTR TTDH 1.00000
DHTRTTDrl ENT RP REN 5.00000
OWELOGDH SWELDGCH 1. 00 000 SWf:LOGDH 1.00000
DWELDGDH ENTRPREN 5.00 000
OASSLYDH SASSl YC H 1.00000 SA SSL YDH 1.00000
DASSLYDH ENTRPREN 5.00000
P FWOTRPI SHTRT HT I 50.56000 SWELDNGI 152.700 00
PHWTRPI SASS"ILY 1 97.13000 SFhDT ;lSI 1.00000
PfWOTP.Pl ENTRPREN - 2340.12 000
PTRALRPI SHTRl"HTI 19.36000 SWELDNGI 49.60000
PTRALRPI SASSMLYI 67.17000 SHYJRAMl 1.00000
PTRALRPI SHYDRAMJ 1. 00000 SHYDRM1K 1.00000
PTRALRPI SHYDRAML 1.00 000 SHYDRAMr4 1.00000
PTRALRPl STRALMSI 1. 00 000 ENTRPkEN 184.650 00
P lOAORP I SHTRTMTI 13.36000 S~ EL ONG I 86.51000
PLOA()RPI SASSl1LV I 14.91000 SH¥iJRAMI 1.00000
P LOADRPI SHYDRM1J 1. 00 000 SH YORAMt<. 1.00000
P LOADRP I SHY DR M1 L 1. 00000 SHYDRAMM 1.00000
P LUADRPI SLOAOMSI 1. 00 000 ENTRPREN 188.97000
POIGGRPI SHTRT Hr I 24.43000 SWELDNGI 147.91000
P D1 GGRPI SASS~ILYI 54.10000 SOIGGNSI 1.00000
PDIGGRPI ENTRPREN ,... 5<i8. 39000
HFWDfRPI SfWOfMSI 1.00000 Sf VlOTP SI 1.00000
MFWDTRPI ENT RP REN 3809.00000
~ITRALRPI STRAL MS I 1.00000 STRALP SI 1.00000
~1TRALRPI ENTRPREN 361.10000
~1l0ADRP I SLOAD ~1S I 1.00000 SLOADP SI 1.00000
MLOADRP1 ENTRPREN 409.75000
MDIGGRPI SOl GG /-'5 I 1.00000 SD IGGP SI 1.00000
~10IGGRPI ENTRPREN 1187.40000
PFWOTRII SfflOf MS I 1.00000 SF~Dn1SJ 1.00000
PHJDTRII ENTRP REN 36.80000
PTRALRII STRAL MS I 1.00000 STRALMSJ 1.000 00
PTRALRII ENT RP REN 3.20 000
PLOAORII SLOAOMS I 1.00000 SLOADMSJ 1.00000
INPUT LISTING 8.29
FACTORY ST RI KE IN MARCH
PLOADRII ENTRPREN 3.20 000
PDIGGRII SOL GG t<lS I 1.00000 SOIGGNSJ 1.00000
PDIGGRll ENTRPRCN 9.80000
DHTRrrNI SHTRTi'-H I 248 e 00 000 SHIRTTXI 1.00000
DHTRTTNI SHIRTTeI 1.00000 SHTRTTCJ 1.00000DHTRTHH SHTRTTUJ .11 000 SliTRT T OJ .01000
D HTR T fNI ENTRPREN 84.20000
DHTRTTXI SHT RT "H 1 43.00000 SHTRTTXI 1.00000
DHTRTTXI SHTRT T II 1. 00 000 EN TRPREN 12.60000DHTRrT 1I SHTKTIHI 15.00000 SHTRTTlI 1. 00000DHTRfT z r ENT RP RE N 5.80 000
DHT RTT SI SHTRT nr r 248. 00 000 ENTRPREN 205. 00000OWELDGNI SWELDNGI 264.00 000 SWEL DGX I 1.00000OWELDGNI SWElDGCI 1.00000 SwElOGCJ 1.00000D WElDG/~I SWElO GU J .07000 SWELOGOJ 002000DWElDGNI ENTRf'REN 8'1·.20 000
DWELOGXI SkELONGI 46 GOO000 SWElDGXI 1.00000DWELDGXI SWElCiGlI 1.00 000 ENIRPREN 12.60000DWELDGZI SWELDNGI 16. 00 000 SWELDGll 1.00000OWELDGlI ENTRPREN 5.80000
DWElDGSI SWELDNGI ~64. 00000 ENTRPREN 215.00000DASSLYNI SASS\1 LY 1 306. 00000 SA SSL Y;<l 1.00000
D ASSL YNI SASSL YC 1 1.00000 SASSlYCJ l~OOOOODASSLYNI SASSLYUJ .10000 SA SSL )' DJ .01000DASSLYNI ENTRPREN 84.20000
DASSLYXI SAS S~l LY I 54.00000 SASSL Y xr 1.00000DASSL YXI SASSLYZI 1. 00000 EN"TRPREN 12.60000DASSL YlI SASSi"lLYI 18.00000 SASSLYlI 1.00000DASSLYZI ENTRpgEr~ ·5. 80 cioo
DASSlYSr SAS S~1 L Y I 306. 00000 EN TRPREN 242.00000DHTRTTur SHIRT TC r 1.00000 SH TI~ T r Ul 1.00000OHTRTTUI ENT RP Rc f'i 35.00000
DWELDGUI SWELDGCI 1.00000 SWEL DGU I 1.00000DWELOGUI ENTRPREN 35.00000
DASSL YUI SASSLYCI 1.00 000 SASSLYUI 1.00000DASSLYUI ENTRP REN II o. 00 000
OHTRTTlJI SHl"RT re I 1.00 000 SHTR TTOI 1.00000DHTRTTDI ENTRPREN 5.00000
DWElDGDI SwELO GC I 1. 00000 SwELDG 0 I 1.00000DWELDGUI ENTRPREN 5.00000
OASSL YDl SASSL YC I .- 1.00000 SASSL YDl 1.00000DASSLYDI ENTRPREN 5.00000
PFWDTkPJ SHTRT MT J 50.56000 S\>IELDNGJ 152.70000P FWDT RPJ SASSMl.YJ 97.130CO SF ~Un1SJ 1.0GOOOPFWOTRPJ ENTf.;.P REN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPJ SHTRT~1TJ 19.36000 S~~ EL DNGJ 49.60000PTRALRPJ SAssr1L Y J 67e17000 SHYDRAMJ 1.00000PTRALRPJ SHYDRM~K 1.00 000 SHYDRANL 1.00000PTRALRPJ SHY DF\ M;ivj 1.00000 STRALM SJ 1.00000
PTRALRPJ ENTRP REN 184.65000
PLOADRPJ SHTRTMTJ 13.36000 SWELDNGJ 86.51000
PLOADRPJ SASSi1l Y J lite 91000 SHYDRM1J 1.00000
P LOADRPJ SHY DR AI-·1K 1.00 000 SHYDRAt'~L 1.00000
PlOA.DRPJ SHY DR A,\1fvl 1.00 000 SLOADrtlSJ 1.00000
INPUT LISTING
8.30
FACT ORY SI R IKE IN MARCH
PlClAORPJ ENT RP REN 188.97000
p 01 GGRP J SHT sr t'H J 24.43000 SWELONGJ 147.91000
PDIGGRPJ SASSNLYJ 54.10000 SDIGG~;SJ 1. 00000
PDIGGRPJ ENTRP REN 598.39000
t>1nWTRPJ SFWOT t-1SJ 1. 00 000 SfWDTPSJ 1. 000 00
MHWTRPJ HJTRP REN 3809. 00000
MTRALRPJ STRALt1SJ 1.00 000 STRAlP SJ 1.00000
MTRALRPJ ENTRPREN 361.10000
MLOADRPJ SLOAD t'iSJ 1.00 000 SlGADP SJ 1.00000
M lOADRPJ ENTRPREN 409.75000
MDIGGRPJ SDI GGf'lS J 1.00000 SOlGGPSJ 1. 00000
MDIGGRPJ [NT RP RE N 1187.40000
PFW()TRIJ SHoWT t-lSJ 1.00000 SF~DniSK 1.00000
PHJOTRIJ ENTRPf\.EN .. 36.80000
PTRALRIJ STRAU·1S J 1.00000 STRAlMSK 1. 000 00
PTRALRIJ ENTR? REN 3.20000
PlOADRIJ SLOAt) t<1SJ 1. OOOCO SLOADMSK 1.00000
PlOADRIJ ENTRPREN 3.20 000
PDIGGRIJ SDI GG~1SJ 1.00 000 SDIGGlvJSK 1. 00000
POI GGRI J ENTRPREN ... 9.80000
D HTRTTNJ SHTRTMTJ 248.00 000 SHTRTTXJ 1.00000
DHTRTTNJ SHTRTTCJ 1.00 000 SHTR TrCK 1.00000
DHTRTTNJ SHTRT TUK .11 000 SHTHTTDK .01000
DHTRTINJ ENTRPREN 84.20 000
DHTRTTXJ SHTRT t·n J 43.00 000 SHTR TT XJ 1. 00000
DHTRTTXJ SHIRl TlJ 1.00 000 ENTRPREN 12.60000
DHTRTTlJ SHTRT MT J 15.00 000 SHTRTTlJ 1.00000
DHTR TTl J ENTRPREN 5.80000
DHT RTTSJ SHTRT I1TJ 248. 00000 E:NTRPREN 205.00000
DWELOGNJ SfoiELDNGJ 264.00000 SWElDGXJ 1.000 00
DWELDGNJ SWELD GCJ 1.00000 SWELDGCK 1. 00000
DWELDGNJ SWELOGUK .07000 SWELDGDK .02000
DWELDGNJ ENTRPI{EN 8/te 20 000
OWELDGXJ SWElDNGJ 46. 00 000 SWELDGXJ 1. 00000
DWELLlGXJ S\.JELDGlJ 1. 00000 EN rHPREN 12.60000
DWELDGZJ SWELDNGJ 16.00000 ;SWELDGlJ 1.00000
Dh'ELDGlJ ENTRPREN 5.80000
D\.JElDGSJ SWEL.DNGJ 264. 00000 ENTRPREN 215.000 00
DASSLYNJ SASSMLYJ 306.00000 SASSlYXJ 1.00000
DASSLYNJ SASSL YCJ 1.00 000 SA SSL yeK 1.000 00
DASSL YNJ SASSLYUK • 10000 SASSL YOK .01000
OASSLYNJ ENTRPREN 8tt. 20 000
DASSLYXJ SASSlvlLYJ 54. 00000 SASSLYXJ 1.00000
DASSL YXJ SASSLYlJ 1.00000 ENTRPREN 12.60000
DASSLYlJ SASSt1LYJ 18.00000 SASSLYlJ 1.00000
DASSLYlJ ENTRP REN 5.80 000
DASSLYSJ SASSMLYJ 306.00 000 EN TRPHEN 242.00000
o HTRTIUJ SHTRT TCJ 1.00000 SHTRTTUJ 1. 00000
DHTRTTUJ ENT RP REN 35.00000
DWELDGUJ SWELD GCJ 1. 00000 SWELDGUJ 1.00000
DWELDGUJ ENTRPREN 35.00000
DASSLYUJ SASSLYCJ l.OOOOO SA SSL YUJ 1. 000 00
DASSLYUJ ENT RP RE N 110.00000
DHTRTTOJ SHTRT TCJ 1.00000 SHTRTTDJ 1.00000
8.31
INPUT LISTING
fACT ORY STRIKE IN MM~CH
DHTRTTDJ ENTRPREfJ S. 00 000
DWELDGDJ SWEL[)GCJ 1.00000 SwELOGOJ 1.00000
DWELDGDJ ENTRPREN 5.00 000
DASSL YDJ SASSL YC J 1. 00 000 SASSl YOJ 1.00000
DASSLYDJ ENT RP RE N .5.00 000
PHIDTRPK SHTHllvlTK 50.56000 S~~ElDf\JGK lS2.70000
PHWrRPK SASSHlYK 97.13000 Sfy,DTMSK 1. 000 00
P HJDT RPK Ei'JTRP REN - 2340.12 000
PTRALRPK SHT 1<.1 i'H K 19.36000 SWELDNGK 't9.60000
PTRt\LRPK SASSMLVK 67.17000 SHYORAHK 1.00000
PTRALRPK SHYDRAML 1.00000 SH 'r' [) R A t-'.t1 1.00000
PTRALRPK STRAL I"ISK 1. 00000 EI'-lTi<PI< EN 1 tlit. 650 00
PLUADRPK SHTRTNTK 13. 36000 Sv.jELDNGK 86.S1000
PlOALJRPK SAS S~1L Y K 14.91000 SHVDRM1K 1.00000
P LU/~D RPK SHY DRM1L leOOOOO SHYURj\t/II~' 1.00000
PLOADRPK SLOADI>1SK 1.00000 EhlTRPREN 188.97000
PDIGGRPK SHTRr ,'''IT K 24.43000 S\~ELDNGI<. 147.91000
PDIGGRPK SASS/-llY' K 54.10000 SOIGGl'1SK 1.00000
PDIGGRPK ENT RPRE N 598.39 000
MfWDTRPK SFWoTfvlSK 1. 00000 SFWDTPSK 1. 00000
MFWDTRPK ENTRP REN 3809.00000
~1TRAL RPK STRAL f>1SK 1. 00 000 STRflL P SK 1.00000
MTRALRPK ENTRPREN 361.10000
MLOADRPI< SLOADI'1SK 1. 00000 SLOADP SK 1.00000
MLOADRPK H.JT RP REN 409.75 000
t" 01 GGRPK SoIGGMSK 1.00000 SDIGGPSK 1.00000
~OIGGRPK ENT RP REN 1187.40000
P HJDTRI K SFWUTMSK 1. 00 000 SFhOH1SL 1.00000
PFWDTRIK ENTRPREN 45.90000
PTRALRIK STRl\LMSK 1.00 000 STRJ\U-1 SL 1.00000
PTRt..LRIK ENTI'P KtN 4.00000
PLOADRIK SLOA[) MSK 1.00000 SLOADMSL 1.00000
PlOADRIK ENTRP REN 4.00000
PDIGGRIK SUIGGMSK 1.00000 SI)IGG~SL 1.00000
POIGGRIK ENT RP REN 12.20000
DHrRTTNK SHTRT HT K 395. 00 000 SHTRTTXK 1.000 00
DHTRTTNK SHrRT TeK 1.00000 SH fR TIel 1. 00000
L)HTRTTNK SHTRTTUL .11000 SHTkTTDL .01000
DHTRT rNK ENTRP REN 99.00000
DHTRTTXK SHrRT ,"'TK 69.00000 SHTRTTXK 1.00000
DHrKTTXK SHTRTTZK 1.00 000 HHkPREN 19.80000
DHTRTT lK SHTRTMTK 24.00000 SHTRrTlK 1.00000
DHTRTTlK ENTRP REN 9.20000
DHTRTTSK SHTRT HTK 395.00000 ENTRPREN 326.40000
OWELDGNK SWELDN()K 420. 00 000 SWE:LDGXK 1.00000
DWELDGNI<. SWELLJGCK 1.00000 SWEL occi. 1.00000
DWELDGNK S~JELDGUL • 07 000 S~H:LDGOL .02000
DWELDGNK ENTRPREN 99.00000
DWElDGXK SWELD NGK 74.00000 S~~ELDGXK 1.00000
DWtLDGXK SWELOGZK 1.0(1000 EN1RPREN 19.80000
D\~cLDGlK SWElD NGK 25.00000 SWEL DGlK 1.00000
DWELDGZK ENTRPREN 9.20000
D\~ELDGSK SWELt) NGK 42 0.00000 ENTRPR EN 342.40000
DASSLYNK SASS~1 LV K 487.00000 SASSLYXK 1.00000
INPUT LI STING
8.32
FACT ORY ST R IKE IN f~ARC H
LJASSLYNK SASSL YCK 1.00 000 SASSL vet, 1.00000
Dt\SSlYNK SASSLYUl .10000 SA SSl YOl .01000
DASSLYNK ENT RP Rf:N 99. 00000
DASSlYXK SASSi'l LV K 85.00000 SA SSL YXK 1.00000
DASSL YXK SASSLYZK 1.00000 ENTRPREN 19.80000
DASSl YlK- SASSMLYK 29.00 000 SA SSL Y IK 1.00000
DASSlYIK ENTRPREN 9.20000
DASSl YSK SASSMlYK 487. 00000 ENTRPREN 385.400 00
DHTRfTUK SHTRTTCK 1..00 000 SHTRTTUK 1.00000
DHTRTTUK ENTRP RE N 35.00000
lH"IELDGUK SWELDGCK 1.00000 SWElOGUK 1.00000
DWElDGUK ENIRP REN 35.00000
OASSLYUK SASSLYCK 1.00000 SA SSL YUK 1.00000
DASSLYUK ENTRPREN 110.00 000
DHTRTTOK SHTRTTCK 1.00 000 SHTR TTOK 1.00000
DHTRTTDK ENfRPREN 5.00000
DWELDGDK SWELDGCK 1.00000 SWEL DGDK 1.00000
DWELDGDK ENTRPREN 5. 00000
DASSLVDK SASSL YCK ... 1. 00000 SASSL YDK 1..00000
OASSLYDK ENTRPREN 5.00000
PHWTRPL SHTRT MTl 50.56000 sv EL ONGL 1.52. 700 00
P FWDTRPl SASSI·1LYL 97.13000 SF~Dn1Sl 1.00000
P fWDT RPL ENTRP REN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPl SHTRT MTL 19.36000 SWELDNGL 49.60000
PTRALRPL SASS~~LVL 61.17000 SHYDRAMl 1.00000
PTRAL RPL SHYDRMIM 1.00000 STRALMSL 1.00000
.PTRALRPL ENTRP REN 184.65000
PlOAORPL SHTRT {"IT l 13.36000 SWEL DNGl 86.51000
·~t~·· PLOADRPL SASSMLYL 14.91000 SHYORAML 1.00000
P LOADRPL SHY DRAt11'-1 1.00000 SLOAOt'lSL 1.00000
P LOADRPL ENTRP REN 188.97 000
POIGGRPL SHTRrr'1TL 24.43000 SWELONGL 147.91000
PDIGGRPL SAS SML'r' L 54.10000 SD IGGMSL 1.00000
POIGGRPL ENTRPREN 598.39000
MFWOTRPL SFW or (vIS L 1. 00 000 SfYiDTPSl 1.00000
MfWDTRPL ENTRPREN 3809.00000
MTRALRPL STRAL MSL 1.00000 STRALP SL 1.00000
tvlTRAL RPL ENTRP REN 361.1.0000
~l LOADRPL SLOADt'1S l 1.00000 SLOAOPSL 1.00000
1-1LOADRPL ENTRP REN 409.75 000
~1DI GGRPL SDIGGMSL - 1. 00 000 SDIGGP SL 1. 000 00
~IDI GGRPL ENTRP REN 1187.40000
PFWOTRIl -SFWDTMSL 1.00000 SF hDTHSt--l 1.00000
PfWDTRIL ENTRP RE N 36.80 000
PTRALRIL STRAL MSl 1.00000 STRALf'1 SM 1.00000
PTRALRIL ENTRP REN 3.20000
PLOADRIl SLOAO ~1SL 1.00000 SlOAOMS1'1 1.00000
PlOAORIL ENTRPREN 3.20000
P OIGGRI L SDIGGMSL 1.00000 SDIGGMSt-1 1.00000
PDIGGRIl. ENTRPREN 9.80000
OHTRTTNL SHTRTMTL 331.00 000 SHTRlTXL 1. 000 00
DHTRTTNL SHTRTTCl 1.00000 SHTRTTCM 1.00000
DHrRTTNL SHTRTTUM .11000 SHTRTTDM .• 01000
DHTR TTNL ENTRPREN 82.40 000
INPUT LI STING
8.33
FACTORY STRIKE IN r'1ARCH
JHTRTTXL SHTRH-1f L 58.00 000 SHTR TT XL 1.00000OHTRTT XL SHIRT r lL 1.00 000 ENTRFRE.N 16.80000DHTRTTLL ShTRTMTL 20.00000 SHTRTT lL 1. 000 00DHTRTTlL ENTRPREN 7.60 000
DHTRTfSL SHT RT Hr L 331.00000 ENTRPR EN 274.00000D~JElDGNL SWELDNGL 352.00000 SwELOG XL 1.00000DWELDGNL SWELD GCL 1.00000 Sw EL OGetvl 1.00000OWELDGNL SWElU GUM .07 000 SwEL DG [)Iv! .02000OWELOGNL ENTRP Rf:N 82.40000
DWELDGXL SwELUNGl 62. 00000 SWELOGXL 1. 00000O~;lELDGXL SWELiJ GlL 1. 00000 ENTRPR EN 16.80000DWElDGZL SWElDNGl 21.00000 SWEL DGlL 1.00000DWElOGll ENTRPREN 7.60000
O~"ElDGSl SWElD NGl 352. 00000 ENTRPREN 287.00000DASSlYNl SASS:01LYl 408. 00 000 SASSl YXL 1. OOOOCDASSLYNl SASSLYCL 1.00000 SASSlYCM 1.00000DASSLYNl SASSLYUM • 10000 SASSlYON ., .010 00DASSLYNL ENTRPREN 82. 'to 000
DASSlYXL SASSI'1lY l "11.00000 SASSlYXL 1.00000DASSLYXl SASSLYZL 1.00 000 ENTRPH EN 16.80000DASSlYZl SASS~1lV L 24.00000 SA SSl Y ZL 1.00000DASSLYll ENT RP REN 7.60000
DASSL YSl SASSi'llY l 408.00 000 ENTRPREN 323.00000DHTRTTUl SHTRTTCL 1.00000 SHIR TTUl 1.00000DHTRTTUl ENT RP REN 35.00000
DWELDGUL SWElD Gel 1.00000 SWElDGLl 1. 00000DWELDGUL ENT RPREN 35.00 000
DASSLYUl SASSLYCL 1. 00 000 SA SSl YUl 1.00000"~.(. DASSLYUl ENTRPREN 110.00000
DHTRTTOl SHTRT TCl 1.00000 SHIH TIDL 1.00000DHTRTTDL ENTRPREN 5. 00 000
OWElDGDl SWELD GCl 1. 00 000 SWElOGOl 1.00000Dv/ELDGDl ENTRPREN 5.00 000
DASSLYOl SASSlYCL 1.00 000 . SASSL YOl 1.00000OASSLYDL ENTRPREN 5.00000
p F~~DTRPM SHT RT m ,-1 50.56000 SwElDNGM 152.10000P FWDT RPM SASS>ilYH 97.1:)000 Sf~U H1SM 1.00000P FwOTRPI"; ENTHP REN - 2340.12000
PTRALRPM SHTRT tH 1'·1 19.36000 SWElONGM 49.60000PTRALRPM SAS St-l lV M 67.17000 SHYORAMM 1.000 00PTRALRPt1 STRAL MSt-l 1.00 000 ENTRPREN 184.65000PLUADRPM SHTRT HHI 13.36000 SwElDNG!1 86.51000PlOADRPM SASS/"lYN 14.91000 SHYURAMM 1.00000P lOAORPM SlOAOMS~1 1.00000 ENTKPREN 188.97000PDl GGRPt1 SHTRT MTM 24.43000 SWElONGH 147.91000PDIGGRPM SASS~ILY~l 54.10000 SO IGGt-l S;'1 1•.000 00PDIGGRPM ENTRPREN 598.39 000
MFIWTRPM SHWT~1SM 1.00 000 SF ~DTP St1 1.00000MFwDTRPM ENTRPREN 3809.00000
r~TRAlRPM STRALMSt-'i 1.00 000 STRAlP SM 1.00000MTRAlRPM ENT RP REN 361.10 000
MlOAURPH SLOADMS M 1.00000 si, GAOP St1 1.00000MlUAORPM ENTRPREN 409.75 000
MDIGGRPM SDI GGI·1S~1 - 1.00 000 SOIGGPSM 1.00000
INPUT LISTING
8.34
FACT DRY Sf RI KE IN MARCH
MOIGGRPM ENTRPREN 1187.40 000
PfWDTRIM SFWOT MS1'1 1.00000 ENTRPR EN 36.800 00
PTRALRIM STRAL 1'151'1 1.00 000 ENTI<'PREN 3. ~OO 00
PlOAORIM SLOADMS~1 1.00000 EI'lTkPREN 3.20000
p or GGRU1 SOIGGMSM 1.00000 ENTRPREN 9.80000
DHfRTTNM SHTRTMTM 331.00000 SHTR TT XM 1.00000
OHTRTTNM sur RT TeM 1. 00 000 ENTRPREN 82.40000
OHTRTTXi'I SHTRTtn M 58.00000 SHTR TT XM 1.00000
DHTRTTXM SHTRT T H1 1. 00 000 ENTRPREN 16.800 00
DHTRTTlN SHTRTHTt-\ 20.00000 SHTRTT lM 1. 00000
DHTRTTlM ENTRPREN 7.60000
DHTRTTSM SHTRT MU1 331.00 000 ENTRPREN 274.00000
OWELDGNH SWELD N(;t-l 352.00000 SWELDGxt·j 1.00000
DWElDGNI-1 SWELOGeM 1.00000 ENTRPREN 82.40000
DWELDGXM SWELD NGt1 62.00 000 SWElDG-Xl'l 1. 000 00
DWELuGXM SHELu Gll<l 1.00000 EN TRPR EN 16.80000
DloJELOGZM SyJELD NGl"'1 21.00000 SWElDGlM 1.00000
D\~ELOGlM ENT R.PRE N 7.60000
DWELDGSM Sl-vELD NGM 352.00000 ENTRPREN 287.00000
DASSLYNM SAS SI<ILY M 408.00 000 SASSLY XM 1.00000
DASSL YNM SASSlYCf.1 1.00000 ENTRPREN 82.4·0000
DASSLYXM SASSMLYM 71.00000 SA SSl YXH 1.00000
o AS si. YXtwt SASSLYlM 1.00000 EN1RPREN 16~ 80000
DASSLYZM SASSI"} L YI'--1 24.00 000 SA SSL 'r'lt4 1.00000
DASSLYlM ENTRP REN 7.60 000
DASSLYSM SAS S~1L Y 1'1 408. 00000 ENTRPREN 323.00000
DHTRTTUM SHT RT TCt1 1.00000 SHTRTTUM 1.00000
DHTRTTUM ENT RPREN 35.00000
,,:~.(. DWELDGUM SWELDGCt-1 1.00000 SWELDGU~1 1.000 00
DWELDGUM ENTRP REN 35.00000
DASSLYUM SASSL yeM 1.00000 SASSLYUM 1.00000
OASSLYUf.I ENTRPREN 110.00000
DHTRTTOM SHT RT re i\; 1.00000 SHTRTTDM 1.00000
DHTRTTDM ENTRPREN 5. 00000
D~~ELOGDM SWElOGC H 1.00000 SWELDGDM 1.00000
OWELDGDH ENTRPREN 5.00000
DASSLYDM SASSL YC I·' 1.00 000 SASSL YOM 1.00000
DASSLYOM ENTRP REN 5. 00000
RHS
RHSl SHYORAI1A 200.00000 SfwDTPSA 10.00000
RHS 1 STRAL PS A 100.00000 sr, GAuP SA 86.00000
RHSI SDIGGPSA 235.00000 SHYDRAMB 420.00000
RHSI SFWDT PS 13 20.00000 STRAlPSB 161.00000
RHSl SLOADPS B 79. 00 000 SDIGGPSB 184. 00000
RHSl SHY DR AMC 620. 00 000' SfwDTPSC 35.00000
RHSl STRAL PS C 190.00 000 SLOADP se 117.00000
RHSI SDIGGPSC 210. 00 000 SHVDRA1>iO a20.00000
RHSI SHIOf PS 0 40.00000 STRALPSD 190.00000
RHSl SLOAD PS 0 118.00000 SDIGGPSD 237.00000
RHS1 SHY ORAME 1060.00 000 SFWDTP SE 35.00000
RHSl STRAL PS E 108. 00 000 SLOADPSE 110.00000
RHS 1 SOIGGPSE 259. 00000 SHYDRAMf 1250.00000
RHSI SFWDT PS F 65.00000 STRALPSf 22. 00000
RHSl SlOADPS F 135.00000 ·$0 IGGP Sf 235.00000
INPUT LISTING
8.35
FACT ORY ST RI KE IN MARCH
RHSl SHYOR AMG 1450.00000 SFWDTPSG 35. 00000
RHS 1 STRAL PS G 4.00000 SLGADP SG 89.00000
RHS1 SDIGGPSG 208. 00000 SHYORAMH 1650.00000
RHS 1 SHJOT PSH 35. 00 000 STkAlP SH 99.00000
RHSI SlOAtJPSH 110. 00000 SDIGGPSH 201.00000
RHS 1 SHYOR AMI 1 BOO. 00 000 SFwDTPSI 55.00000
RHSI STRAl PS I 131.00 000 SLUADP SI 99.00000RHSI SOl GGPS I 181. 00000 SHYORAi~J 1950. 00000
RHSI SFWDTPSJ 44.00000 STRALP SJ 85.00000
RHSI SLOADPS J 74.00000 SDIGGPSJ 162.00000
RHS1 SHYURAMK 2190.000GO SFhDTP SK 38.000()O
RHSI STRAL PS K 50. 00 aGO SLOADP SK 68.00000
R HSI SDIGGPSK 127. 00 000 SHYDRAMl 2390.00000
RHSI SFWDTPSl 47. 00 000 SLOADP SL 85.00000
RHS1 SDI GGPS l 158. 00 000 SH YURM4~1 25 ~O. 00000
RHSI SFWOT PSM 51.00000 STRAlI) SM 120. 00000
RHSl SLOAOPSM 90.00000 SO IGGP 5t·1 220.00000
BOUNDS
FX BDUNOSSI PFwOT RI t 5.00000
FX BOUNOSSI PTRAL RI Z 67.00000FX BOUNDSSI flOADRII 154.00000
FX BOUNDSS1 POl GGRI l 100. 00 000
UP oOUNOSSl PfWDTRPA 50. 00 000
UP BOUNDSSI PTRAL RPA 188.00 000
UP BOUNDSSI PlOADRPA 124.00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 PDIGGRPA 251.00000
FX BOUNOSSI lJHTRT rNA 23.00000
FX BOUNDSSl DWELDGNA 106. 00000,·t.(· FX BOUNDSSI DASSL YNA 45.00 000
UP B OUNDSS 1 FHJl)T RP B 55.00 000
UP BOUNDSSI PTRAL RP 0 210.00000
UP BOUNDSSI PLDADRPB 136. 00 000UP B OUNDSS 1 PDIGGRPB 286.00 000
UP B OUNOSSl CHTRlTNB 30. 00 000
UP BOUNOSSI DViELO GNB 135.00 000
UP 8 OUNDSS 1 DASSL YNB 55.00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 FFwor RPC 50.00000
UP B OUNDSSI PTRAL RPC 188.00000
UP BOUNDSS 1 FLOADRPC 124. 00 000
UP B OUNDSSI PDIGGRPC 251.00000
UP B OUNl:JSS 1 OHI RI TNC 30.00 000
UP B OUNDSS 1 CrlELDGNC 135.00 000
UP B OUNDSSI CASSLYNC 55.00000
UP BOUNDSS1 PHIOT RPD 50.00000
UP BOUNDSSI PTRAL RP 0 188.00000
UP BOUNDSSl fLOAD RP 0 124. 00 000
UP BOUNDSS 1 POIGGRPD 251.00000
UP BDUNDSS 1 CHTRTTN D 30. CO000
UP B OUt'-lDSS 1 Ol-JELDGND 135.00 000
UP B OUNDSS1 CASSl YN 0 55.00000
FX BOUNOSS 1 PFWDT RP E •FX BOUNDSS 1 PTRAL RPE •FX B OUNDSSl PLOAORP E •FX BOUNOSSl PDIGGRPE •
INPUT LISTING
8.36
FACT DRY ST RI KE IN MARCH
UP BOUi'-JOSS 1 DHTRT TN E 30. 00000
UP BOUNDSSl (WELDGNE 135. 00 000UP BDU~~DSSl DASSL YNE 55. 00 000UP BOUNDSSl FFWDl RP F it 7.00 000
UP 8 OUNDSS 1 PTRALRPF 180. 00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 FLDAIJRP F 118.00000
UP BDUNDSSI POI GGRPf 249.00 000UP BOUNOSSl OHTRT TNF 30.00000
UP B DUNOSS 1 OWElD GNF 135. 00000
UP BOUNDSSl CASSL YNF 55.00000
UP BOUNOSS 1 PFWDT RP G 50.00000
UP BOUNDSS1 FTRAL RPG 108.00 000
UP BOUNOSS1 FlOAD RPG 124. 00 000
UP B OUNDSS 1 PDIGGRPG 251.00000
UP BOUNDSS 1 CHTRTTNG 30.00000
UP 8 OUNOSS 1 D~ELDGNG 135.00 000
UP B LJUNDSS 1 DASSLYNG 55. 00 000
UP B OUNDSSI FFWOT RPH 50.00000
UP B OUNDSSl PTRAL RPH lS8.0COOO
UP B OUNDSSI FLOAORPH 124.00000
UP BOUNOSS1 PDIGGRPH ·251.00000
UP B OUNOSSI OHTRTTNH 30.00000
UP BOUNDSS 1 OkEL.D GNH 135.00 000
UP BOUNDSS1 DASSL YNH 55.00 000
UP B OUNOSS 1 PFWOTRPI 37.00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 FTRALRPI 142. 00 000
UP BOUNDSSI FLOAD RP I 93. 00000
UP BOUNDSSI PUIGGRPI 195.00000.'-.{~:;
UP B OUNOSSI LHTRTTNI 30. 00000
UP B OUNOSS 1 CWELDGN I 13 5. 00 000
UP B OUNDSS 1 CASSLYNI 55. 00000
UP B OUNOSS 1 PFWOTRPJ 37.00000
UP BDUNDSSI PTRAL RP J 142. 00 000
UP B OUNDSS 1 PLOADRPJ 93.00000
UP BOUNDSS1 FDIGGRPJ 195.00000
UP BOUNDSSI DHTRTTNJ 30. 00000
UP B OUNOS S1 D>-wELDGNJ 135. 00 COO
UP B OUNDSS 1 DASSLYNJ 55.00 000
UP BOUNDSSI PFWDT RPK 60.00000
UP BOUNDSS 1 PTRAL RPK 225. 00 000
UP BOUNDSSI FLOAORPK 150.00000
UP BOUNDSSI PDIGG RPK 312. 00 000
UP B OUNDSSI DHTRTTNK 30. 00000
UP BOUNDSSI DrJELDGNK 135. 00 000
UP BOUNDSS1 CASSLYNK 55.00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 PFWDTRPl 50.00 000
UP B OUNDSS 1 PTRAL RPl rss , 00 000
UP s OUNOSS 1 PlOALJRPl 124. 00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 POI GGRPL 251.00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 OHTRTTNl 30. 00000
UP BOUNDSSI DwElDGNL 135.00 000
UP BOUNOSSI DASSLYNL 55.00000
UP B OUNDSS 1 PF~wr RPM 50. 00000
UP B OUNOSSl PTRALRPM 1.88. 00 000
8.37
INPUT LISTING
FACTOR Y SI RI KE IN MI~RC H
UP B OUNDSS 1 PLOAD RPM 124·.00000
UP BOUNDSSl FDI GG RPt·, 251. 00000
lO BOUNOSSl PFI~OrRII1 10.00 000
lO (3 OUNDSS 1 FTRAL RI M 80.00 aGO
LO BLlUNDSSl PLOAO RI 11 40.00000
LO B OUNDSS 1 FDl GG RI!',' 92. 00 000
UP 8 DUNDSS 1 DHTRTTNI"I 30.00 000
UP BOUNDS SI CWElDGNI"l 135.00000
UP BOUI\JDSSl OASSL YNf" 55.00000
ENDAT A
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The following pages contain a listing of the program which
accesses MPS/360 results and calculates and prints the one-page summary.
For details of the programming language, reference should be made to the
IBM manual for MPSRG .
.'-.(:.
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ANALYZE MDREPGRT
TIHE = 0.02
Ml
N N,OVT=N,OVTtXIDFFFFFFF*CIDffFFfFF
~11
t~2
El 1 HFFFFXf
ElIlFfFFFlf
~12
t-B
E2 IlHTRTTf
E2 1 HJELDGF
E2 llASSLYF
r N,OVT
N N,SUM=N,SUM+N,OVT
N N,OVT=E,O
tu
MS
N N,HLD=N,HLD+XIPFFFfRIF*CIPFfFFRlf
1~5
r..,6
E5 IlFWDTF
E5 IlTRALf
E5 llLOADf
E511DIGGF
E5 IlBUCKf
",-d N, HLD
'N N,SUM=N,$UM+N,HLO
N N,HLD=E,O
M6
HO
N N,HLD=N,HLD+XIPFFFFRIF*KIFFfFI
M8
M9
E8 IlFWDTF
E8 11 TRALF
E8 llLOAOF
E8 1101 GGF
E8 IlBUCK!=
I N, HLO/ E,1000
N N,SUM=N,SUM+N,HLO/E,lOOO
N N,HLD=E,O
M9
MA
N N2COSTF=N2CCSTF+XIPFFFFRPF*CIPffffRPF+XIPFFFfRIF*CIPFFFFRlf
MA
\.
MB
N NICOSTF=E,O
EA IlFWDTF & air
EA IlTRALF & 2H
EA IlL OA 0 F & 2 H
EA IlDIGGF & 2lf
REPORT PROGRAM LISTING
FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH
EA IIBUC KF & 21F
EO IlHTRTTF & 21F
EO llWELDGF & 21F
EO llASSLYF & 2IF
N N,HLO=NICOSTF/E,lOOO
N NICOSTF=F,I~T(N,HLOl
N N,TC05T=N,TCDSr+NICOSTF
MB
MC
N N2COSTF=N2CCSTF+XIOFFFFFFF*CIOFFFFFFF
~1C
MD
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
EC
MO
ME
N N2REVF=N2REVF+XIMFFFFRPF*CIMFFFFRPF
ME
t~F
IIFFFFFNF
11FFFFl="XF
IlFFFFFlF
IlFFFFFSF
IlFFFFFUF
IlffFfFDF
& 221=
<.'i 22F
& 22F
& 22F
& 22F
&. 22F
N Nl REVF =E t 0
Et: IlFWDTF &. 2IF
EE IlTRAlF & 21F
EE llLOADF & 21F
EE IlDIGGF & 2lF
'~':EE 11 BUCKF & 2lF
N N,HlO=NIREVF/E,lOOO
N NIREVF=F,lNT{N,HLD)
N N,TREV=N,TREV+NIREVF
MF
MG
I NI REVF +Nl C 05T F
MG
MH
I NI REVF
r'iH
MI
I NICOSTF
tH
MJ
N N,LOST=(TlSFFfFPSF-XlMFFFFRPFl*CIMFfFFRPF+N,LOST
MJ
MK
EJ IlFWDTF
EJ IlTRALF
EJ llLOADF
EJ 11DIGGF
EJ IlBUCKF
I-N.L05T
N N,SUM=N.SUM+N.LOST
N N,LOST=E.O
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MK
N N,TCOST=.E,O
EB I,A
EB 1,B
EB 1 ,C
EB 1,0
EB 1, E
EB ItF
EB 1,G
EBl,H
ES 1, I
EB 1, J
EB I,K
EB l,l
N N,TREV=E,Q
EF 1 ,A
EF 1 ,B
EF 1,C
EF 1,0
EF l,E
EF 1 ,F
EF l,G
EF 1,H
EF 1, I
EF I,J
EF 1 ,K
EF 1,l
IH REPOR r F,-,t
D
D
C
H
C
I
I
2H
C
I
I
o
C
3H
C
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
OR ''''.0.A,POLICY='FACTORY STRIKE IN MARCH'
A,FORECAST='24/05/71' & A,PERIOO:tFRCM NOV "71 TO OCT "72' & A,RU~=
'06/06/71'
MANAGEMENT FOlICY:***********************************
DATE OF .'SALES FORECAST:*******~A,POLICY
A,FORECAST
PlANNl NG PERIOD :******~****************
• CC MP L T ER R. UN :********A,PERIOD
A,RUN
K,OA=20&K.Oe=22&K,DC=20&K~DO=20&K,OE=24&K,OF=19&K,UG=2O&K,DH=20&K,Dl=
15 &K, DJ=lS &K, OK= 24&K, DL= 20&K, DH=23 9
DAYS ** ** ** ** ** **
**K,DA
K,DS
K, DC
K,DD
K,OE
K, OF
K,OG
K, OH
K,OI
K,OJ
** ** ** ** ***
K,DK
K,Dl
Kt Of.,
A,MA='NOV'&A,MB='OEC'&A,MC:'JAN'&A,MD='FEB'&AtME='MAR'&A,MF='APR'&A1M
G='MAY'&A,MH='JUN'&A,MI='JUl'&A,MJ='AUG'&A,MK='SEP'&A,ML;'OCTf
MONTH *** *** *** *** ****** *** *** *** XX TOTAL***A,MA
ArMB
At MC
At MD
A,ME
A, "1F
A,MG
At MH
A, Ml
At MJ
A, MK
A,Ml
------ ~_1 1 1 1 1 1 _
I I I L I L XXXXXXXXXXXX XXX
I I I I I I
XX XX
I I
f'OOO XX
I I
I
I
I
o
C
H
C
I
I
I
I
1
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
H
C
H
C
H
C
H
C I
H REVENUE
-".C I **** I...._ ....~EH I,A
EH 1,B
EH I,C
EH l,D
EH I,E
EH 1 ,F
EH l,G
EH 1 ,H
EH 1, I
EH 1, J
EH I,K
EH 1 ,l
r N, TREV
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***
*** XX
I I I
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
I II
H
C
H COST
r- I ****'\-El 1,A
El 1 ,6
El 1 ,C
El 1 ,0
El 1 ,E
El 1 ,F
El 1 .G
El 1,H
XX
**** ** .....* ******>iC*
xx
****XX
XX
**** IXX ********I **** ****I **** *****
****
XX
***. **** **** ****
**** **** I **** j **** XX
I
XX
**** I***** xx ****
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Ell tl
El 1,J
El 1, K
Ell, L
I N, TCDS T
HC I I
H CONTRIBUTION
CI*** I ***
EG 1 ,A
EG 1,B
EG 1,C
EG 1 ,0
EG 1 ,E
1 ,F
1 ,G
1 ,H
1 , I
1,J
1 ,K
1 ,L
N,TREV+N,TCCSr
xx XX
';'** I
**** xx ******
***
I ***I *** *** xx
I-------I-------~-------I--~----I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------l-------I-------I-------XX-----------xx
I I I I I I
I I J xx F xx
**** I **** I **** I **** **** I ******~* I **** I **** I **** xx *¥*** xx
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E3 1 ,D
E3 1 ,E
E3 1 ,F
E3 1 ,G
E3 ItH
E3 1 ,1
E3 1 ,J
E3 1 ,K
E3 1, L
I N, SUM
N N,SUM=E,O
H
e
H
C I
ML
N N,HlD=N,HLD+XlorfFFrSF*ClOFrFFFSF
ML
MM
EL IlHTRTT F
El IlHELDGF
EL llASSLYF
N N,SUM=N,SUM+N,HlD
I N,HLD
N N,HLO=E,O
MM
N N,HLO=E,Q
EM 1 ,A
:~':EM 1,B
E~1 1, C
E~1 1,0
EM 1 ,E
EM l,F
EM 1 ,G
EI'1 1 ,H
EI~1, I
Pt 1, J
HI 1,K
Ht 1,l
I N, SUM
N N, SU 1'1=E f 0
H
C
H F.~'.I. HLDG
C **** I ****N N,HlO=E,Q
E6 l,A
E6 1,B
E6 l,e
E6 1 to
E6 1, E
E6 1 ,F
E6 1 ,G
E6 l,H
I I XX
SUBCON PREMIUM I ***** I ***** I **•• * J *****
***** I ***** I ***** I ***** I **~** I ***** XX
**** ****I **** ****I ****
XX
**** ****
I **** XX
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XX
****~'< I ****~***** xx
Ixx
**** I ********* xx
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E6 1, I
E6 1,J
Eo 1 ,K
E6 1 .t,
I Nt $U,..l
N N,$UM=E,O
N N,HlD=E,Q
H I
C I I XX XX
H LOST SALES REV I ***** I ***** I ***** ***** ***** I *****
C ***** I ***** 1 ***** I ***** 1 ***** I ***** xx ****** xx
N N. LOST =E ,0
EK I ,A
EK 1,8
EK 1,C
EK l,D
EK I,E
EK 1 ,F
EK l,G
EK 1 ,H
EK 1, r
EK 1,J
EK l,K
EK 1 ,L
I-N,SUH
N N,SUM=E,OH ------ 1 1 1 1 1 1 _
C 1 I I I I I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
.~~ -----------------------------------~---------------------------------C ------------------------------------------------xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
H I I I I I I
C I I 1 xx xx
HACTIVITY SUMMARV J I
C I I I XX HR S'000 XX
H 1 I
C I J XX XX
H STANDARD HOURS **** **** **** **** **** I -****
C I **** 1 **** I **~* I **** I **** I **** xx ***** XX
D K,FWDTH=300.39&K,TRALrl=l36.13&K,LGADH=114.1B&K,DIGGH=226.44
o K,8UCKH=5l.S7
M4
N N2COSTf=N2CGSTF+XIPFFFFRPF*KIFfFFH
M4
M1
hi NICOSTF=E.O
E4 IlFWDTF & 2H
E4 llTRALF & 2lF
E4 llLOADF & 21F
E4 1 1 0 I GGF s 2 If
E4 11BUCKF & 2H
N N,HLD=NICOSTF/E, 1000
N NICOSTF=F.I~T(N,HLDJ
I NICOSfr
N N,5UM=N.SUM+NICOSTF
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117
N N,SUt~=E.O
E7 I,A
E7 ltB
E7 1 .c
E7 1 ,0
E7 1, E
E7 1 ,F
E7 1 ,G
E7 I ,H
E7 I, I
E7 I,J
E71,K
E7 1 ,L
I N, SUM
N NtSUM=E.O
H
C
H
C I
MN
N N,OVT=N,OVT+XIOFFFFFSF*KlfFFFfP*K2HRSAVNf
l'iN
MO
EN 11HTRTTf & 2lf
EN llWELOGF & 21f
EN 11ASSLYf & 2lF
N N,HLD=N,OVT/E,lOOO
'~i~ N,OVT=F, INT (N,HLO)
N N,HLD=NICOSTf-N,OVT
N N,$UM=N,SUM+N,HLD
IN, HL 0
N NtOVT=E,O
MO
o K,HTRTTP=2.07&K,WElDGP=2.20&K,ASSLYP=2.55
o K,HRSAVNA=160&K,HRSAVNB=176&K,HRSAVNC=lbOBK,hRSAVND=16O&K,HRSAVNE=192
Cl.K ,H RSAV r~f =152<~K, HRS AVNG=160 &K ,HRS AVNH=160 &K ,HRSAVNI =120 &K ,1-1 RSAV NJ=12
C O&K,HRSAVNK=191&K,HRSAVNl=l60
N N,5UM=E,O
N N,UVT=E,O
EO 1 ,A
EO l,S
EO 1 ,e
EO l,l)
EO 1,E
EO IfF
EO l,G
EO l,H
EO i ,I
EO 1,J
EO 1 ,K
EO 1 ,L
I N,SUM
N N,SUM=E,O
I
MADE 11\
**** I ****
xx IXX
**** i***** xx ****
I
****
****
I **** ********
**** ******** XX
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N N,DVT=E,O
N N,HLD=E,O
H
e
H
e I
~lP
EN IlHTRTTF & 21F
EN llWELDGF & 21F
EN 11ASSLYf & 21F
N N,HLD=N,OYT/E,lOOO
N N,OYT=F,INT(N,HLD)
I N, DVT
N N,SUM=N,SUM+N,DYT
N N,OVT=I:,O
MP
N N,OVT=E,O
N N,SUM=E,O
EP 1 ,A
EP ltB
EP l,e
EP 1., D
EP 1 ,E
EP 1 ,F
EP ltG
EP 1 ,H
EP 1 ,I
EP 1 ,J
·<:.,~P 1, K
EP l,l
I N,$UM
N N, SU"I=E,°
I I
SUBCUNTRACTEIJ
**** I **** I
H
C I I
MANPOWER (DIRECT)
**** I **** I
****
H
C I
I'1Q
N N,OVT=N,OVT+XlDFFFFfNF
HQ
MR
EQ IlHTRTTF
EO llWELDGF
EQ IlASSLYf
I N, DVT
N N,5UH=N,SUM+N,QVT
N N,QVT=E,O
MR
N N,QVT=E,O
ER I,A
ER i ,B
ER 1,C
ER 1,0
ER 1 ,E
ER l,F
**~*
********
xx
**** **** ******** I **** XX
I XX
**** I **** **** ****
I **** I **** I **** XX
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I
XX
**** I***** XX ****
I
XX
**** I***** xx ****
H
C I
MS
N N2COSTF=N2CCSTF+XIDFFFFFFF*K3HRSAVfF
MS
HT
ES 11 FFn:FXF & 22 F & 3 2XF
ES 11 f f r FF l F & 22 F & 3 21 f
MT
MU
N NICOSTF=E,O
ET IlHTRTTF & 2lF
ET llWELDGF & 21F
ET llASSLYF & 2IF
I Nl COST F
N N,SUM=N,SUM+NICOSTF .
MU
o K,HRSAVlA=9.6&K,HRSAVl8=10.6&K,HRSAVlC=9.6&K,HRSAVlD=9.6&K,HRSAVZE=11
~t .5&K,HRSAVlf=9.1&K,HRSAVZG=9.6&K,HisAVIH=9.b~K,HRSAVlI=7.2&K,HRSAVlJ=C 7.2&K,HRSAVlK=11.5&K,HkSAVIl=9.6
o K,HRSAVXA=28&K,HRSAVXB=31&K,hRSAVXC=2B&K,HRSAVXO=28&K,HRSAVXE=34&K,~R
C SA VX F=27 &K ,HRSAV XG=2 8&K, HRSAVX H:28&K, HRSAV Xl=21&K, Hr<.SA VXJ=21 &K ,HkS~\VXC K=33&K,HRSAVXl=28
N N,SUt1=E,O
EU 1 ,A
EU 1,8
EU 1,e
EU 1,0
EU 1,E
EU 1 ,F
EU l,G
EU 1,H
EU 1, I
EU 1,J
EU 1,K
EU 1 ,l
I N, SUN
N N,SUt-1=E,O
H
C
H
C I **.**
MV
N N,OVT=N,OVT+XIDFHFFNF*K2HRSAVNF
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ER I ,G
ER 1,H
ER i ,I
ER 1 ,J
ER I,K
ER I,l
I N,SUIVE,12
N N, SUf·1:E,0
H
C J I XX
OVERT It1E - HOURS I ***** I ***** I ***** ****~j(
***** I ***** I ***** I ***** , ***** I ***** XX ***********
I XX
- PERCENT **.** I **.** **.** I **.****.** I **.** I **.** I **.** I **.** XX **.****.**
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I
xx
I *****XX
I
XX
I **.**XX
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MV
~lX
EV IIHTRTTF & 2lF
EV llWELDGf & ZlF
EV llASSlYF & ZlF
N N,HLD=(NiCCSTF/N,QVT)*E,lOO
I N,HLD
N N,SUM=N,SUM+N,HLD
N N,OVT=E,O
I'1X
N N,SUM=E,O
EX 1 ,A
EX l,B
EX 1 .c
EX 1 ,0
EX 1 ,E
EX l,F
EX L,G
EX 1,H
EX i ,I
EX 1 ,J
EX 1 ,K
EX l,L
I N, SUM/ E.12
N N,SUM=E,O
N N,OVT=E,O
N N,HLD=E,O
H 1 1 J 1 1 1 _
·~c 1 I I I I __~ I xxxxxxXXXXXXXXX
2H ---------------------------------------------------------------------c -- ---------------- ------------ ------------------ XXXXXX xxxxxx XXX
HSALESSUM~iARY-% I j I I I 1
C I I I XX % XX
Hl
I N,OVT=(XIMFFFFRPF*CIMFFFFRPF)/(N2kEVF*E,lO)
N N,SUM=N,SUM+N,UVT
~Il
1>12
• H 2FFFFFF I **.** I **.** I **.** I **.** I **.** I **.**
C I **.** I **.** **.** 1 **.** I **.** I **.** xx **.** XX
El IlHfFA & 2,A
El IlFFFFB & 2,B
El IHFFFC & 2,C
El lLFFFFD & 2,0
El IlFFFFE & 2,E
El 1 HFFFF & 2,F
El llFFFFG do 2,G
El IlFFF FH & 2,H
El IlFFFFl & 2,1
El llFFFFJ & 2,J
El IlFFFFK & 2,K
El llFFFFl & 2,L
I N,SUI4/E,12
N N,SUt-I=E,O
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~\2
E2 1,FWUT & 2,FWDT
E2 l,TRAL & 2,DRILL
E2 1,LOAD & 2,LOADER
E2 1,DIGG & 2,DIGGER
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 _
C 1 I I I I l XXXXXXxxxxxxxxx
NO ERRORS - ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF ~YTES REQUIRED ON REPORT AND SCRATCH
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